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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the relation between investors' trading horizon and
stock prices. The first chapter explores the theoretical relation between the horizon of traders
and the negative externality generated by their activity on the information revealed by stock
prices. The last two chapters focus on the empirical relation between institutional investors
trading frequency and stock prices behaviour.
The first chapter examines how short term trading impacts the aggregation of information
in financial markets. I develop a model where short-term traders, in an attempt to learn about
the average beliefs of future market participants, make the price relatively more noisy. This
typically introduces a negative informational externality on long-term investors. I show that
(i) as the horizon of the informed traders decreases, the price becomes relatively less precise;
(ii) an inflow of informed traders in the market can decrease the informativeness of the price
when the traders have a relatively short horizon or the market is expected to be thin in the
future; (iii) finally, as rational informed short-term traders have access to an extra source of
information about the future price, they end up creating more noise and a decrease in the
informativeness of the price might result. Thus, paradoxically, more informed trading could
lead to a less informative price.
Among scholars, practitioners and policy makers, investor short-termism and high frequency
trading have been associated with excess volatility in financial markets and with a disconnect
between asset prices and fundamentals. Motivated by this observation, in Chapter 2 I construct
a novel measure of the intrinsic frequency of trading for each of the large US institutional
investors (13-F institutions) using Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings quarterly data for
the period 1980-2005. This measure controls for the market and portfolio characteristics and
identifies an investor-specific fixed effect in the frequency of trading. I then study how the
composition of these fixed effects impacts stock price behavior through their forecasting role in
explaining the return and the return on equity (cash flow of a company) in the short run as
well as the long run. I show that (i) the securities in which investors exhibit higher intrinsic
trading frequency exhibit higher volatility, but (ii) this volatility is mainly driven by the cash-
flow component of the security prices. Further, (iii) the prices of the securities held by investors
with a higher intrinsic trading frequency do not forecast the long-run return as opposed to the
securities held by investors with a lower intrinsic trading frequency. As such, the prices mainly
respond to the long-run return on equity. Overall, the results challenge the view that higher
frequency of trading-a commonly used proxy for investor short-termnism-causes a disconnect
between asset prices and fundamentals.
Finally, in Chapter 3 (co-auhtored with Fernando Duarte) we show a novel relation be-
tween the institutional investors' intrinsic trading frequency-a commonly used proxy for the
investors's investment horizon- and the cross-section of stock returns. We show that the 20$
of stocks with the lowest trading frequency earn mean returns that are 6 percentage points per
year higher than the 20% of stocks that have the highest trading frequency. The magnitude and
predictability of these returns persist or even increase when risk-adjusted by common indicators
of systematic risks such as the Fama-French, liquidity or momentum factors. Our results show
that the characteristics of stockholders affect expected returns of the very securities they hold,
supporting the view that heterogeneity among investors is an important dimension of asset
prices.
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Title: Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Guido Lorenzoni
Title: Associate Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Short-Term Traders, Learning and
Informational Externalities
1.1 Introduction
Financial markets are populated by traders with different horizons that meet at a given time.
Some traders have short horizons. They enter and exit the market within a day or a week.
Other traders have a longer horizon. Typically, they buy an asset from a firm and hold on to
the asset for much longer periods. Hence, long term traders are likely to care relatively more
about the underlying fundamental value of the stock they invest in than about predicting short-
term movements. In contrast, short term traders who decide to buy a risky asset today to sell it
tomorrow, will care about forecasting the price in the market tomorrow. Nevertheless, the price
tomorrow will depend on the forecast of the price the day after tomorrow, and so on. Using
backward induction, short term traders should also care about forecasting the fundamental
value of the asset they will buy.
In a world with symmetric information, by applying the law of iterated expectations, today's
forecast of tomorrow's forecast of the day after tomorrow's price is given by today's forecast
of the day after tomorrow's price. Generalizing, the intertemporal higher order forecast boils
down to today's forecast. Hence, even though a trader cares about the future price, ultimately
the only object of interest reduces to the fundamental. Short-term traders' forecast of the price
at which they will sell the asset comes down to the forecast of the fundamental value just as
with long term traders.
On the other hand, in the presence of asymmetric information, traders with different hori-
zons often behave differently and try to predict very different objects. In particular, short
term traders seem to gather and use different information than long term traders who mainly
use information about the underlying value of the company. In an economy with asymmetric
information, traders' inference of the price at which they will sell the asset differs from their
inference of the fundamental value.1 Rational short term traders will want to learn about the
average forecast of future traders in order to forecast the future price. Typically, this will give
an important role to the horizon of traders in financial markets.
In this paper, I study the incidence of the horizon of traders on the informational efficiency
of financial markets. One of the major roles of financial markets appears to be the allocation
of scarce resources from investors to firms with production-investment decisions. The informa-
tion revealed by the price appears to be crucial in the optimality of the allocation decision of
investors. In a world with uncertainty and idiosyncratic information, the price can be seen as a
vehicle, which aggregates and reveals this dispersed information to market participants. In par-
ticular, uninformed long term investors might want to use the information revealed by the price
to allocate their resources to the best investment opportunity.2 The negative externality that
short-term traders generate on the informational efficiency of financial markets, has often been
at the center of the policy debate on the role of short-termism (e.g. Bombay Stock Exchange
market regulations: Abolition of the Badla facility (1993)). This has been particularly strik-
ing in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Understanding the related mechanism behind this
friction and its respective positive implications is a necessary step for the underlying debate.
'DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann (1990b) first introduced the mechanism, where short-term ratio-
nal traders try to forecast the beliefs of future irrational traders reflected in the price at which they sell the asset.
More recently, Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) exploits the same idea by highlighting how the failure of the law
of iterated expectations in the presence of asymmetric information leaves a special role to higher order beliefs as
traders try to forecast the future price. Alternative mechanisms have been highlighted that give a role for the
horizon in financial markets, e.g. DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann (1990a).
2 Another channel through which the informativeness of the price will matter, is the information it conveys
to managers about the value of the investment they want to undertake. Informed investors in financial markets
might gather a lot of important information about the value of an investment and not convey it directly to
managers for strategic reasons. Hence, the price of the asset of their own firm can be a good signal of the value
of the investment.
In this paper, I look at a market constituted by some traders who care only about the
fundamental of the underlying firm, i.e. long term investors, and by other traders who care
only about the future price, i.e. short term traders. I consider the horizon of the traders as
an exogenous characteristic. Rational, short term, and risk neutral informed traders generate
a negative externality on uninformed long term investors because their behavior will make the
price less informative. This externality is precisely due to the informational friction created
by short term traders, as they are trying to forecast the average forecast of future market
participants. The central mechanism lies in the informational friction created by shorter horizon
traders. This friction precisely results from the fact that in the process of forecasting the
price in the future, short term traders may want to learn about the average beliefs of the
market in which they'll be selling their assets. Such information about average beliefs will not
necessarily be perfectly correlated with the information about the fundamental and hence, a
negative informational externality on non-informed traders might result. First, I show that as
the horizon of the traders decreases, the price becomes less informative. The shorter the horizon
of the trader, the more he cares about near-term price movements, which are determined in
the future market. Forecasting the future market price makes the traders use their information
in such a way that the price ends up less accurate about the fundamental. Secondly, I show
that an inflow of informed traders can be associated with a decrease in the quality of the
information revealed by the price. A market characterized by very short term traders and/or a
very thin market in the future, is more likely to experience a negative effect following an inflow
of informed traders.
Third, I take a closer look at the inference problem of short term traders. I extend the
model and explicitly allow the informed short term traders to have access to an information
technology, which is informative only about the average beliefs of the market participants in
the future. This signal is independent of the fundamental of the underlying asset.3 One could
look at this new signal as investor sentiments. Rational short term traders might want to use
the beliefs signal as it will give them valuable information about the average beliefs of future
market participants and ultimately future prices. This signal is closely related to a recent paper
3 This embodies the idea that traders in financial markets are interested in forecasting the forecast of other
market participants. Ultimately, this will translate in them using the beliefs signal which is not related to the
fundamental value of the asset.
by Angeletos and La'o (2011) where they assess the role played by sentiments and psychology in
real business cycles in a world with rational agents. The value of introducing the beliefs signal is
that it allows me to study a change in the structure of traders' beliefs about the average beliefs
of future traders, independently of a change in their first order beliefs about the fundamental. I
show that, in equilibrium, the use of this signal can lead to a negative informational externality
such that the price will end up being less informative. Relatedly, increasing the precision about
future agents' beliefs is not associated with an increase in the precision of first order beliefs
about the fundamental. Conditional on short-term traders using the beliefs signal, an increase
in its precision may end up creating a negative informational externality on long term investors.
Related literature. This paper builds on and relates to various existing literature. It
builds on the literature that formalizes Keynes' higher order beliefs in asset pricing models
in understanding financial marketsO inefficiencies. 4 On one hand, Harrison and Kreps (1978)
introduce a heterogeneous beliefs based asset pricing models with short sales constraints (as
a source of limit to arbitrage), where the stock price is generally higher than its fundamental
value.5 The difference is given by an option value to resell the asset to future investors with a
higher valuation. Higher order beliefs matter through the option value, as it depends on the
opinions of other investors. On the other hand, in DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann
(1990b), short-term rational traders generates excess movements in the prices as they try to
forecast the beliefs of future irrational traders, i.e. positive-feedback traders extrapolating past
price trends, reflected in the price at which they will sell the asset. This paper uses this channel
- trading based on forecasting the behavior of others - in understanding the effect of traders'
horizon for stock prices informativeness. However, the focus is on rational investors forecasting
rational investors.
As such, this paper builds on the more recent literature that analyzes the higher order
expectations in noisy rational expectation asset pricing models, where traders have a common
prior, but different information over the fundamentals of the asset; Allen, Morris and Shin
4Keynes compares investors to beauty-contest judges who vote based on what they believe other judges
believe... .about contestants' beauty (higher order beliefs) instead on their opinion about contestants' absolute
beauty.
"An example of heterogenous beliefs is given by adding overconfident agents as in Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003). See also Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993), Biais and Boessarts (1998), Zhou (1998) and Banerjee,
Kaniel and Kremer (2009) for more articles related to this strand of the literature.
(2006), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2008), Cespa and Vives (2009), Grisse (2009).6 In par-
ticular, Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) show that in the presence of dispersed information and
short-lived traders, higher order expectations have a specific role to play, leading traders to
overweight the public signals relative to their private signals as the public signals have an ex-
tra commonality dimension. The main channel comes from the failure of the law of iterated
expectations for average expectations in the presence of asymmetric information. First order
expectations differ from higher order expectation and the price deviates systematically from
the average expectations of the fundamental value of the asset. By considering a simplified
framework, I highlight novel positive implications and bring more insights on the role of the
horizon of the traders on the behavior of the traders in the presence of asymmetric information
as well as the frictions it generates.
A number of articles have stressed the role of short-term speculation in generating ineffi-
ciencies in financial markets; Tirole (1982), DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann (1990a),
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996), Kondor (2009), Cespa and Vives (2011) among others. 7 Ti-
role (1982) calls attention to the role of myopic traders in asset market bubbles as they break
down the backward induction argument. DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann (1990a)
provides an alternative to the higher order beliefs channel for the horizon to be associated to
a disconnect between the stock price and its fundamental value. The short-investment horizon
limits risk-averse speculators' capacity to arbitrage the mispricing generated by noisy traders
due to the unpredictability of the noise traders mispricing, which introduces a systematic risk
in the short-run. 8
6 The noisy rational expectation equilibrium models have been introduced in Grossman (1976), Hellwig (1980),
and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Admati (1985). Even though mentioned in He and Wang (1995) or Foster
and Viswanathan (1996), the role of higher order beliefs had not been examined in this class of models until
recently with Allen, Morris and Shin (2006), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2008).
7 Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) find that in an economy with long run and short run information, if
investors are sufficiently risk-averse, they focus on the short run information. Kondor (2009) show that public
announcements can feed the disagreement among short-term Bayesian traders and hence, increase the trading
volume in equilibrium. By introducing heterogeneity across traders in terms of their trading frequency, Cespa and
Vives (2011) connect asset illiquidity and over-reliance on public information through higher order expectations
(HOE) about the fundamentals and the liquidity trades. They find that if asset prices are dominated by HOE's
about fundamentals (liquidity trades), they over(under)-rely on public information, the market is illiquid (liquid)
and the volume of informational trading is low (high).
8 Due to their short horizon, arbitrageurs buying an asset with a price lower than its fundamental, would have
to resell it in the near future and bear the risk that the mispricing increases. This risk, which they assume to be
systematic, limits the aggressiveness of arbitrageurs
By relying on the presence of short-lived traders to highlight their source of inefficiency (e.g.
higher order beliefs, noise traders), these studies bring to light an implicit difference between
short and long horizon agents. Nevertheless, they don't directly address the horizon of traders
in generating these inefficiencies. I explore explicitly the role of the horizon on the deviation
of the price from its fundamentals by modeling the horizon as the probability of trading in the
market in the next period.9 To that extent, this paper is related to Froot, Scharfstein and Stein
(1992), Dow and Gorton (1994), Vives (1995). In particular, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992)
show how short-termism induces complementarities in the acquisition of information. Short-
term investors have an incentive to collect/pay attention to the same (or correlated) pieces
of information about the fundamentals, because this helps them speculate on short-run price
movements. These positive information spillovers reduce the informational efficiency of prices
and increase the level of "noise". On the other hand, in the present paper the horizon introduces
intergenerational complementarities between traders today and tomorrow. As a consequence,
short-term traders want to put more weight on information future traders will be using even
though no other same period traders are using this information. This behavior decreases the
information aggregated by the price.
This paper also connects to the behavioral finance literature; see Barberis, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), and
Barberis and Thaler (2003) among others.1 0 . The behavioral finance literature offers explana-
tions for the financial market anomalies using under-reaction, over-reaction phenomenon. The
disconnect is generated in a model where rational short-term agents are over-reacting to their
public signal or their beliefs signal, in an attempt to forecast the forecasts of other rational
agents. I exploit the use of information as opposed to noisy or irrational traders as the central
mechanism. The assumption of risk neutral agents precisely allows me to focus on the use of in-
formation to forecast the forecasts of future traders by ignoring any risk aversion consideration.
9 Later, I show how this probability can be micro-founded by the cost of portfolio re-balancing that an investor
is facing.
'
0 Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) use a learning model where the earnings follow a random walk. However,
as individuals believe they either follow a steady growth trend or are mean-reverting, it generates over and under-
reaction. Identically, in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) investors under-react to public news as
they are characterized by overconfidence and attribution bias. Finally, Hong and Stein (1999) use a model of
gradual information diffusion where the heterogeneity among investors positively correlates with momentum.
Barberis and Thaler (2003) provide a summary of the literature
As such, the approach in this paper is complementary as it provides similar phenomenon (e.g.
overreaction, excess volatility, prices disconnected from the fundamental) without behavioral
traders (expect for the noisy supply). 1'
Finally, this paper is connected to the recent empirical literature on the relation between
the trading frequency of institutional investors and its interaction with stock price behavior
motivated by the effect of the investment horizon of institutional investors; Ke, Ramalingegowda
and Yu (2006), Jin and Kogan (2007), Khan, Kogan and Serafeim (2010), Parsa (2010), Duarte
and Parsa (2011), Yan and Zhang (2009). By parameterizing the horizon of the investors, this
paper highlights a positive relation between the horizon and stock price behavior, which can be
linked back to the previous literature. In particular, the horizon is modeled as the probability of
trading in the market in the next period. It is shown that this probability can be micro-founded
by the cost of portfolio re-balancing that an investor is facing. As such, there is a tight link
between the notion of horizon used in this paper and the investment horizon as well as the
trading frequency.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 defines a measure for the informativeness
of the market, presents and illustrates the main comparative statics. Section 5 introduces the
beliefs signal, characterizes the new equilibrium and shows the comparatives statics on the effect
of the precision of the beliefs signal on the informativeness of the price. Section 6 discusses an
alternative interpretation for the horizon of the traders. Finally, section 7 concludes. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
1.2 Model
In this section, I describe in details the general model that I am going to use to study the role
of short-term trading on the informational efficiency of the market.
'As will be discussed later, in the class of noisy rational expectation models, the limit to arbitrage alongside
the noisy supply's main purpose is the existence of an equilibrium by allowing the information to remain dispersed
and the price to not be fully revealing. The limit to arbitrage is provided through a cost of investing in the
risky asset, given the risk neutrality assumption. The inefficiency is derived from higher order beliefs and the use
of information and does not directly depend on the noisy supply. This is in contrast to the behavioral finance
framework discussed above.
Timing, Actions and Information
There are 3 periods in the economy indexed by t = 1, 2, 3. There are two assets. A safe asset
yielding a risk-free rate of zero as it is taken to be the numeraire and its price remains at 1. A
risky asset with a liquidation value of 0 unknown to the traders until t = 3.
At t = 1, two groups of agents of measure-one and measure-A1 continuum enter the market,
denoted L and S1 respectively. A trader in the Si group enters the market at t = 1 and decides
how much to trade in the risky asset at the price p1. When making the decision to trade in the
risky asset, the trader faces uncertainty about being hit by a "liquidity shock" at t = 2 with
probability (1 - r) E [0, 1] which will force him to sell the asset at P2. A "liquidity shock" is
identical to a preference shock which will make traders want to consume at t = 2. If the trader
is not hit by the liquidity shock which will occur with probability r, he will hold on to the asset
and receive the liquidation value 0 at t = 3. One can think of r as the horizon of the trader.12
For r = 0, traders are short-termist and they decide the amount they are going to invest in the
risky asset given they will consume at t = 2. As a consequence, traders care about their capital
gain, p2. For r = 1, traders are long-termist and invest in the asset given they will receive the
fundamental value 0. For r E (0, 1), an increase in r makes traders less sensitive to P2 and more
sensitive to 0 as it becomes less likely to be hit by the liquidity shock. One can summarize the
ex ante return of the Si group trader at t = 1:
R, = rO + (1 - r)p2, Vi E S1
The L group enters the market at t = 1. An agent in the L group is defined as an investor,
i.e. he is purely long-termist. He needs to decide how much to invest in the risky asset at the
price p1 given he will receive 0 at t = 3. His return is given by:
R4=9, Vi c L
1 2In the last section, I will provide an alternative interpretation for r. I will associate r with the cost an agent
is facing of rebalancing its portfolio. This cost can be defined by real costs such as taxes, administrative costs as
well as subjective costs related to preferences.
At t = 2, the traders hit by the liquidity shock will sell their position to a new group of traders
denoted S2 of measure-A2 continuum that enters the market. A trader in the S2 group decides
how much to invest in the risky asset at P2 given he will receive the liquidation value 0. Trader's
return at t = 2 is given by:
Ri = 0, Vi E S2
At t = 3, all the remaining market participants receive and observe the liquidation value, 0.
The supply of the assets is noisy at t = 1, 2, Kt = Ut; 13 is uncertain and not observed
where ut ~ N (0, o-,) is serially uncorrelated and independent of 0.
At the time of making their decision, each group of agents respectively has access to an
information set constituted of private and public signals. At t = 1, each trader in the Si group
and each investor in the L group is using respectively the following information set
Ii = {xiI, z1, pI1 }, Vi E S1 (1.1)
Ii, = {zi,p1}, Vi E L (1.2)
where xii = 0 + ei, ei, ~ N (0, a-') iid ; zi = 0 + El, Ei ~ N (0, a-i); and they use the
information provided by the price p1.
At t = 2, each trader in the S2 group is using the following signals
I2 = {Xi2, Z1, Z2, P1, P2} , Vi E S2 (1.3)
where z2 = 0 + C2, E2 ~ N (0, a-); Xi2 = 0 + ei2, Ei2 ~ N (0, a-) iid; and they use the
information in the history of prices P1,P2.
As we can notice, the traders in the S1 group have access to additional idiosyncratic in-
formation, the L group does not have. The price will appear typically as a vehicle that will
aggregate the idiosyncratic information and reveal it to the market. One can interpret the
13 The assumption of noisy supply is often made in rational expectations models for existence reasons in order
to prevent the price from fully revealing the fundamental. Noisy supply can be seen as a simplifying device which
captures alternative source of uncertainty which affects the price but not the fundamental. Noisy supply can be
the result of noisy traders or liquidity traders who would trade for reasons exogenous to the model and have a
noisy demand.
information structure as follow. The economy at t = 1 is composed of two groups of agents.
The first group invested in information gathering and built an additional private signal. The
second group is long-termist and has access to no additional signal.
Payoffs
All market participants are risk neutral. Let's define kit by the individual demand of agent
i at time t. There is an additional cost associated to investing in the risky asset which is given
k2
by -y2Lt where y E R+. The cost can be seen as a borrowing cost or a participation cost which is2
a function of the amount each agent is investing in the risky asset. The payoffs of the different
groups can be summarized as follows.
At t = 1 : The trader payoff is given by
E((1 - r)p2 + rO - piIii)k - -yk 2 /2, Vi E S1
The investor payoff is given by
E(G - pilIi)k - yk 2/2, Vi E L
At t = 2 : The payoff of the trader is given by
E(9 -p2Ii2)k - yk2/2, Vi E S2
The bigger 7, the higher the cost of investing and the smaller the demand for risky asset. For
y 0, the demand for the risky asset is infinitely elastic. Throughout the paper, I am going to
consider cases where y > 0. This assumption must hold for obvious existence reasons. The cost
of investing in the risky asset alongside the noisy supply is necessary for the price to not be fully
revealing and consequently the equilibrium to exist as the price will be a function of the noise
and the fundamental. From an intuitive point of view, one can interpret the cost of investing
in the risky asset as an obstacle to arbitrage tightly linked to the limits of arbitrage literature.
The limit of arbitrage is often an important channel for the existence of inefficiencies in financial
markets to be formalized. It is an essential component in behavioral finance, absence of which
rational arbitrageur would eliminate irrational agents mispricing. In the absence of costs, the
demand of rational traders fully absorbs the noisy supply. As soon as they expect the price
to be lower than the expected future payoffs of their investment, they take a negative position
up to the point where the supposed mispricing disappears. On the other hand, if the price is
higher, they buy as long as the mispricing exists and completely absorb it. If the investors are
facing a cost of investing in the risky asset, which limits their ability to buy the risky asset, then
they can not fully absorb any mispricing they estimate. Similar to the behavioral literature, in
the absence of the limit to arbitrage, noise traders won't matter in the equilibrium stock prices.
Nevertheless, in the class of noisy rational expectation models, the limit to arbitrage alongside
the noisy supply's main purpose is the existence of an equilibrium by allowing the information
to remain dispersed. The inefficiency I emphasize in this paper is derived from higher order
beliefs and the use of information. It does not directly depend on the noisy supply. This is in
contrast to the behavioral finance framework discussed above.
Finally, notice that the cost of investing in the risky asset is in slight contrast to usual limit
of arbitrage used. The noisy rational expectations literature often uses risk aversion. More
generally, risks, agency issues or market frictions (short-selling costs) are used as potential limit
to arbitrage; DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann (1990a), Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). One could interpret the risk neutral agents with cost of investing
in the risky asset as institutional investors facing regulations in terms of their holding of risky
assets rather than individual investors who could suffer more from risk aversion.
1.3 Equilibrium
In this section, I am going to define and characterize the equilibrium.
1.3.1 Definition
At t = 1, 2 individual asset demands are a function of the realizations of their respective signals
and the price, Vi C S1 , kil : R3 - R ; Vi e L, kil : R2 _+ R and Vi E S2 , ki2 R5 -+ R given by
ks, (xii, zi,p1); kL (zi,pi) and ks2 (Xi2 , z 1 , z 2 , P1, P2). Their corresponding aggregates are then
functions of (0, zi, p1) ; (zi, pi) and (0, z1 , z2, P1, P2) respectively. They are denoted Ksj; KL
and Ks 2 . Formally, the equilibrium is defined as :
Definition 1 An (symmetric) equilibrium is a price function for t = 1, 2, P1 (9, z1 , ul) and
P2 (9, z 1 , Z2, Pi, U1, U2) and individual investment strategies for t = 1, 2, ksi (xii, zi, pi) ; kL (zi, pl)
and ks 2 (i2, Z, z2, pi, p2) as well as their corresponding aggregates KS, (9, zi, pi) ; KL (zi, pl)
and Ks 2 (9, z1 , z2 , pi, P2) such that:
ks, (xii, zi, pi)
kL (zi, pi)
Ks, (9, zi, pi)
KL (z1, p1)
A1Ksi (9, zi, p1) + KL (zi, pi)
ks 2 (Xi2, zi, z2, pi, p2)
KS 2 (9, z1 , z2, pi, p2)
A2 KS 2 (0, Zi, Z2, pi, p2)
E argmaxE [(1 -r)p 2 +r- pilzi,pi]k--y -(1.4)kER 2
E argmaxE[-pizi,p1]k--y--
kER 2
= E[ks1 (xi,zi,p)|6, zi,p1]
= kL (z1, p)
= Kis(ul)
kER 2
Eargmax E[ - p2 |xi2, zi,z2, pi,p2] k -y
= E [ks2 (Xi 2 , Zi, z2, Pi, p2) 10, z, z2, pi, p2]
= KS
The first set of conditions defines a rational expectations competitive equilibrium for the first
period. The second set of conditions defines a rational expectations competitive equilibrium
for the second period. The individual demands embody that each agent uses all available
information including the one he infers from both the past and present price realization. For
tractability reason, I am going to focus on linear rational expectation equilibrium where the
price is a linear function.14
Definition 2 A linear equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the prices, P1 (,z1, ul) and
P2 (9, zi, z2, P1, U1 , U2) are linear in (9, z1, ui) and (0, z 1, Z2, P1, U1 , U2) :
(1-6)P1 = #30 + fzi zi + f3uUi
4 This restriction is common in the literature in a Gaussian information structure given the sum of jointly
normally distributed variables remains normal.
(1.5)
and
P2 = #3*0 +i3*zi + #* z 2 + 3 *p1 +#*3 (ui (1 - r) Ai + U2) (1.7)
1.3.2 Intertemporal two-ways feedback
In this section, I am going to shed more light on the intertemporal relation between the equi-
librium at t = 1 and the equilibrium at t = 2. In particular, I show how the price at t = 1 and
t = 2 are going to be jointly determined in equilibrium. For that purpose, the first step consists
in deducing the information structure of the price at t = 1, 2.
Endogenous Information
In any linear equilibrium as defined above, observing pi and P2 is informationally equivalent
to observing the following two Gaussian sufficient statistics
P1 =0 +-Ui (1.8)
and
P2 = 0 + -? (ul (1 - r) Al + U 2) (1.9)
1 1
where 1 =- (P1 - #3, zi); #2 = (P2 - #*,P1 - #*,zi - 3* z2) and their precision is
given respectively by ap , = 22 ; = 0
u1u #*2,2 (1 + (1 - r)2 )
One can notice that the precision of the two endogenous signals is an increasing function
of the sensitivity of the price to the fundamentals, i.e. #0 and #3. 30 and 3 are associated
respectively with the equilibrium average use of the private signal by the traders at t = 1
and t = 2. It embodies the informational externality the traders have on the investors. In
particular, as short term traders rely more on their private signal to infer their return, they
make the information revealed by the price to investors and future market participants more
accurate, i.e. #0 increases. In addition to #0 and #*, ap1 and as are, ceteris paribus, a
decreasing function of the volatility in the supply noise (of) and a decreasing function of #u,
3*. The more the price will respond to their respective supply noise, the less informative about
0 it will be. In particular, p2 depends on the supply noise at t = 1, i.e. u1 . This results from
the presence of the short term traders who import the supply noise of the first period in the
second period. The more short termist is the market, (r, A), the more noisy will be the price
at t = 2.
Backward feedback
As long as r E [0, 1), there exists an intergenerational feedback from the market at t = 2 to
the market at t = 1. This comes from the fact that short term traders will sell their position
at t = 2 with probability (1 - r) and care about their capital gains. At t = 1, traders make
their decision on the basis of their forecast of P2 which depends on the average beliefs of future
market participants about the fundamental 0. Formally, short term traders' return is given by
R = rO + (1 - r) P2, where for any given P2 satisfying condition 1.7, the individual demand for
the traders and the investors at t = 1 satisfy the following optimality conditions:
E (RIzii, zi, pi) - pi
and
kL(ZlPl)=E (O|zi,pi) - pi
Aggregating the individual demands and applying the market clearing condition, pi is going
to be an increasing function of traders' average forecast of p2. Denote s1 (.) =f E (.Ixii, zi, pi) di
and EL (.) =f E (.Izi, pi) di the average forecast of traders and investors respectively for a
measure-one continuum in each group.
Lemma 3 In any linear equilibrium, p1 satisfies the following condition:
A15si (rO + (1 - r)P2 (0, zi, z2, pu, U2)) + E () 7 Ui (1.10)
P1 1+A I 1+Al 1+A1
Proof. The aggregate demand is given by
K1 (9, z1,Pf) L 1 (E (RIrii, zi, pi) - pi) di + fo4 (E (0|zi, pi) - pi) diK1 (6 zipi)
Using the notation above and applying the market clearing condition,
AiEs1 (rO + (1 - r) p2 (0, zi, z2, P1, l, U2 )) + ERL (9) - (Ai + 1) pi
The previous lemma states that pi is given by a weighted average of the average forecast of
the traders and the investors as well as the supply noise. The main point to notice is that pi
is an increasing function of traders's average forecast of P2 at t = 1. The higher is the traders'
average forecast of the future price, P2, the higher is going to be their aggregate demand and
the equilibrium price p1. An increase in the horizon of the traders (r) or an inflow of traders
(A1 ) makes pi more sensitive to P2 as on average market participants are likely to care more
about the price.
Using condition 1.7, P2 is a linear function of the fundamental 9 and the public signals used
by future traders as well as the noise supply in the market at t = 2.
P2 = 36 +* Ozi +#* z2 +#* 1p +#*, (ui (1 - r) A1 + u2)
The sensitivity of the price, P2, on (0, z1, P1, Z2, i1, U2) is defined by future market partic-
ipants' average forecast of the fundamental. As traders at t = 2, rely relatively more on a
certain signal to infer 9, the price will end up being relatively more sensitive to the given signal.
Substituting P2 in R, the return of the short term traders can be written as a linear combination
of (9, z 1, Pi Z2, u 1, U2 ) -
R=(r + (1 - r)# *) 0 + (1 - r) (#8*lzi + #* Z2 +#6*lP2 + #* (ui (1 - r) Ai + U2))
The main point to highlight is that short term traders' forecast of R differs from their
forecast of 9 and requires a different use of their information set than if they had to infer
only 9. Precisely, the difference depends endogenously on the average forecast of future traders.
Let o r + (1 - r) #* +#8* -(1 - r)A1*3 ;nz) (1-r) * - (1 -r)Ai#* ;
~p1 (1- pi (1- r) X1 , this point is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 4 In any linear equilibrium, for any given #'s defined by conditions 1.6-1.7, the average
forecast of the return of the informed traders at t = 1 is given by:
Esi (R) = roEs1 (0) + zi zi + Kpipi (-11)
where let 7 = " i E Is, = {x, zip1, Es1 (01,1) = g6s1 + 6szi + 6511.
EiEls1i 
1 Z1 P
Proof. It follows from taking traders average conditional expectation of R = rO + (1 - r) P2
after substituting P2 by condition 1.7:
Es 1 (R) = (r + (1 - r) #3*) Es (0)+(1 - r)2 Aip*Es, (u1)+(1- - r) z (#*zi + /* p1)
pi - (00 + 3z, zi)
where (i) Es, (z2) = E5s (0), given Es, (E2) = 0 and (ii) Es, (ui) = 5si i )
P1 _z 1 z 1 - Es 1 (0) $ 0. Hence, substituting in the condition above:
Es, (R) = roEs1 (0) + rz 1 z1 + ppi1
where no = r+(1 - r) #* + 0* - (1 - r) Xi#*= ; Kzi (1 - r) - (1 - r) A 1j* O
and pi (1- r #*+ (1 - r) A1 . m)
Notice that unless zzizi = pipi = 0 and Ko = 1, Rs, (R) # Es (0). In particular, the
weight short term traders give on their private signal to forecast p2 differs from their use of
the private signal to forecast 0. The private signal helps short term traders predict P2 only to
the extent that it helps predict the fundamental. This difference depends on ro which is an
increasing function of the average use of X2 and z2 by traders at t = 2 in forecasting 0, i.e. 3
and #*2. The more future traders will use their private signal in order to forecast 0, the more
P2 will be sensitive to 0. Furthermore, as future traders increase the use of z2 in forecasting 0,
short term traders increase the use of their private signal. This is because z2 = 0 + f2 where
short term traders signal is informative about z 2 only through 0. 15
5 Notice that in order to infer p2, short term traders will put an additional weight on intergenerational common
signals, {zi, p1} as these signals reveal information about p2 beyond the information they reveal about 0. This
dimension has been highlighted by Allen-Morris-Shin (2006). Given the focus of the paper is on the incidence of
Given the optimal use of information by traders to infer R depends on the average beliefs of
future market participants, pi's sensitivity to the fundamentals and the public signals depends
on P2'S sensitivity to the fundamental and the public signals. In other words, (3, #21, Ou) is a
(yifunction of (3;, #*, #*2, #1 , X 3). Let 6f- = , i E IL = {zipi},
ZiEIL
Lemma 5 In any linear equilibrium, for any (#3,#*, , 2 ,1 #3*) E R51
P1 =)300 +#zizi +3uui
where
K6A1___ K6A 1 65 - A1 (1 - r) z + L
0= , z = Z1 and3 =i-K 1 (1 + A1 (1 - Ai (1 -r) * ))
whererK= (1+A1) 
-o A1L l - Aix,1 16.
Proof. See in Appendix A *
Forward feedback
So far, the focus has been on the market at t = 1 taking as given P2 as well as the impact
of p1 on P2. There exists also a forward feedback from the market at t = 1 to the market at
t = 2. In the presence of asymmetric information, as long as pi is relatively informative from
the point of view of future market participants, traders at t = 2 are going to use the price as
an endogenous signal of the fundamental. This is illustrated more formally in what follows. At
t = 2, for any given p1 satisfying condition 1.6, the individual demand for the traders entering
the market satisfies the following optimality condition:
ks 2 (Xi 2 , zi, z 2 , P1 i P 2 ) = E (0|zi2, zi, z 2, P1, P 2 ) - P2
the horizon of traders on the precision of the information revealed by the price. The main discussion will be on
the optimal use of the private signal x 11 . The more short term traders will use their private signal, the more the
price will depend on it and reveal it.
16 adjusts the market clearing price to endogenize its informational role. As seen earlier, the market clearing
price is given by the average forecast of traders and investors as well as the supply noise. However, the price is
used as a signal in the average forecast. The sensitivity of the price to the different signals is given by the use of
the different signals in the forecasting process adjusted by the information brought by the price in the inference
process. This is precisely &. The bigger the informative role of the price, the less sensitive the aggregate demand
is going to be to the price. As a consequence, K will become smaller.
This intergenerational information externality exists independently of the horizon of the
traders. Aggregating the individual demands and applying the market clearing condition, P2
is going to be a function of pi. Let 612 ,Es = {x2 ,ziz2,Pip2} and denote
isisS2 ai
Es 2 () =fo E (.|xi2, z1, z2, P1, p2) di the traders' average forecast at t = 2, the next lemma
summarizes this relation:
Lemma 6 In any linear equilibrium, the equilibrium price P2 satisfies the following condition
2 i (ul - r) Ai + U2) (1.12)
A2
where Es2 (0) = J*20 + 6*1z1 + 6*2z2 + * 1 ± 6 2 .
The equilibrium price at t = 2 is given by traders' average forecast of 0 and the supply
noises. There are two points to highlight from the previous lemma. First, P2 is an increasing
function of pi given pi is positively correlated to the fundamental, i.e. #0 > 0. This relation
illustrates the informational externality from t = 1 to t = 2 as the price is informative about
the fundamental. A higher p1 is likely to signal a higher fundamental to traders at t = 2
which increases their demand and P2. Second, the sensitivity of P2 to the fundamental, the
exogenous public signals and pi, i.e. (#, #*, * Z2* P, #*) , depends on the sensitivity of pi to
the fundamentals, the public signal and the supply noise, i.e. (#,3, # 0,) . A more informative
pi, i.e. higher , makes traders at t = 2 increase the use of pi to forecast 0 at the expense
of the other signals.
Lemma 7 In any linear equilibrium, for any (00, #zk #) E R3
P2 = #3 + 0*, Z + #*z2Z2 + #*,p2 + #*P (ui (1 -r) Ai + u2)
where
#0 = *+ ; # *, = * 6* 
; 3*  6*0 2 P1Z Z1 P1 1 3 ' OZ2 -Z2
6*
#* = and #*= -- IT
P 00 
_ S i A2
Proof. See in Appendix A
Two-ways feedback
The previous two lemmas highlighted the existence of a forward feedback taking as given the
impact of p2 on pi as well as a backward feedback taking as given the impact of pi on P2. In any
linear equilibrium, pi and P2 are jointly determined internalizing the intertemporal two-ways
feedback and solving for a fixed-point problem. A higher price today is likely to be associated
with a higher expected price tomorrow which raises the demand of short term traders and the
price today. This is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Any linear equilibrium is the solution of a system of equations given by the
following two conditions:
P= AEs1 (rO + (1 - r) p 2 ) + ( 11+A1 1+A1 1+A1u
and
P2 _ ES() - Y(ui(1 -r)A1+u 2)A2
where Es 2 (0) = 6*26 +*,z 1 + J* Z2 + +*2
More formally, the two-ways feedback in the prices is associated to the two-ways feedback in
the inference process of traders at t = 1 and t = 2. The optimal use of information by short term
traders to forecast P2 will affect the relation between pi and the fundamentals and ultimately
the informativeness of the price (opl). The informativeness of the price has an impact on the
optimal use of information by traders at t = 2 which affect the sensitivity of the price (p2) to
the fundamentals and the different signals. As a result, the optimal use of information by short
term traders to forecast P2 will change. Concretely, the fixed point problem will be solved in
term of the sensitivity of the prices at t = 1, 2.
Corollary 9 Any linear equilibrium is the solution of the following system of equations:
13 = B (3*) and /* = B* (13)
where 3 = [00, Ozl 13u] and 3* = [1, * , * X, P1 , * Furthermore, B : R 5 -- R 3 and
B* : R 3 -+ R 5.
1.3.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
In this section, I am going to characterize the equilibrium. As we have just seen in the previous
section, the equilibrium is the solution of a fixed-point problem in the 3's. The intertemporal
two-ways feedback relies on two assumptions: (i) traders at t = 1 care about their capital gains,
i.e. r < 1 and (ii) traders at t = 2 use pi in order to infer the fundamental. Suppose that
traders at t = 1 only care about the fundamental value 0, then the equilibrium at t = 1 will
be independent of the equilibrium at t = 2. On the other hand, suppose traders at t = 2 find
p, uninformative about 0, then P2 will be independent of pi. This could occur whenever either
of aX2 , az 2 -> oo at t = 2. Before proceeding, I am going to shed more light on the two-ways
feedback by deriving the equilibrium for 3 extreme benchmark cases: (i) No feedback, (ii) No
forward feedback and (iii) No backward feedback.
Benchmark
Suppose r = 1 and ax2 -> 00. For r = 1, the traders at t = 1 have a long horizon, they
care about the fundamental value of the stock they are buying. On the other hand, at t = 2,
as aX2 -0 traders' average forecast of the fundamental is independent of pi. Hence, the
equilibrium price at t = 0 is independently determined of the equilibrium at t = 1 where the
equilibrium prices are given by:
A1 - -1 7 __ (u, (1 - r) Al + u2) Y
p1 = $5s1 (0) + _EL () -±l1 and P2 = 0 -
1 +Ai 1 +A1 1 + Ai A2
Given Es1 (0) = og 0 + o" zi + J 6Pi and EL (0) = 6L zi + 6L
pi = #06 + #zizi +3u1
whee / 0 E 1X1/ A1 JS+ 1 6L /~-in~ 6 L Swhere #0 -- 1; #2, -- og+ 1 ; #2 - and K 1 - + A1 1 -0
i 1+A1 zl 1+A 1 z 00 -
The solution is determined in term of b LO , i.e. the negative of the sensitivity of the
price to the fundamental relative to the supply noise. b is the unique solution to the following
equation: b = Alax b . One can express all the coefficients, (#3, z , ,)O, as a
7(ax, + azi + 02
function of b. The existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium will follow.
Suppose r < 1, p1 will be a function of P2.
Pi= A1Es, (r + (1 - r) p 2) + EL7() _ 7 du p2 adp - (u1 (1 - r) A1 + u 2 )1-+A 1  1-+A 1  1+A1 A2
Nevertheless, as future market participants' beliefs are given by 9, traders' average forecast
of P2 boils down to the average forecast of the fundamental and the supply noises at t = 2. As
earlier the equilibrium at t = 1 will be independent of future market participants' beliefs. The
main difference comes from the fact that short term traders internalize the effect of the supply
noise at t = 1 (u1) on the future price. 18
Finally, suppose a., is bounded but r = 1. At t = 2, traders are going to use p1 to forecast 9.
As a result, traders' optimal use of information depends on the informativeness of p1. Formally,
P2 = #*0 + #3*zi + 3* z2 + #*,pi + #* (ui (1 - r) A1 + U2)
where #* = * + 6* ; 3* 1 = *, - * ; * *; =- and #,= -7
130 ~~ 
-2 Z2P 0 A2
The solution is determined in term of b* = -±. b* is the unique solution to the following
equation: b* A2ax 2  . One can express all the
b2 b*2
n (1 + (1 - r)2 A2
coefficients, (3, # *, * 3k, #*) , as a function of
Equilibrium characterization
As noted earlier, completing the equilibrium characterization requires solving a fixed-point
problem. On the one hand, pi is defined by how traders use their available information to infer
17 b* is the unique solution to the cubic expression: b (a., + az,) + b 3  a
18 One way to completely cancel any feedback from t = 2 to t = 1 will be to have in addition to axi -> oo,
at -- 0 or -y -+ 0. In both cases, p2 will be independent of the supply noise.
,p0) .
R which depends on P2 and on how future traders use their available information to infer the
fundamentals. On the other hand, how future traders use their available information depends
on the informativeness of pi which is determined by how traders at t = 1 use their information.
Concretely, solving the fixed-point problem boils down in solving a fixed-point problem in term
of the #'s, the sensitivity of pi and P2 to the different signals. The equilibrium is reduced to
the solution of the equation in the following lemma.
Lemma 10 ] functions G: R+8 x R+ x [0, 1] - R+ and F: R+8 x R+ x [0, 1] -+ R8 such that
let b = -00 , in any equilibrium, b solves
b = G (b, axi, IaX2, azi, Iaz2, or, A1, A2, r,) (1.13)
while (#0, #,3 23, , * *1 2; 0*;T*u) = F (b, ax 1 , ax 2 , azi, az 2 , ou, Ai, A2 , r, -y).
Proof. Proof in Appendix B m
The equilibrium is the solution of a fixed-point problem in term of b which is defined by the
sensitivity of the price (pi) to the fundamental relative to the supply noise. It also characterizes
the informativeness of the price pi. Given the informativeness of the price, b, one can solve for
the sensitivity of the price at t = 2 to the fundamental relative to the supply noise, i.e. b* = 1
in the same fashion as for the forward feedback benchmark case. As a consequence, one can
determine (# 3,*,#*) as a function of b given b* is also characterized by b. This allows me
to define the function G. The next proposition states the existence and the uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
Proposition 11 There exists at least one equilibrium for any -y > 0,i.e. E at least one b E R+
that solves
b E {b E R+ : b = G (b, ax, ax 2 , aziaZ 2,1 o7, A1 , A2 , r,y)}
Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See in Appendix B m
1.4 Information aggregation
In this section, I am going to examine more precisely the relation between the horizon of
the traders and the informational efficiency of the market. The focus of this paper is on the
information revealed by the price and the extent in which the average horizon of the traders is
going to affect the information conveyed by the price about the fundamental to the investors
at t = 1 and the traders at t = 2.19
In the model we are considering, a natural measure of the prices' informativeness is given
by ap, and a,2.20 ap, and a,2 are both functions of L and , i.e. the sensitivity of the price
to the fundamental relative to the supply noise at t = 1 and t = 2. In what follows, I am going
present the extent in which a change in the horizon of the traders affects the behavior of the
traders and their optimal use of information which ultimately changes api. As we know, from
the previous section, O and - are both associated to traders' relative use of the private signal
in inferring the unknown object of interests.
The first natural measure of the horizon of the trader is given by r. If r = 1, each trader is
long-termist and at the time of making his decision he will forecast 0. Any increase in r raises
the importance of 0 at the expense of p2 for each trader making him more long-termist. At the
same time, as the traders are all identical, on average the horizon of the traders in the market
increases. In a first step, I am going to explore the effect of a change in r on a,
In a second step, I am going to explore the effect of an inflow of informed traders in the
market at t 1 on a, 1, i.e. A,. A, is a measure of the informed short term traders entering the
market at t = 1. As we are going to see, a higher A, is not always characterized by a higher
ap. It will typically depend on r among others. An increase in A, is characterized by an arrival
of continuum of traders at t = 1 having private information. However, for any given horizon
r < 1, it also increases the share of traders with shorter horizon r. Hence, the average horizon
of the market decreases. For the rest of this section, I am going to focus on a, .
19 The informational efficiency of the market is an important measure that has been used extensively in Finance.
Prices are informationally efficient if they fully and correctly reflect the relevant information. The focus of this
section will be on the information revelation of the price. In particular, on the extent investors can infer the
information which is dispersed in the economy.
2 0 From the point of view of an econometrician who would have access to the same common signal as the
traders, a, and ap2 would be as the R-squared of a regression of the price on the liquidation value, 0.
Proposition 12 In any linear equilibrium,
60
(i) a ' > 0Or
Proof. See in Appendix B m
The previous proposition states that there is an increasing monotone relation between the
horizon of the traders (r) and the information revealed by pi about the fundamental. As the
horizon of the informed trader increases, the share of their gross return which depends on
the fundamental increases, making the traders use more their private information. 2 1 Overall,
a market associated with relatively more long term traders tends to reveal better quality of
information through its price. In particular, in an economy with only long term traders, i.e.
traders that only care about the fundamental of the company they are investing in (r = 1),
the price is more informative than in an economy where traders care also about their capital
gains, i.e. for any r < 0. The logic behind holds as follow. On one hand, a long term informed
trader who tries to forecast 0 to make his optimal decision to invest in an asset will attach
more weight on his private signal than a trader who cares less about the fundamental and
more on his capital gains, i.e. r < 122. It is translated by ro E [0, 1]. This is because the
private signal is informative only about 0. Hence, traders with a smaller horizon, will use
their private signal relative to the other signals to forecast P2 only to the extent that P2 is
correlated to 0. On the other hand, as each trader uses more their private signal, the aggregate
demand is relatively more sensitive to 0 and on aggregate the price is more informative about
the fundamental. 23 Overall the presence of short-term traders creates a negative informational
externality on the market. The same intuition goes for any r such that a decrease in the horizon
of the traders decreases the informativeness of the price. As all informed traders care relatively
more about the fundamental and relatively less about forecasting the average beliefs of future
2 1There exist several negative indirect effects but overall the direct positive effect of an increase in the horizon
of the traders is stronger. (i) As he horizon of the traders increases today, there will be less supply noise
tomorrow in the market and the price tomorrow will be more informative decreasing the relation between p2 and
0. Ultimately this leads traders to use less their private signal; (ii) An increase in c,, makes pi more informative
which induce traders at t = 1 and t = 2, to increase pi at the expense of the other signals in inferring 0. This
leads to further decreases in api. All these indirect effects will make the smaller but it will remain positive.
22 This result has been illustrated by Allen-Morris-Shin (2003).2 3There is an additional effect which goes on the other direction. As the price becomes more informative, the
informed traders uses relatively more the price as a signal at the expense of their private signal. In equilibrium,
this effect is always smaller than the original increase in the use of their private signal.
market participants when making their decision, they all use relatively more their private signal
and the price becomes a more precise information aggregator.
Next, I am going to look at the effect of an inflow of informed traders in the market on
api,. As we mentioned earlier, an increase in A1 is associated with an increase in the number of
informed traders but also by an increase in the average horizon of the market as long as r 5 1.
There will be on average more short-term traders. As we are going to see, having more traders
with private information does not automatically increase the informativeness of the price.
Proposition 13 In any linear equilibrium,
(i) For r = 1, 0a > 0.
(ii) For r =, 1, ap, is a non monotonic function of Ai.
Proof. See in Appendix B m
The first part states that in an economy with only long term informed traders, an increase
in the number of traders increases the informativeness of the price. This is simply due to the
fact that the aggregate demand is composed of a bigger share of informed traders who have
access to private information. As a consequence the price is more precise. Whenever, r $ 1,
this effect still exists. However, an increase in the share of informed traders can lead each trader
to decrease their relative use of private signal so much that on aggregate the price may end up
being relatively less revealing about the fundamental.
For r relatively small, informed traders anticipate that an inflow of short term traders in the
market at t = 1 will be associated with a bigger transfer of the supply noise in the market at
t = 2. Hence, informed traders anticipate the fact that the correlation between the supply noise
and P2 is more important. As a consequence, in forecasting p2 they will use relatively less their
private signal as we have seen earlier. The same occurs whenever there are less traders at t = 2
in the market, i.e. A2 small. If one considers a market to be thin whenever there are buyers and
sellers in small numbers, then a small A2 can be associated with a thinner market. 24 Hence, a
thinner market defined as above is more likely to have a decrease in the informativeness of the
2 4 A thin market is often associated with a more volatile and less liquid asset.
market price as the share of informed traders increases.2 5 The reasoning is similar as for small
r.
The figures la-id illustrate the last 2 propositions. The first figure represents the relation
between ap, and r. The parameters value for the precision of the different exogenous signals
are equal to 1, i.e. a, = ax 2 = az2 = az2 = of= 1. Furthermore, -y = 1 and A2 = 0.1. One
of the reason I look at low values of A2 is to be able to highlight as we are going to see the
interaction between a thinner market and a higher A,. The remaining points remain the same
for A2 relatively larger. I look at two different cases for A, : Al = 0.1 and A, = 0.5. The first
thing to notice is the fact that for both cases, ap, is monotonically increasing in r.
There are three main comments to make when comparing the two cases. First, the higher
the share of informed traders in the market (A,), the greater the increase in the information
revealed by the market price as the horizon of the traders increases. In particular, a market
characterized by a low proportion of informed traders, e.g. A, = 0.1, does not see an important
effect of the horizon of the traders on the quality of the information revealed by the price.
Second, for low enough r, a market with more informed traders is not associated with more
precise information aggregated by the price. This shows the point made above where a thin
market with shorter horizon traders can be related with a more precise information revealed
by the price when there is less informed traders in the market. Finally, for high enough r more
informed traders is associated with a higher api. The limit where r = 1 is stated in proposition
11.
Figures l.b-d. explore more precisely proposition 11. Figure l.b-c focus on the relation
between a , and Al while figure l.d. take a closer look at the impact of A2 on ap. Figure
1.b. compares two cases for the thinness of the market at t = 2, i.e. A2 : A2 = 0.1 and A = 1,
while keeping r constant at 0.1. On the other hand, Figure 1.c. keeps A2 constant at 0.1 and
compares the two cases: r = 0.1 and r = 0.5. All the other parameters value remain the same
as in figure L.a.
In figure L.b. two points should be highlighted. The first one is the fact that a thinner
market at t = 2, i.e. lower A2 is associated with a lower ap, . The difference increases as the
2 5In the discussion section, I will present an alternative way to interpret the model where A2 is linked to the
share of short term traders.
proportion of informed traders in the market increases. In other words, when the share of
informed traders in the market is small, a higher or a lower A2 won't have much impact on a, .
This is the analogue of the point made earlier where the effect of a change in r on api is small
if A, is small. Second, for low enough A2 , one can see that an increase in A2 at first raises ap,
but it reaches a maximum and decreases from then on. When there are few informed traders in
the market, an inflow of informed traders increases ap, as there is simply a bigger share of the
aggregated demand composed of traders having access to the private signal. There is however
a second effect. More short-term traders transfers a higher share of the supply noise at t = 1 in
the market at t = 2. It results in a decrease in the use of the private information as explained
earlier. As A, increases the second effect becomes bigger. Higher A, is associated with more
traders hit by the shock selling in the market at t = 2. This leads to a decrease in the quality
of the information revealed by the price.
Likewise in figure 1.c., a market characterized by relatively short-term traders can be related
to a non monotonic relation between a, 1 and Al. For small A1 , an increase in the proportion
of informed traders raises ap1 . However, as Al increases the share of short-term traders in the
market increases so much that informed traders use less their private signal to infer P2. Each
trader anticipates the fact that the price P2 will as a consequence be more related to the supply
noise u1 .
Finally, as shown in figure 1.d which illustrates the relation between a, 1 and A2 for two values
of A : A = 0.1 and A, = 1, a thinner market is associated with a loss in the informativeness of
the price, ap, mainly when the number of short term traders in the market is relatively high.
As explained earlier, this is due to the sensitivity of P2 on the supply noise.
1.5 Beliefs signal
So far, the information the informed traders have about the average beliefs of the traders at
t = 2, was correlated to the fundamental. Everything they inferred about the market was
through their signals about 0 where some signals are more correlated to the beliefs of the
agents at t = 2, e.g. zi, pi and others are only correlated through 0, e.g. xii. However, one
could imagine short-term traders, r : 1, trying to forecast the direction of the average beliefs of
the traders at t = 2 through some information set that are not correlated to the fundamental.
Nevertheless, rational short-term traders will use this information as it will help them infer
the future price through the average beliefs of future market participants. In this section, I
am extending the previous analysis by allowing the informed traders to have access to a signal
about the noise in the public signal of the traders born the next period: y = E2 + W where
w ~ N (0, o 2 ) 26 that I am going to refer to beliefs signal. Hence, the information set of the
informed traders is updated to It = {z 1, y, P1}, i E S1 . Given y is only informative about the
average beliefs of future market participants, the benchmark equilibrium, i.e. r = 1, with the
new information set will be the same as in an economy with y uninformative. Contrary to an
economy without the beliefs signal, the introduction of y, makes possible the analysis of the
effect of a change in the precision of higher order beliefs independently of the precision of the
information about 0.27
The beliefs signal can be seen as investor sentiment, i.e. a measure of the mood of the
market. Any change in y can be interpreted as a change in the level of optimism or pessimism
of the traders at t = 1 about the future prices or the future market independently of their
beliefs of the fundamentals. The role of investor sentiments is widely acknowledged in financial
markets both by practitioners and academicians2 8 . In this section, the role played by the
investor sentiment is directly connected to the importance of higher order beliefs which raises
in the presence of short term traders and asymmetric information. Rational short term traders
will decide how much to invest in the risky asset in the basis of investor sentiment as it is
informative about the future price. Hence, the price will depend on investor sentiments. The
beliefs signal is closely related to recent work by Angeletos-La'o (2011) which shows in a rational
set up how the business cycle can be driven by shocks independent of fundamental shocks and
the expectation of fundamental shocks. However, these shocks affect the business cycle through
the expectation of aggregate activity as they are related to higher order beliefs. They refer to
these shocks as market sentiments.
26 The beliefs signal is not common knowledge. Uninformed traders and traders at t = 2 do not observe it.
This is a crucial hypothesis in the derivation of the endogenous information structure which follows.
2 7One can notice that y helps traders forecast p2 to the extent that it helps them forecast e2. On the other hand,
the private signal, xa, helps traders predicts p2 only to the extent that it is informative about the fundamental.
This is in contrast to pi which is common to the traders at t = 1, 2.
28 For a recent paper about investor sentiments and stock markets, I refer to Wurgler and Baker (2007).
For the remaining of the analysis, suppose az, = 0, ax2 = 0. Hence, as a. 2 = 0, the price
at t = 2 won't carry extra information to traders at t = 2. These simplifications allow me to
highlight the main intuition behind the effect of the introduction of the beliefs signal. All the
results hold in the more general case.
Equilibrium characterization
At t = 1, as rational short-term traders have access to information about E2,
E (z2|Iii) = E (6|Iij) + aw -y, E Si( + aZ2)
One can notice that in the presence of y, E (z2|Ii,) 5 E (0|Ii,), i E S1, precisely because
E(C 2 |Ii1 ) = aw y 4 0, i E S1 . As a consequence, the forecast of P2 and ultimately(az2 + a.)
the equilibrium price, pi, will depend on y. An increase in the relative precision of the beliefs
signal, a , makes rational short-term traders put relatively more weight on their beliefs signal
az2
to infer z2 and ultimately forecast P2.
Let P2 = #*e z2 + * 1pi + /*3 (ui (1 - r) A2 + U2), for any (#*E, #*k, #*,) E R3 given, de-
fine Ko = r +- (1 - r) ()* -1r)A )( 30)Ai and r, -
(1 - r) (3 - A1 (1 - r) #* . The following lemma summarizes the dependence of the short-
term traders' forecast of R to the beliefs signal, y.
Lemma 14 In any linear equilibrium, for any (#*2, # , ) E 3, the forecast of the return
of the informed agents at t = 1 is given by:
Es, (R) = noEsi (0) + Ky ES 1 (E2) + KpiPi (1.14)
where let o- - a , i = { } and ap = 2
ser1 8 a' and a s1 p-
Es (0) = 6'0 + 65S1 and Es, (2) = yX P1 (az 2 + aw)
Proof. See in Appendix C m
For any (#*1, # O, #*3) E R 3 given, the main difference with the previous case is ry :A 0.
The traders' average forecast of R, depends on the beliefs signal as it helps them predict future
price. Iy measures the sensitivity of the traders' average beliefs of R on y. One can notice that
that as r -> 1, KY tends to zero. Furthermore, the weight short term traders give to both their
private signal and their beliefs signal is increasing in the sensitivity of the future price to z2,
i.e. #*3 . As earlier, #*2 is defined by future market participants' use of z 2 in forecasting 0 which
depends on the informativeness of the price and ultimately (03, 0y, U).
As earlier, the equilibrium is the solution of a fixed-point problem which internalizes the
two-ways feedback. For more details about the derivations please refer to the appendix.
Information aggregation
In this subsection, I am exploring the extent in which the quality of the information revealed
by the price is affected by the use of the beliefs signal. Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning
the existence of the asymmetry in the information revealed by the price pi between investors
at t = 1 and future market participants. Given the linear structure of the equilibrium, the
information revealed by pi is summarized by the Gaussian signal:
=0 + U1 + Y
where P1  - with precision op= 2 22Y - , + U.29 From the point of view
Y Y Ulof the traders at t = 2, as short term informed traders use the beliefs signal, p1 and z 2 become
correlated with covariance o-zy = -Y-U2  Overall the precision of the information set of future
TOZ2'
market participants will internalize the dependence between the two signals.
Lemma 15 In any linear equilibrium,
(i) The information revealed by the price at t = 1 to uninformed trader is given by
- =(1.15)
o2U + /320,2
29Given y is unobserved by the investors and future traders, it appears as an extra source of noise in addition
to the supply noise.
(ii) The information revealed by the price at t = 1 to traders at t = 2 is given by
apz = az2 Azi + api Ap1  (1-16)
where 0 < Az 2,A 1 1.
Proof. See in Appendix C u
This asymmetry in the informational externality results precisely from the nature of the use
of the beliefs signal. As explained earlier, traders will use the beliefs signal precisely because
they want to infer the average forecast of traders at t = 2. As much as for long term investors
it appears as an additional source of noise, as the short term traders are using y to forecast P2,
the endogenous information provided by the market to future market participants is going to
change in two dimensions: (i) covariance between pi and z2 and (ii) variance of pi. The precision
of the information set of future traders is not anymore given by the sum of the precision of the
two signals, but it endogenizes the covariance between the two signals. Intuitively, by using y
they transfer information about z 2 = 0 + E2 through the information the price imports about
E2. This indirectly affects the information future market participants get out of z2 about 0. In
addition, the use of y affects directly the informativeness of pi (apl).
If o-zy = 0, the effect of the use of y on the information set of future market participants
will only be through ap, where aPz = az + ap,. However, the introduction of the beliefs signal
decreases aPz for given ap, as 0 < Az2 , Api 5 1. The positive correlation between the two signals
makes the information set of future market participants more noisy in equilibrium for given ap.
As a result, whenever the use of y by short term traders decreases the informativeness of the
price from the point of view of long term investors at t = 0, the overall precision of future traders'
information set decreases also. Let at be the precision of the signal when y is uninformative
about 9.
Lemma 16 If ap, a*, then apz : az1 + at.
Proof. See in Appendix C u
In the remainder of this section, I am going to illustrate graphically the effect of a change
in the precision of y on the information revealed by the price to uninformed traders and future
traders in equilibrium.
Figures 2.a.-2.b. illustrate ap, arPz respectively as a function of a, where the pink line
represents the benchmark case where y is uninformative a, --+ 0 . The parameters value for
the precision of the different exogenous signals are equal to 1, i.e. a = z o= = 1. and
r = A1 = A2 = -y = 0.5
From figure 2.a., one can notice that the use of the beliefs signal decreases the informative-
ness of the price from the point of view of long term investor. In general, the introduction of the
beliefs signal generates two effects: (i) relatively more noise (y) and (ii) change in the sensitivity
of the price to the supply noise volatility . The first one is the consequence of using the
beliefs signal which appears as a noise from the point of view of long term investors who want
to infer the fundamental. The second one is related to a change in the use of the private signal
which follows the introduction of the beliefs signal. The use of y will make the price relatively
more noisy from the point of view of future market participants. As a consequence, traders at
t = 2 will use relatively more their public signal, Z2, in inferring the fundamental. As short
term traders anticipate tomorrow's price to be more sensitive to z2, they will rely more on their
private signal and the price will be relatively less sensitive to the supply noise. The overall
outcome depends on the size of the two effects which go in opposite directions. As illustrated
in the figures 2.c.-2.d., it will depend on -y : for relatively low y the price is less informative
while for relatively high, the overall effect is almost inexistent.
In addition, an increase in a, can be associated with a decrease in the information revealed
by the price to investors. 30 In other words, an economy where short term traders have a
more precise signal about the price pi, can result in an economy with less accurate information
revealed by the price about the fundamentals. The logic remains the same as earlier, an increase
in the precision of the beliefs signal leads the price to be more noisy as O increases.
However, the price depends relatively less on the supply noise. The overall effect depends on -Y.
Figure 2.b. on the other hand, illustrates the relation between ap2 and a,. As we can
notice, the use of the beliefs signal has a negative effect on the informativeness of future market
participants' information set.31 This is a direct consequence of the lemma above. As short term
3 0 Notice that even though the higher the horizon, the more likely it is to have a negative relation between a,
and ap,. The ap, is overall higher for higher horizon.
3
'As future traders have only 2 signals, a smaller apz is associated with a loss in the precision of their
information set.
traders use the beliefs signal, not only for given precision, the positive correlation between the
two signals generates a loss in term of the precision of future market participants information
set, i.e. Ap1, Az2 E [0, 1], but the precision of pi tends to decrease. As a result, they end up with
a less accurate information about the fundamental.
Figures 2.c-2d. shed more light on the role played by -y in the impact of the use of the
beliefs signal. They look more closely at the relation between the ap1 , apz and y respectively.
The parameters value for the precision of the different exogenous signals are equal to 1, i.e.
ax, = az2 = of = 1 and A2 = A = 0.2; r = 0.1. Two cases are being considered: a, -> 0
and a, = 1. As mentioned earlier, the effect of the introduction of y depends on -y. Three
main points are to be noted from figure 2.c-2.d.: (i) The information revealed by the price
when a, -+ 0 is more precise than when a, = 1 from the point of view of investors and
future market participants; (ii) As y increases, the difference in the informativeness of the price
between a, -+ 0 and a, = 1 decreases and (iii) The informativeness of the price is a decreasing
function of y.
A low y is associated with a high demand. In equilibrium, the price becomes less sensitive
to the supply noise as -y decreases. At the limit, y -+ 0, the price is not a function of the
supply noise. This explains the negative slope. In addition, as we explained earlier, the use
of the beliefs signal makes the price more noisy as ) 0' as well as less dependent on the
supply noise. The second effect is more important for high -y than low -y. The information gain
from the traders relying more on their private signal is more beneficial in an economy with high
supply noise (higher y) than an economy with low supply noise (lower -y). As a consequence,
for relatively low -y, the negative effect of introducing y is bigger than the positive one while
for relatively high 7, the effect is almost inexistent.
1.6 Alternative interpretation
Before concluding, I would like to provide another interpretation to the horizon of the traders,
i.e. r. So far, I have defined r as the probability of being hit by a liquidity or preference shock
and exiting the market at t = 2. r summarized the extent in which the traders care about the 0
at the expense of P2. Consider the following alternative economy, where there is a measure one
of long term investors born at t = 1 identical to the long term investors defined earlier where
U = ki (0 - p1) - -. In addition, there is a measure A, of short term traders characterized by
2
the following utility function:
k 2 k2 c (k1 - k2 )2U = k 1 (p 2 - p1)- cl + k2 (0 - p 2) - -222 2 2
In words, the traders behave as myopic short term traders. They decide how much to invest
in the risky asset given that the market will be open at t = 2 and they will re-trade the asset
at p2. Hence, the short term traders can reenter the market at t = 2 and readjust their position
while the long term investors hold on to the asset until the end. The information set of the
traders is defined as in the section 2.32 Suppose there are no traders born at t = 2. Typically,
the informed traders will trade among each others at t = 2. Finally, suppose there is an extra
cost c of being active in the market at t = 2, i.e. changing position. The higher is c, the more
costly it is to participate in the market at t = 1.33 When c -+ oo, k2 = k1, i.e. agents only care
about the fundamental. It is so costly to change their position that the traders decide their
respective positions at t = 1. They know they will have to keep their position until t = 3 and
receive 0. Let the first order condition at t = 2 be given by
Ei2 (0 - p1) c
kis = + T + ki 11 + c (1+c)
As we can notice, the higher is kii, the higher is ki2 as long as c > 0. Traders at t = 1 will
anticipate that their optimal decision at t = 1 will constrain their optimal position at t = 2
because of the cost of changing their position. Substituting ki2 in the payoff function we have:
+c 2U = k1 1 - c P2 + c 0 - p1 - 1 2k(1+ c) (1+ c) 1+c 2
3 2In particular, suppose that o, 2 = a' + a* where x2 can be seen as a sufficient statistic for the two signals
X1, X 2 .3 3 Wang-Huang (2008) develop a model where they associate the liquidity of the market to the cost of partici-
pation in the market. Typically, in their model they associate hedge funds as permanent participants in financial
market who improves the liquidity of the market. One could think of short term traders in this variation of the
model as traders who are active all the time in the market because they are facing low enough participation cost.
One plausible interpretation would be taxes of engaging in short term trading or administrative costs. However,
one can also look at c as subjective cost related to preferences which make an investor rebalancing its portfolio
costly.
As a result, in this economy, the choice of traders at t = 1 can be summarized by the following
utility function:
k2
U = ki (rO + (1 - r) p2 - Pi) - 7
2
c 1 + 2c
where r + and 1y +. One can notice that the payoff function of the short term1+ c 1
traders in this alternative model is identical to the payoff function of the short term traders in
the main text where r can be seen as the relative cost of changing their portfolio at t = 2. The
higher the cost, the more the short term trader is going to expect it to be unlikely to change
his portfolio and the more he will care about 0 when making his decision. 34
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied an economy where short-term traders introduce an informational friction
in financial markets. The present study can be divided in two parts where I first look at the
extent in which a change in the composition of the market between informed and uninformed
traders on one hand, short versus long term traders on the other, affect the informational
efficiency of the market. Then, I focus on the process by which traders try to learn the beliefs
of future market participants, by introducing a beliefs signal. A beliefs signal is defined as
a signal which is informative about future price as it is informative about the future market
participants average beliefs but independent of the fundamental.
The results can be summarized as follow: (i) a decrease in the horizon of the informed
traders deteriorate the precision of the price; (ii) an inflow of informed traders in the market
can decrease the informativeness of the price when the traders have a relatively short horizon or
the market is expected to be thin in the future; (iii) the use of the beliefs-related information
can decrease the precision of the information revealed by the price; (iv) as the informed traders
have a more precise information about the average beliefs, i.e. a more precise beliefs signal,
long term investors have overall a less precise information; (v) this phenomenon is more likely
the smaller the cost of participation in the market.
3 4 One point to mention is that -y is also a function of c. In other word, the higher is c the higher is the cost
of investing at t = 1. The more long-termist, the smaller their position or the more the price is sensitive to the
supply shock.
Further investigation needs to be made in understanding better the extent to which short-
term trading affects the market equilibrium outcome. In particular, empirically, few studies
have looked at the effect of short-term trading on financial markets. In line with Berkman
and Eleswarapu (1998), Parsa (2010), 35, future work needs to be made in trying to assess
empirically the effect of short-term trading on the informational efficiency of the market and in
general financial markets outcome.
"Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) study the effect of short term trading on share prices and liquidity. To do
so, they look at the Bombay Stock Exchange market before and after the abolition of the reinstatement of the
Badla (forward trading facility). They argue that short term traders have on average a positive effect on the
market. Parsa (2010) assess the horizon of investors through their intrinsic trading frequency. Then it explores
the decomposition of the price between the cash flow and discount factor component as a function of the trading
frequency of institutional investors. It shows that overall the prices of the securities held by investors trading
more frequently mainly forecast the long run cash flow component of the securities.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Appendix A
Lemma 3
For any given (#8, 1 ,*2 ,2 , iu) E R', we know from lemma 2 that:
A1 ( 0 5s1 (0) + zi ,  + Kpipi)
1 + A1
EL (0) 7ui
1+A1 1+A1
where let f =-1 , i E i = {xi,zi,p1} and =
ZiEIs, Ci
ai
ZiEIL ai
Hence, Es, (0) = is, 0 + 6" z1 + o~fi31 and EL (0) = j Zi + 6L'fil. Substituting and solving for
pi and rearranging, we have:
Pi = #09 + #3 zi + #ui
Aw # K=;
where/3= X1; A1 K0 6%5 + AiK 1 + jz 7#azi = + - L =H1 ((1 +A 1) - AjKpj) U K and zo = r+(1 - r)
Substituting Kzi and Kp1 in # and solving the equation for #z:
AI Ke6" + A1 (1 -0)*, + 6L
13,- Al I Z1Al1-r Z1
z I (+ A, (1 - (1I )*)
Lemma 5
For any given (#0, #Z, ,3p1) E R3 , we know from lemma 4
Es2 (0) _ (u (1 - r) A + U 2 )YP2 -
where 62 =
*P2*2 and #i -
i
ZiES 2 aiIC IS2 = { X2, Z1,Z2,P1, P2}1, ES 2 (9)=
6* 0 + 6 * z + 6 * z 2 + *1P1 +
1 1
(p1 - #*1 1) and P2 - (p2 - 3*iP - - 3* z2) . Substituting and
solving for pi and rearranging, we have:
p2 = 0*00+ 3*1 1+#3*22 + * Op +#* (u (1 - r)A+ u 2 )
p1=
i E IL = {zi,pl}.
#+ #*2
K = (1 + A1) -
- (1 - r) #*
A Si 1A1 O-- AiK,
Kzi (1 r) (0*1 - (1 - r) Aip* ; zp r) X - 1+(1 -r) Ai ;
1. *( -;)~ P2/*/1)_ _23 (2~A2)6 . - 6* - 6* - - 6* #*,-
where #* = 2 0 ;8 #z x 0z
1 2 - *- *- *
/O* 1 0
-p~ 6* #*
#* - -X= -. Rearranging, we obtain: 3 = * ± 6*
1 - P* 1 1\ 2
#3* =8 * - * / *1 6*- -*1 a ~i0Z Zi 1 1 02 6 Z2' P1 U3,3 ~ i
P / 3 0 ' z1-p A2
Corrolary 1
The equilibrium is concretely the solution of a system of equations in terms of the sensitivity
of the price at t = 1, 2. The system of equations are defined from lemma 3 and lemma 5. Pre-
cisely, one can define from lemma 3 (#/3, zi, Ou) as an implicit function of (#3, #*z, #*2, #
by solving the system of equations for (0, Oz 1, 0,,) , denoted B (.). Furthermore, one can define
from lemma 5 (#3, #*k, #~*2' 3Z2 1 3*) as an implicit function of (#3, #21, #) , denoted B* (.). The
solution will be the joint solution of the system of equations defined by B (.) and B* (.).
1.8.2 Appendix B
Lemma 6
Let b = and b* = . One can define the system above to depend on b and b*:
130 P2 X2
* = J* - * #)3
#* = 6*
O2 Z2
6*
= P
#* -#Ilb*
and
Ko 1A(1 r
AirnOosl + A2 1-r)#. + 6L
#21= ( + A, (1 -- (1 
-r)#*)
#. = -#01b
b2 b *2
where ap+ = ( and ap2 =) . Furthermore, using the system of equation
o~ )1 +U1- )
above, one can redefine r. as functions of only b and b*,
(o*+ * +*) b* - (* + J* ) Ai(1 -r) b
no = r + (1 - r) ((J;2±6X2 +3*2) b* P X2
As a consequence, Hence, b and b* must satisfy the following two conditions:
b = fi (b, b*)
b* =f 2 (b,b*)
where f1 (b, b*) = 21 and f2 (b, b*) = given J1 - aI ; J* =
1y axi + azi + api X2
aX2 b 2 b *2
; api =- and a P2 - . Notice that for no-ax2 + azi + az2 + aP1 + aP2 0'1 + (1 - r)2
tational purpose, I am abstracting the reliance of all the functions on (b, b*) until it becomes
necessary.
One can use b* = f2 (b, b*) to solve for b* as a function of b given b* is the unique solution
of the depressed cubic :
# (b, b*) =0
where #$(b, b*) - b* aX2 + azI + az2 + ( + b *3 2 ax2; #(b, b*) is con-
+ - r)2 A 2 7
A2 b2tinuous in (b, b*); for any b E R: (i) # (b, 0) = 2 < 0; (ii) #' (b, b*) + azi 2
7 oxf+ a2 + aZ2 + 2
3 + ) 2  ; > 0 and (iii) limb*,+o = +oo. Hence, there is a unique b* that solves
q5 (b, b*) = 0 for any b E R. Denote the solution b* = b* (b). Now substituting the solution
b* = b* (b) in fi (b, b*) , one can define the function G (b, .) = fi (b, b* (b)) .
Finally, I still need to show that the system of equations above can be written as a function
of b only. To start with, notice that #3,#* ,#* are functions of b after substituting b* = b* (b),
given they depend on (b, b*). Furthermore, 0 = can be rewritten as a function of
(b, b*) and hence, as a function of b:
KA65
r)Ai P11 andKo=0where = (1 + A) - Aao S ino o wA (1 -0
Ka (b, b*) from above. Solving for #e, we have:
KOA1 (o-9 + 6,1) + A1 ((1 - r) (*l + (1 - r) A1 (6* + ) b/b*)) + 6L
(1 + A1)
where the previous condition only depends on (b, b*). As a consequence, ,, are deter-
mined by b. Finally, one can solve the following system for linear equations in (#21, * to get
them as a function of b:
# = * - o* #z1
AiKOop + A 2(1 -r)#* + 6Lz
zi= (1 + A1 (1 - (1 - r) #*1))
where #o=,
F (b,.).
AiKo5'zi + A2 (1 - r) R + 6 L1- 1 ) zi Z1 Hence,
(1 + A1 (1 - (1 - r)# *) + A2 (1 - r) 6* )
one can define the function
Proposition 2
I need to prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. The proof is given for
-Y > 0.
(i) Uniqueness: G (b,.) is a continuous function over R+ given I am looking at a positive
KOXidsi
solution. Furthermore, G (0,.) = X1 ;> 0
because (i) Ko = r+(1 - r) 1 - "z1  > 0 where - b*2 (0) and
aX2 + azi + aZ2 + aP2 (1+(i - r)2A)
(ii) 6S a- &1 > 0. On the other hand, limb-+oo G (b,.) = 0 because (i) limb-+, 6" = 0,
(i*)+(6* )(A1(l-r)b(ii) lim b ++ oo (6* + 6*, + *-2) = 0 and (iii) lim b ++ oo x, bHene, 2 + i X2 l Z2e X1
Hence, there is at least one b E R+± such that b = G (b, CX1, aX2, QzI I az2 o72, Ali A2, r, -Y)
#80
(ii) In order to prove uniqueness, we need to show that G'(b,.) < 0.
G(b,.) = fi (b, b* (b))Ob
Ofi (b, b* (b)) db* (b)
Ob* b
w ( fi (b, b* (b)) = 'where (a) Ob - P
Ofi (b, b* (b))
(b) Ob*
A1i"8 (I - r) 2 (K* + _ * + *_ ) _ _ * (ap 2 + ax 2 ) A1 (1 - r)b A2ax-2
2 A1 (1 - r) b
-2yb*A2ai*2 )A6S
(C) db* (b) f21 (b, b*) 26*/b <0b 1 - f 22 (b, b*) 1 - 26* -
Hence, one can show that G'(b,.) < 0 which shows uniqueness.
Proposition 3
We need to show that: 2 0. Notice that ap, = . Hence, > . So, we need49O rOar
to show that the sensitivity of the price to the fundamental relative to the noise increases with
the horizon of the traders.
Ofi (b, b* (b) , r) Ofi (b, b* (b) , r) Ob) (b, r)
Ob Or + Ob* Or
r (Ofi (b, b* (b), r) + fi (b, b* (b), r) db* (b, r)
Ob Ob* b
> 0
We know from above that the previous proposition that the denominator is positive. We
still need to show that:
1of (b, b* (b),r)(a) r
bfi (b, b* (b),r)
(b) Ob*
(J* + 5*1) A1 6" >02 0(r +(1 - r) (2 (6* ,2 b* - 2 a* A (1 - r)b A1b*A2a*2 ) X1
(c) Bb 0(b, r) 2b*6* (1 - r) A <0
(1+(1 - r)2 -
Hence, the condition above is satisfied.
Proposition 4
(1 -- r) 2 (j* + 6* ) 6P,2b*
In any linear equilibrium,
ofi (b, b* (b) , r) + ofi (b, b* (b) , r) 9b* (b, r)
Ob _O 1  Ob* BA1
9A1  (fi (b, b* (b), r) + f (b, b* (b), r) db* (b, r)
1-b b* b
> 0
Ob ___
See graphs for the proof. For r = 1, the proof is trivially given by: = > + 1.
1.8.3 Appendix C
I am going to solve the problem in the presence of the beliefs signal in more details.
Lemma 7
Given the linear structure of equilibrium,
1+ = 0 + 1 + y00 30
where pi with precision ap, = 2 . a + 2. We can notice that
o2 + 032 U2) Y eW + E2
P1 and z2 conditional on 0 are distributed as a bivariate normal distribution with covariance
0-zy = j0r2 As a consequence:
7t z p*
0|Z2,Pi 
~ N (Pz, C,)
Denote Pz =- iP1i + 6Z2Z2 the su
1 -zp
P=az 2  +ap - whereaz 1 -a2 p2 1 - p2
Furthermore, p 2
aPz = az 2 + 0'
()2
o2 Z2
fficient Gaussian statistic of z2,i1 for 0 with precision
,= az2~ 2 - 1
-
Pz2 -az2 + ap 2
900
or~ 2
a nd -p- 0Z
012 012+ o2 U
_7zp
1--
and &p1 = a, 
.
0-2
Notice that for o-zp = 0,
Typically, as short term traders are using y, pi transfers information about 62 to future
market participants which affects the information they extract from z2 about 0. The weight
given to both signals and ultimately to their respective precision is such that 'Or') ' <p 2
1.36 2 / 2
iff the weight given to az2 (ap,) is bigger than 1.36 Intuitively, one way to look at it is as follows.
The variance decomposition of Pz between z2 and pi is such that there is a higher dependence
on the precision of z2 if in a linear regression of z 2 - pi, the R 2 is higher than the regression
coefficient. Hence, whenever pi explains a significant share in E2, a weight higher than 1 will be
given to it. As a consequence, the decomposition of precision of Pz will depend relatively more
on the precision of z2.
From the point of view of short term traders, for any given (#*,,# #i*3) E R3, we know
that
P2 =#*3 Z2 + 13 1p + #* ((1 - r) Aiui + U2)
Given R = r9 + (1 - r)p2 and j, = {xii, pi, y}, i E S1 , we have:
Es, (R) = K0 Es1 (0) + KyES1 (61) + KpiP1
where Rsi (R) = Es, (rO + (1 - r) p2) = (r + (1 - r) #*,) Esi (0)+(1 - r) -r* po-(1 - r) 2 AiRs, (u1)+
(1 - r) 7r* Rs, (El). Let of' = - , i E Is, = {xi,pi}, (i) Ess() = 3*,19+oii; (ii)
- #e Es, (0) - o,,pi + 0YY a.Es, (ui) - ) 3  and (iii) Rs, (El) = y. Notice that from the
#3u aw + aZ2
1 #)#2
point of the view of the informed traders, i = p i My and api = 32 . This is
because informed traders observe y. Hence, it does not appear as noise.
Equilibrium characterization
From the point of view of the market at t = 2, the equilibrium price is given by:
P2 = #3*2 Z2 + 3*,pi + #* ((1 - r) )1u1 + u2)
3 6 Notice that by construction we can not have both , < p 2 at the same time. This is because p 2 E [0, 1]
z 2  P
and U = p2  p P4 can not be.
Z2 P
where 3*2 z2; * = 1 and #
1- 2
Zp 1  ;zp
OzP
1-at( a =
At t =1, on the other hand, we have:
p1 =
2 2
Al (KOBSi (0) + KyEs1 (El) + Kpipi)
1-+-A1
2 6po
EL (0)
1 + \
where =- r -t
y (1-r)(#
a . y
a. + az2
Kpi = (1 - r)
-yA1 (1 - r) #3 a + az2
A2/u Oaw
and (iii) EL (0) = . Hence, denote
'0
( # + (1
and Es (0) = 60 + ipi; (ii)
K 1+ \ 1
61
- AlKp 1 - AlKOSI
00
- r) - and/3
Esi (El) =
1)
" aew + az2
00 = Al1K9/ =
and #3 = -
In the same fashion as earlier, denote b0 = - and by = , the equilibrium will be# #;
characterized by a fixed point of this two dimensional object.
Proposition 17 3 functions G : R2+ x R4+ x [0,1]3 -+ R2 + and F : R2+ x R + x [0,1] 3 - R5
such that there exists at least one equilibrium i.e. ] at least one (bo, by) E R2 + that solves the
following system of equations:
bo = G (bo, by, e 1, aZ2 , a, o-, A, A2, r, Y)
by=G2 (bo, by, Oei, az2, a., o 2 , , A2, r,,y)
where G = [G1, G 21 and (#3, py, pu, * ,i 10*) F (bo, by, ao, azi, aw, or , A, y, r, y)
Proof. We know from above that 3*2 - SZ2 depends only on (bo, by). Furthermore, #0 =
where
K
Ko =r+(1 -r) (3*2- - ly1r) Albo
- Jpi and &P1 =
y
1 + A1 U
6 1
- ) A1#* ;(1 - r) #*O - (1
K ( r) #* - ly(1 - r) Alby
which are function of (bo, by). Given no and ny are both function of (bo, by) E R+, I can
show that (bo, by) solve for the following system of equations:
be =
ax Ail (1 - r) #*2 a 2
7 ax
1
±a P1 + ax A (1 - r)2A)
A, 1 'no + A + A16Ko 0 + 1
(1 + A,)
(bo, by). As a consequence, #*i - 'p' also depends only onP, 0
(1- r) #*2 - -yXi 2  r)by)
( Z2 2
a )
ao + az2
N
Corollary 18 In any linear equilibrium,
(i) 0 < < 1
(ii) SP1,6Z2 > 0
Proof. From above, we know that #*1 > 0, given
a1 i -O
UPI ~
api (1 - #0)+ az2 -
Furthermore,
which is also a function of
(bo, by). Finally, notice that
ax1 + api
N9 2
)3e Z222~z
0UU2 + # -2# y
,32
(1-r Si+(1 
- r) A b))
where for any > 1, #* (p1) ( ) 1; for any 0 < i <
2 0 1 - z2 > 0, as a consequence, #* (Sp1)3 o__2 + # -
(1 - r) * a(r ± + az ' < 1. As a consequence, we
(r + (1 - r) #*1) -
1, #* (3pi) E [0, 1] and for any
Lemma 8
It is the direct application of (i)
where i = with precision api = 2 2 
#i #2 2 +)302 o
o, + o and (ii)
UU2
where aPz =a
U2 0a2 + o U2
Notice that (i) Az2 E [0, 1
01z2,Pi ~ N Pz, ap,
+ afPi 1 2 Furthermore,
(' 2,
p2 )0 Z2 ; Z
C_ +#2___2 Z2
2 Z2
= and)30
given 1 > 0 and (ii) Api E [0, 1] given 1 > 2 2Oand (ii) 11  Uy+'32 (0.2±
is always true in equilibrium, which follows from the corollary 2.
Lemma 9
It follows directly from Az2 , Api E [0, 1].
> 0. It follows that: 0 < )30
know that
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Chapter 2
Institutional Investors'
Short-Termism, Trading Frequency
and Firm-Level Stock Price
Volatility
2.1 Introduction
Investors' short investment horizon is often cited as an important factor affecting stock prices
behavior. Recurrently, policy makers and practitioners associate investors' short-termism with
instability, volatility and noise in financial markets. The use of information by short-term
investors is highlighted as a potential channel through which the horizon of investors leads to
volatility and/or the disconnect of a stock price from its fundamental valuation. This idea goes
back as far as Keynes' beauty contest analogy of financial markets.' An investor with a short
Keynes described the strategy of rational investors in financial markets, using an analogy to a newspaper
beauty contest. The beauty contest is described as a game in which the players win if they pick the most popular
photographs of women. "It is not a case of choosing those [faces] that, to the best of one's judgment, are really
the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third
degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.
And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees." (Keynes, General Theory of
Employment Interest and Money, 1936). Keynes likened the behavior of investors in stock markets to the beauty
contest's players as highlighted in the previous quote.
horizon cares about near future price movements and future market participants' beliefs or
perceptions of the intrinsic value of the company. The investor's investment decision could be
unsupported by information about fundamentals such as a firm's profitability. Referring to the
risk related to the myopic behavior of financial institutions, a Member of the Executive Board
of the ECB stated:2
"...The combination of the two risks mentioned above - myopic behavior and market
concentration - might further fuel the risk of herding behavior... Asset managers
might thus become more and more focused on trying to anticipate other managers'
expectations, including the central bank short-term behavior, rather than looking
at fundamentals." L. Bini Smaghi, 2006.
Although these popular notions have spurred considerable theoretical work, there is little
empirical work validating, or rejecting, these notions. This paper attempts to fill this gap.
Assessing the empirical relevance of the relation between the horizon of an investor and stock
prices, faces an important challenge. This challenge is associated to the difficulty of mapping
these notions to the data. An investor's horizon is a primitive of its preferences and behavior
and by its nature, is not observable. This paper constructs an indicator for the investor's
horizon using its trading frequency. As such, the measure for the horizon in this paper is less
directly connected to the notion of horizon referring to the length of an investor's life-span, as
an investor's life-span may not be directly related to an investor frequency of trading. On the
other hand, this measure closely relates to the common notion shared in the popular claims
that associate short-term investors to short-term price movements' chasers.
"...We think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary
businesses, in which we measure our success by the long-term progress of the com-
panies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks. In fact, we
would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading,
or quotation of prices, in the stocks of those companies. If we have good long-
2 This quote is taken from the speech of Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, a member of the executive board of the ECB,
at a conference on "Dealing with the New Giants", Geneva, 4 May 2006.
term expectations, short-term price changes are meaningless for us... " Berkshire
Hathaway, 1999.
Here, the investment horizon refers to the length of time that an investor expects to hold
a security or a portfolio. As such, the horizon of an investor is tightly linked to the frequency
with which it tends to rebalance its portfolio (its trading frequency). An investor with a shorter
horizon -who holds on to a security for a shorter period of time, will trade more frequently.
"...Here's no doubt Warren Buffett [primary shareholder, chairman and CEO of
Berkshire Hathaway] is a long-term investor. He looks for outstanding businesses
that he can buy at a fair price with the intent of holding them for a long time... -
ideally forever" G. Forsythe, 2007.3
However, it is worth noting that while an investment horizon is an unobservable investor's
characteristic, its frequency to trade is an equilibrium outcome. Hence, a simple comparison
of the portfolio turnover rates across investors and time will confound the horizon with the
effect of security and market characteristics. For example, consider two investors who hold
different securities and have different portfolio turnover rates. The difference in their portfolio
turnover rates may be due to the differences in the investors' investment horizon (what we are
interested in) or may be due to the differences in the characteristics of the securities they hold.
Similarly, the portfolio turnover rate of investors at different points in time may be different
due to aggregate market effects that change across time.
In this paper, I construct a novel measure of the intrinsic frequency of trading for the large
US institutional investors as the fixed effect in the investors' trading frequency. I then study
how the composition of these fixed effects at the security level impacts stock prices behavior
using firm-level panel data.
I use quarterly holding data for the large US financial institutions, also named the 13-F
institutions after the report they are required to fill on a quarterly basis, from the Thomson-
Reuters Institutional Holdings dataset from 1980 to 2005. I measure the institution's intrinsic
3 This quote has been taken from the February 2007 issue of Schwab Investing Insights, a monthly publication
for Schwab clients. It has been written by Greg Forsythe, CFA, Senior Vice President, Schwab Equity Ratings,
Schwab Center for Financial Research.
trading frequency as the investor's fixed effect in a three way fixed effects model of the investors'
change in their positions. In particular, I use information about the quarterly change in an
institution's position in a security, measured by the absolute value of the percentage change in
the number of shares they are holding in the security. I exploit the three dimensions of the
variable: investors, security and time. The institution's fixed effect captures the institutions'
intrinsic trading frequency, by controlling for any security and market characteristics, which
could influence the investor's change in its position across time and across securities. This new
measure captures an institution's trading characteristic and provides a way to compare one
institution to another in terms of their trading behavior.
As shown by Gompers and Metrick (2001), the 13-F institutions have experienced a tremen-
dous growth and represent an important share of the US equity markets. The growth in the
institutional investor population has been accompanied with an increase in the size of the mu-
tual funds, the brokerage companies and the investment banks. I show that on average, the
latter institutions appear to exhibit the highest intrinsic trading frequency. This finding is in
line with claims made about the stock markets becoming more short-termist:
"...The culture of short-termism-investing for short-term gains at the expense of
long-term accumulation-has taken hold on Wall Street. Managerial capitalism has
replaced financial capitalism as holding periods for stocks dropped from eight years
in the 1960s to as low as six months today" B. George, Wall Street Journal, 2010.
For each security traded in the NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex and held by a 13-F institution, I
then construct an institution's trading frequency index. This index is measured as the weighted
average of the trading frequency fixed effect of the investors holding the security. I then explore
the relation between the institution's trading frequency index and stock prices movements at
the security level. I look at the extent to which security prices respond, on average, to different
kinds of information, when held by high as opposed to low trading frequency investors. In
particular, does the price of the securities held by high trading frequency investors forecast
less the long run cash flow of a company than the securities held by low trading frequency
investors? Does the price of the securities held by high trading frequency investors forecast
better the long run discount factor relative to the securities held by low trading frequency
investors? Concretely, I estimate the forecasting coefficients of a regression of the total return
and the total return on equity on the book to market ratio-a proxy for the price, for different
horizons, i.e. from one to thirteen years into the future. The cash flow is proxied by the return
on equity. The return on equity can be seen as a normalized measure of the earnings (net
income) of a company, defined as the earnings over the book value of the company. Thus, it is
related to the company's fundamental because of its link to productivity. On the other hand,
the discount rate component, measured by the return, can reflect time-varying risk aversion or
investor sentiments. 4 Forecasting regressions are informative on the extent to which investors
react to different types of information. For instance, if the investors react to information
about the long run cash flow of a company, then on average the prices should respond to that
information and should forecast the cash flow of the company. I use firm level annual data
and I explore the difference in the forecasting coefficients for the securities held by high trading
frequency investors as opposed to low trading frequency investors.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, consistent with claims made about the
volatility and short-termism, I find that securities held by higher trading frequency investors
exhibit a higher volatility than securities held by lower trading frequency investors. The return
of the securities with a high institution's trading index, i.e. an index in the upper tercile, has
a standard deviation 7 percentage points higher than the securities with a low institution's
trading index. 5
However, looking at the forecasting role of the book to market ratio, I then show that the
price of a security held by low trading frequency investors mainly forecasts the long run cash
flow of a firm, as captured by the profitability of a firm, as opposed to the long run return.
Overall, there is no statistical and economic difference between the forecasting role of the prices
for the return on equity for securities held by high trading frequency investors as opposed to
low trading frequency investors at any horizon. However, when it comes to the long run return,
the forecasting role of the book to market ratio differs between high and low trading frequency
4 Conceptually, using Vuolteenaho (2002) accounting present value identity, the book to market ratio can be
decomposed between long run return on equity (cash flow component) and long run discount factor (discount
factor component) as well as an error term. Hence, the book to market-a proxy for the price-should reflect a
mixture of information about the long run return and the long run return on equity.
5This phenomenon is a pervasive feature of the data and holds for weekly, monthly and quarterly returns as
well.
securities. The book to market does not seem to forecast long run return for the securities held
by high trading frequency investors (with a coefficient of 0.08 and a standard error of 0.07 for
the return after 13 years) as opposed to the securities held by low trading frequency investors
(with a coefficient of 0.26 and a standard deviation of 0.037).
I then explore the return predictability in more detail. Does the return predictability of the
securities held by high trading frequency investors differ as well with respect to other traditional
forecasting variables used in the literature? Overall, in terms of the return predictability litera-
ture, this study shows that the securities held by investors with different trading characteristics
differ in terms of their risk premia. In particular, contrary to the return of the securities held
by low trading frequency investors, the return of the securities held by high trading frequency
investors, is on average non forecastable by the usual forecasting variables highlighted in the
literature, such as the return, the return on equity, the book to market ratio or the leverage.
Moreover, I show that the trading frequency index contains additional information regarding
the next year return, not embedded in the usual forecasting variables.
Another way to explore this question is to look at the return directly by using the return
decomposition framework put forward by Campbell (1991). Conceptually, this decomposition
divides the unexpected change in the return on the change in the expectation of future cash
flows (Cash flow News) and/or future return (Discount Factor News) using the present value
identity. Looking at the return decomposition, I find that the unexpected return movements
(with a variance of 0.11) are traced back to the cash flow news (with a variance of 0.095) as
opposed to the discount factor news (with a variance of 0.004). Both cash flow and discount
factor news are estimated through a panel VAR.
Finally, I show that the lower volatility of the return of the securities held by low trading
frequency institutions index is traced back to an immediate under-reaction of the price to cash
flow news. The cash flow news have been built using the VAR-return decomposition. Overall,
a portfolio of securities held by low trading frequency investors exhibits on average a slower
reaction of the return to the cash flow news than a portfolio of the securities held by high
trading frequency investors. After distinguishing between good and bad cash flow news, I find
that the differential reaction of the return between high and low trading frequency institutions
index is associated to the reaction of the return to good news. On average a security reaction
to a 1% cash flow news, is 24% higher for securities held by high trading frequency institutions
relative to low trading frequency institutions.
To summarize, using yearly frequency data and the 13-F institutional investors, it seems
that short-term investors are more like the dog that barks, [but] does not bite. In other words,
they are associated to higher volatility, but on average the volatility is related to the price
reflecting the fundamental and to firm-level information about cash flow news. It seems that
the prices are aggregating the information about the firm's cash flow well.
It is important to stress the scope of this study as well as some directions for future research.
First, given that I use quarterly holdings data for the 13-F institutions, I cannot make any
inference regarding the relationship between stock prices and short-termism for day traders or
retail investors. It is plausible that the disconnect between the prices and the fundamental
valuation does indeed take place with day traders or retail investors. Likewise, short-termism
could generate a deviation from the fundamental valuation at higher frequency (for monthly or
daily data) and such deviation decreases for annual frequency data. Second, my measure on the
investor's idiosyncratic frequency to trade is a proxy for, but does not capture exclusively the
investor's horizon. For instance, the trading frequency fixed-effect could confound the investor's
horizon together with other investor's intrinsic characteristics making him or her likely to trade
more frequently such as its information such as his or her access to information.6
Nonetheless, beyond these caveats related to the interpretation of the trading frequency
fixed effect, this study highlights a new type of variable in understanding and explaining stock
prices. This variable, contrary to usual securities characteristics, is related to the heterogeneity
in the investors holding the securities. As such, the results show that the trading frequency
index contains novel information to understand stock prices beyond the usual variables such as
the size of a security, among others. This new variable embeds an interesting way of looking at
asset pricing as it relates not to the characteristics of the firm, but rather to the characteristics
of the investors who hold the particular security.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description
of the literature. Section 3 introduces the measure for the horizon of the institutional investors
6 Thanks to the focus on large U.S. institutional investors, the variations in the fixed-effect are less likely to
capture differences in risk aversion or liquidity constraints. These could be more of a constraints among retail
investors, which might be more subject to heterogeneity in risk aversion or the funds they have access to.
as well as some descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces the interaction between stock prices
behavior and the average horizon of the institutions holding the security. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This study builds on and contributes to various existing literatures. A number of studies have
highlighted a role for short-term investors in generating financial market inefficiencies. Among
others, DeLong, Summers, Shleifer and Waldmann (1990a) and (1990b), emphasize the role of
rational risk averse short-term speculators for mispricing generated by irrational traders. Short-
term investors might also trade on the basis of overconfidence; Odean (1998) and Barber and
Odean (2000), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009).7 In addition to these behavioral approaches,
Dow and Gorton (1994) show that investors will use their signals only if it is impounded in the
price at which they will sell the asset. Similarly, in Allen, Morris and Shin (2006), Bacchetta
and Van Wincoop (2008), Cespa and Vives (2009), Grisse (2009), rational short-lived investors
overreact to public signals, as it informs them about future market participants beliefs reflected
in the price at which they will liquidate the asset in the future. Directly studying the incidence of
the horizon of traders, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) emphasize a negative relation between
the horizon and stock price informativeness. A similar result is obtained in Parsa (2011). The
results in the current paper challenge the previous studies as I find that securities held by
institutional investors trading more frequently leads to higher volatility, but the volatility is
not "disconnected" from the long run security payoff.
More broadly, I show that securities held by institutions trading more frequently are not
predictable (at least by the usual variables used in the literature), while the securities held by
institutions trading less frequently exhibit substantial predictability and under-reaction. These
results relate to the stock price "anomalies" and return predictability literature. The expla-
nation behind the return predictability remains a source of academic debate, as the empirical
7 In DeLong et al. (1990a), short-lived risk averse speculators are limited in their capacity to arbitrage the
mispricing generated by noisy traders due to the unpredictability of the same mispricing, which introduces risk
that can not be diversified away in the short-run. Their assumption on the horizon of speculators is at the
core of noise traders aptitude to crowd away arbitrage. In DeLong et al. (1990b), impatient rational traders
can even generate excess movements in the prices as they try to forecast the beliefs of irrational traders, i.e.
positive-feedback traders extrapolating past price trends. Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000), Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2009) provide evidence that overconfident investors are likely to trade more frequently.
findings are consistent with either efficiency or mispricing (irrational or rational) (see for ex-
ample Fama and French (1993), Fama (1998), Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), Campbell,
Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Subrahmanyam (1998), Hong and Stein, (1999) and (2007), and Banerjee, Kaniel and Kremer
(2009) amongst others). The results in the current work suggest that the understanding of stock
return predictability should focus on the low trading frequency institutional investors and the
friction that allows the securities held by high and low trading frequency institutions to differ. 8
The empirical strategy builds on the literature that explores the fundamental components
behind the stock price movements, namely the cash flow and the discount factor; Campbell
and Shiller (1988a), (1988b), Campbell (1991), Campbell and Ammer (1993). In particular,
this study builds on and contributes to the firm-level stock price decomposition literature;
see Vuolteenaho (2002), Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2002), Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004), Koubouros, Malliaropulos, and Panopoulou (2005), Hecht and Vuolteenaho (2006),
Larrain, and Yogo (2008) and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009). Conceptually, using
Vuolteenaho (2002) accounting present value identity, the book-to-market ratio can be decom-
posed between long run return on equity (cash flow component) and long run discount factor
(discount factor component) as well as an error term. Hence, the book-to-market - a proxy for
the price - should reflect a mixture of information about the long run return and the long run
return on equity. I explore the two components of the book to market movements as a function
of the institutional investors' trading frequency characteristics.
This paper also adds to the vast literature on institutional investors. On one hand, Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Wermers (1999,
2000), Nofsinger and Sias (1999) documented a positive contemporaneous relation between in-
stitutional investors' buying and stock returns. Daniel, Grimblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997),
Gompers and Metrick (2001) highlighted a positive relation between institutional buying and
the short-term expected return, where the expected returns are higher (lower) for stocks ex-
8 One potential explanation for the predictability and under-reaction pattern for the securities held by insti-
tutions trading less frequently is related to the underlying characteristics of the securities low trading frequency
institutions invest in. Nevertheless, I control for an important set of securitiesO characteristics. An alterna-
tive explanation recognizes that institutional investors are facing some constraints (Shleifer and Vishny (1997))
and are unable to take full advantage of stock price differences. As such, the results suggest an institutionOs
phenomenon related to mispricing. In both cases, the understanding is tightly linked to low trading frequency
institutions.
periencing a significant institutional buying (selling). These studies consider the institutional
investors as a homogenous group. On the other hand, Wermers (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001), Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenhao (2002) explores a source of heterogeneity in the type of
investors (mutual funds, retail investors, institutional investors, and so on) on the equilibrium
investors' trading behaviors. 9 This paper contributes to the previous literature by exploiting
the intrinsic trading frequency behavior of institutional investors as a source of heterogeneity
among institutional investors, in understanding stock prices' behavior.
Finally, this paper connects to previous studies, which have looked at the portfolio turnover
rate of institutional investors and its interaction with financial markets; Gaspar, Massa and
Matos (2005), Ke, Ramalingegowda and Yu (2006), Yan and Zhang (2009). Motivated by the
effect of the investment horizon of institutional investors, Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) use
institutional investors portfolio turnover rate and explore the corporate controls market. 10 Ke,
Ramalingegowda and Yu (2006), Yan and Zhang (2009) focus on stock prices. 1 ' This paper is
related and adds to the previous studies as it uses the institution's trading information. How-
ever, by using the fixed-effect trading frequency of the investors, it focuses on the institutions'
intrinsic trading characteristic as opposed to their equilibrium trading behavior, which might
confound securities and market characteristics.
As such, this study is related to Jin and Kogan (2007), Khan, Kogan and Serafeim (2010).
Jin and Kogan (2007) focus on one particular channel behind the mutual funds trading frequency
intrinsic to the mutual fund. They use the variation in the portfolio turnover rate of the mutual
fund managers, and its interaction with a measure of investor's impatience, defined as the
sensitivity of money flows into and out of the fund in response to the short-term performance
of the fund. They find that mutual fund managers tend to focus on short horizon investments
9 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) explores a dataset of the shareholdings in FSCD stocks and documents
differences in the buy and sell behavior as well as the performance of different types of investors, such as
households, foreign investors, financial institutions and insurance companies. Wermers (1999) focuses on the
mutual fund industry and provides evidence on the "herdingd behavior of mutual funds as well as their impact
for the stock prices. Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenhao (2002) study the difference between the trading behaviors of
institutional investors as opposed to individual investors in their reaction to cash flow news using the VAR-return
decomposition at the firm level.
"Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) show that firms with shareholders having a higher portfolio turnover are
more likely to get an acquisition bid, but at a lower premium.
"Yan and Zhang (2009) finds that the trading of institutional investors with a high portfolio turnover rate
forecasts future stock returns. Ke, Ramalingegowda and Yu (2006) focus on the reaction to information by
institutions with different portfolio turnover rate.
due to the short horizon of their investors (and not the other way around). Their evidence
suggests that this behavior may result in abnormal returns as it leads to an inflated demand of
short horizon investment opportunities at the expense of longer horizon alternatives. Similar
to the findings in Jin and Kogan (2007), I provide evidence that the institution's trading
frequency matters for the behavior of stock prices. 12 Nevertheless, this study differs from Jin
and Kogan (2007) as I don't focus on one particular channel behind the trading frequency of
the institutions. The measure I construct for the institutional investors' trading frequency is
a "black box", which captures the component of the institution's turnover explained by the
institution's intrinsic characteristics as opposed to the market and/or characteristics of the
securities they invest in. Institutional investors can have different horizons for many reasons:
different levels of patience (subjective discount factor), liquidity needs, administrative costs,
legal restrictions, competitive pressures related to the performance based pay; see Dow and
Gorton (1997), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006). Instead, the
measure used in this study, allows me to focus on the whole set of institutional investors and
the interaction of their trading frequency with stock prices, as the only information required is
the holdings of the investors.
2.3 Data Description and Methodology
In order to study the relation between the investors' trading frequency and the stock prices
behavior, (i) I construct an investor-specific measure of the intrinsic frequency of trading; then
(ii) I construct a security-specific measure of the composition of the intrinsic trading frequency
of the investors holding the security at a given moment in time; Finally, (iii) I use the security
level measure constructed in (ii) to see how the aforementioned security-specific characteristic
impacts stock market outcomes. In what follows, I describe step by step, each of these points
as well as the results on the relation between the investors' trading frequency and stock prices.
1 2 Contrary to earlier studies, the main object of interest of this paper and Jin and Kogan (2007)Os is not on
the effects of the demand by institutional investors on stock prices, but rather on the differential response of the
stock prices held by institutions with different trading frequency.
2.3.1 Institutional Investor's Trading Frequency Fixed Effect
In order to study the institutional investor's trading frequency, I use information about the
quarterly equity holdings of all the institutions provided by the Thomson Reuters Ownership
dataset.13 The dataset results from the 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 which requires all institutions with greater than $100 million of securities under discre-
tionary management to disclose their holdings on all their common-stock positions greater than
10,000 shares or $200,000 on the SEC's form 13F. The institutions included are divided into
5 categories: Banks, Insurance Companies, Investment Companies and Their Managers (e.g.
Mutual Funds), Investment Advisors which includes the large brokerage firms and all Others
(Pension Funds, University Endowments, Foundations). It reports a total of 4382 managers.
The data coverage increased in terms of both the security and manager dimension from a total
of 573 managers and 4451 securities in 1980 to 2617 managers and 13125 securities in 2005. The
institutional investors represented initially 16% of the market they invested in ($954 millions)
in 1980 but this number increases to an average of 44% ($17,500 millions) in 2005.14
For each institution, define sijt as the number of shares institution i is holding in security j
at quarter t and yijt as the absolute value of the percentage change in the position of institution
i in security j at quarter t15
yijt = abs - ijt1(2.1)
(sigt + sit- 1)
yijt is capturing the frequency of trade of institution i in each security j at quarter t. If an
institution i is holding the same number of securities at quarter t and t - 1, then yijt = 0. If
on average yijt is bigger for institution i than institution i', then on average, institution i is
rebalancing its portfolio more frequently than institution i' during a given period of time.
3 The dataset was previously known as the CDA/Spectrum 34 database. The institutions in the sample are
also referred to as the 13F institutions in reference to the form they are required to fill at a quarterly basis.
4 Some of this growth is due to an increase in the value of the equity market throughout the sample period,
which forced more institutions to fill the 13-F forms as the rising market pushed their portfolio across the nominal
threshold level of $100 million. For more details about the dataset, I refer you to Gompers and Metrick (2001).
151 am using in the denominator the average number of shares in quarter t and quarter t - 1 instead of the
number of shares in quarter t - 1. The main reason is to keep yijt from being forced to a missing value when
the number of shares moves from 0 to a positive number. However, notice that as the number of shares increase
from 0 to a positive number yjt will be equal to 2. Hence, part of the information is clearly missing as a change
of an institution's position is treated differently whether it was holding a positive number at t - 1 or 0 at t - 1.
yijt presents an obvious weakness at capturing an institution's intrinsic characteristic. The
trading behavior of an investor, captured by the absolute value of the percentage change in the
position of institution in a given security at a given quarter, is an equilibrium outcome. As such,
it is likely to be the endogenous result of the investor's characteristics such as its investment
horizon, as well as of the characteristics of the securities they are investing in and aggregate
market effects. As a consequence, it is unclear that this measure will allow one to capture an
investor intrinsic characteristic. For instance, two managers identical in every respect except
for the securities they are investing in, could have different portfolio turnover rates as the flow
of information in the two sets of securities is very different. Ultimately, an investor's trading
behavior will confound its characteristics (risk aversion, horizon) as well as the market and the
security characteristics.
In addition, an investor's portfolio turnover rate or any measure based directly on the
investors' trading information might lead to spurious results when looking at the effect of the
investors' trading frequency on the security price behavior. Using again the example above if
two otherwise identical managers invest in a set of securities with different levels of volatility,
then the investor investing in the more volatile securities might end up with a larger portfolio
turnover rate. One could spuriously associate high trading frequency investors with securities
that have a higher volatility, as their portfolio turnover rates will be high as well. Thus, the
behavior of the portfolio turnover rate might inherit the dynamic characteristics of the securities
they are investing in.
Overall, any measure of an investor's trading frequency based solely on the observed change
in the investor's positions will carry these concerns. In what follows, I construct a measure,
which captures an investor's idiosyncratic tendency to change its position, once any security or
market effects have been partialled out. To this end, I estimate by ordinary least squares, for
each year T = 1980, ..., 2005 a regression of the form:
yT3 = a+h Tg + X t+eit, (2.2)
where y is the absolute value of the change in the holding of institution i in security j in
quarter t of year T, hT is the institution fixed effect; g is the time-security interaction fixed
effect and X controls for the size of the portfolio of investor i as well as the size of each security
in the portfolio of investor i.16 The estimates of h[ in equation (2.2) provide an annual measure
of the investor's trading frequency that does not confound any security or time effects. The
two latter effects are fully absorbed by the term gt. I allow the measure of the institution's
trading frequency (h) to change annually in order to capture changes across time that could
be driven by an investor characteristics, such as the investment horizon associated to changes
in its corporate governance, its objective, its CEO, the regulation or its preferences.
Definition 19 An investors's intrinsic trading frequency, or "horizon ", is defined by the fixed
effect in the regression (2.2) :
hT, Vi E I (2.3)
A larger institution's fixed effect hf, is associated to investors who change their positions
more often and hence have a higher idiosyncratic trading frequency. Ultimately, h provides a
measure comparable to the portfolio turnover rate. However, by exploiting the three dimensions
of the data (institutions, security and quarter), it combines the changes in an institution security
holdings in one churning rate, which summarizes only the trading behavior that results from
the institution.
I compared the yearly hT with different alternatives such as the quarterly rolling measure,
the 2 years rolling measure as well as the 5 years rolling measure. The quarterly rolling measure
is defined by a fixed effect estimated from the first quarter of 1981 using data from the four
previous quarters rolling for each quarter until the last quarter of 2005. The 2 years and 5
years rolling measure roll over each year. In each of these two alternatives, the fixed effect for
a given year is estimated using data from the second quarter of a 2 and 5 years to the second
quarter of the year of interest. I also allowed for time breaks whenever they change their type,
e.g. from a bank to a mutual fund. The decision to look mainly at the yearly measure has been
made in order to allow changes in the horizon of the investor through time without imposing it
happening only at a specific moment such as when they change their type. However, the three
measures are highly correlated (above 90%).17
1
6 Concretely, the fixed effect measures are computed with respect to the following normalization:
Et Z3 bjitgjt = EZ 6jitb; = 0 where ojit = 1 if yjit is non missing and 0 otherwise.7 More details are provided in the appendix found at http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/sparsa/research
Descriptive Statistics
As a first reality check on the measure, Table I describes the distribution of the fixed effect
estimates in two dimensions: (i) the dispersion across different types of institutions and (ii)
the persistence of the fixed effect estimates across time. Panel A summarizes the descriptive
statistics-mean, standard deviation, 25% and 75% percentiles-of the fixed effect estimates by
type of institutions from 1980 to 1998.18 The investors are divided into 5 types of institutions:
Banks, Insurance Companies, Investment Companies and their Managers (e.g. Mutual Funds),
Investment Advisors, and all Others (Pension Funds, University Endowments, Foundations).
In line with common priors, the mutual funds and the investment advisers exhibit on average
the highest trading frequency fixed effects, respectively 0.063 and 0.177. The group of insurance
companies and banks have on average the lowest trading frequency fixed effects, respectively
-0.007 and 0.006. It has been shown in previous studies that the growth of the financial
institutions came hand in hand with an increase in the presence of the investment advisers,
and the mutual funds. This could give support to claims made in the media or among policy
makers about Wall street becoming too short-termist, as the institutions dominating it are the
institutions with the shortest horizon.19 Finally, notice that despite the difference in terms of
the averages, each type exhibits a high level of within group variability.20
Panel B reports the first to fifth order autocorrelation of the trading frequency fixed effects.
One can notice that the fixed effect measure is relatively persistent across time with a first
order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.72. The autocorrelation of the fixed effect decays slowly
with time (as expected) but it remains above 0.5.
18The reason I am using only the dataset from 1980 to 1998 is because there has been a mapping error that
occurred when TFN integrated data from the former Technimetrics. Many of these institutions were and are
still improperly classified as "Others".
"For instance, "Overcoming Short-termism: A call for a more responsible Approach to Investment and Business
Management", September 2009.
2 0One needs to remain cautious about these results as the mutual funds are considered as a block and report
only an aggregated number. As we saw, the largest institutions are dominated by the mutual funds. Hence, it is
very likely that the standard deviation is downward-biased specially among the largest institutions.
Portfolio Characteristics
Do investors characterized by a different trading frequency fixed effect differ in terms of the
securities they hold in their portfolio? Table II compares the characteristics of the portfolios of
both high and low trading frequency institutions. A high and a low trading frequency institution
is defined as follows. Each year, I rank each institution according their hT measure and sort
them in 5 different groups defined by the quintiles of h. The institutions with a fixed effect
lower than the lowest quintile are defined as low trading frequency institutions. On the other
hand, the institutions with a fixed effect higher than the upper quintile are defined as high
trading frequency institutions.
Table II reports three groups of portfolio characteristics: (i) Market level, (ii) Accounting
level and (iii) Others. The market level variables correspond to the size, the volatility, the
volume of trade, the turnover as well as the past 3 and 12 months return of the securities
(momentum 3 and momentum 12). The accounting level variables include the book to market
ratio, the profitability (measured by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
return on equity), the yield, the earning price ratio, and leverage ratio. Finally, the last group
of variables illustrates the concentration of the investor's portfolio at both the security and the
industry level and the stock exchange they invest in. Below, I summarize the definition of each
variable (for more details on the construction of the variables see the Appendix).
1. Market level: For each end of quarter and security held by an institution, the size of
the security is measured as the combined value of all common stock classes outstanding.
The volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the daily excess return during the
previous year, i.e. from the beginning of quarter t+1 year s-1, to the end of quarter t year
s. The daily excess return is defined as (ri - rf i.e. in excess of the daily risk free rate.
I also look at the decomposition of the volatility between idiosyncratic volatility and the
common component. The idiosyncratic risk is defined as the firm specific risk. For each
year ending at the end of a quarter, daily excess returns of individual stocks are regressed
on the daily Fama-French (1993,1996) three factors: the excess return on a broad market
portfolio (rmt - r{), SMB, i.e. small minus big, and HML, i.e. high minus low. The
predicted values are used to estimate the common movement and the residuals are used to
estimate the idiosyncratic risk. By definition, the idiosyncratic risk is independent of the
common movement.The volume of trade is measured as the sum of the trading volumes
during the year preceding a given quarter. The share turnover is measured as the volume
divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of a given quarter. Finally, the
3 and 12 months returns are respectively compounded from monthly returns, recorded
from 3 months and 12 months prior to the end of the quarter t.
2. Accounting level: The accounting variables are measured at an annual frequency. For
each year, the book-to-market of a firm is defined as the book equity at the end of the
previous fiscal year divided by the market equity, i.e. the size, at the end of June of the
current year. The profitability is measured as the earning in the current year divided by
the book equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. The leverage is measured as the
book equity divided by the sum of the book and debt equity. Finally, the Yield and the
earning price ratio are respectively measured by the cash dividend of a company at the
end of the fiscal year divided by the market equity at the end of June of the same year
and the earning value divided by the market equity.
3. Others: I look at the market they are investing in. Finally, I report a measure of the
concentration of the investor's portfolio at the security level and industry level. I use
the Herfindahl index, which is defined for each institution at each quarter as Y w ,
where wi is the share of the portfolio, they are holding in a given security (industry). A
institution with a larger index has a more concentrated portfolio.
Table II reports the average share of the investors' portfolio held in securities with a given
characteristic. For all the variables at the market and accounting level, I rank all the securities in
the NYSE for each time period, quarterly for the market variables and yearly for the accounting
variables, according to the variables of interest. I use the lowest quintile and upper quintile of
the given variable, to generate two groups of securities. The securities held by the institutions
with a given characteristic x, below the lowest quintile (Low group) and the securities with a
given characteristic x above the upper quintile (High group). For instance, consider the size of
a security. For each quarter, I defined the lowest and upper quintile according to the size of the
securities in the NYSE. I then create two groups of securities based on the two cutoffs: the small
securities and the large securities. I finally report the relative share of an investor's portfolio
that is held in small and large securities. I do the same exercise for each of the variables I
defined above.
Each row represents a security level characteristic. The first two columns show the port-
folio composition of the institutions with a high trading frequency and the last two columns
the portfolio composition of the institutions with a low trading frequency. For each group of
investors, the first column summarizes the average shares held in securities with a high value
and the second column reports the average shares held in securities with a low value.
Table II highlights mainly three differences in the portfolio composition of investors with a
different trading frequency: (i) volatility, (ii) turnover and (iii) profitability. In particular, from
the second row of the Table II, high trading frequency investors hold 24% of the their portfolio
on average in securities with a high volatility, while low trading frequency investors hold 10%
of their portfolio in securities with a high volatility. The converse happens when looking at the
securities with a low volatility. Only 15% of the portfolio of high trading frequency investors
is in low volatility shares while the corresponding figure for low trading frequency investors is
21%. This result is a preview of the security level analysis. High trading frequency investors
have a higher share in securities with a high turnover (t0.38) relative to low trading frequency
investors (+0.18). Finally, high trading frequency investors have a lower share in securities with
a high profitability (0.007) relative to low frequency investors (±0.46).
It is important to notice that these patterns are not spurious in the sense that my measure
of the intrinsic trading frequency of investors controls for aggregate- and security-level effects,
including the volatility of different securities. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these
patterns identify a causal relation. Investors with a high fixed effect could prefer securities
with a high volatility, or a high turnover as well as the high turnover rate, or volatility is being
generated partly by the presence of high trading frequency investors. Finally, apart from these
three characteristics, the table does not highlight any other striking difference in the portfolio
of investors with different trading frequencies.
2.3.2 A Security Trading Frequency Index
The preceding discussion explained the investor-specific measure of its intrinsic trading fre-
quency. I now proceed to construct a security-specific characteristic, by looking at the com-
position of the investors that hold a particular security and taking a weighted average of the
investors' intrinsic frequency of trade. This seeks to capture the effect of the institutions'
trading frequency on the stock price movements.
In order to explore the interaction between the stock price movements and the institutions
trading frequency fixed effect, I use information from three sources: (i) The Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP), (ii) The Standard & Poor's Compustat North America annual
research file and (iii) The Thomson Reuters Ownership Data. The set of securities included
corresponds to the intersection of these three databases, i.e. the securities that belong to the
portfolio of the 13-F financial institutions from the beginning of 1980 to the end of 2005 with
both market and accounting information available respectively in the CRSP and the Compustat.
The CRSP provides information on monthly prices, dividends, shares outstanding, and
returns for NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq securities. The Compustat contains accounting infor-
mation for most publicly traded U.S. companies. In addition, the one-month Treasury Bill
Rate at monthly frequency gives the risk-free interest rate from Ibbotson Associates. I restrict
attention to the securities traded in the NYSE, the AMEX and the NASDAQ as well as the
securities, which are held by more than 25 institutions, or the institutions represent at least
10% of the shares outstanding of the securities. In other words, the present study focuses on
the securities, where the institutional investors as a group hold a non-marginal share of the
total ownership. Depending on the year, 30 to 50% of the securities have been dropped from
the sample due to these criteria. More details on the data described in this section can be found
in the Appendix.
For each 13-F institution, the Thomson Reuters ownership data reports the securities the
investor is holding in its portfolio. For each year T and security j held by a group of institutions
Ij, I am defining the security js trading frequency index at year T as the weighted average of
the fixed effect of the institutions in Ij :
HjT = ( WijThiT (2.4)
iEIj
where WirT , sjrj is the number of shares outstanding of security j held by
institution i at year T and hiT is the fixed effect of institution i at year T. The weight, i.e.
wijt, is capturing the relative importance of investor i for security j at year t, in terms of the
number of shares investor i holds relative to the total number of shares the group of institutional
investors is holding. It implies that the trading frequency of an investor holding 90% of the
shares of a security should have a larger effect than the trading frequency of an investor holding
only 10% of the shares of a security. The security's trading frequency index will give more
weight to the former investor's fixed effect than to that of the latter. Notice that in order to
align the information on the investors with the accounting level information, the measure H in
year T is using information from the end of June of year T - 1 to the end of June of year T
and WijT is the average relative size of institution j from the end of June in year T - 1 to the
end of June in year T.
Definition 20 The security specific trading frequency index is defined as the weighted average
of the trading frequency fixed effect of the investors holding the security given by (2.4):
HT, Vj E J (2.5)
H3 r maps the institutional investors' trading frequency, i.e. hT, to the security. H is
interpreted as the average trading frequency of the population of institutional investors holding
the security j at year T. A security j will have a high trading frequency index if, on average,
the institutional investors holding the security, are characterized by a short investment horizon,
proxied by a large h. Overall, the institutions are weighted by their relative size with respect
to the institutions holding the security. As a consequence, the variation in H can be traced
back to one of two sources: (i) For a given pool of investors, the investors with a lower value
of the fixed effect are holding a higher share of the security. In other words, the high trading
frequency investors represent a higher share of the security, i.e. higher weight wijT on the high
hjT (the high trading frequency investors). (ii) For a given weight, the institutions holding the
security have a higher institution's trading frequency. Both sources of variation, translate in
a security having higher trading frequency investors than another security or having a higher
trading frequency across time.2 1
In addition, I define a high and low trading frequency group. Each year, I sort all the
securities with respect to Hit. I construct three groups of securities based on the terciles of
H: lowest tercile, L, the middle tercile, M, and the upper tercile, U. Group L is defined as
the securities, which have a trading frequency index H in the first tercile. I will name these
securities the low trading group. Group M is defined as the securities which have a trading
frequency index H in the second tercile. I will name these securities the medium trading group
securities. Finally, group U is defined as the securities, which have a trading frequency index
in the upper tercile. The securities in the last group are the high trading group securities.
Descriptive Statistics
Before proceeding to the results on the predictability of the firm level return and the return
on equity, Table III summarizes the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, 25 as
well as 75 percentiles) of the variables and the sample used in the remaining of this paper. In
particular, the set of variables used in order of appearance in Table III are: the log of the annual
return rit, the log of the Clean-Surplus return on equity eit at the end of the fiscal year. The
Clean-Surplus profitability is defined as one plus the Clean-Surplus earnings divided by the last
fiscal year book equity. The earnings on the clean-surplus relation Xt for the fiscal year t are
given by:
= [(1+ Re) Mt_1 - Dt] Bt-B-+D
Mt
It can be seen as the return on the book value adjusted for equity offerings. The accounting
clean surplus identity is given by Bt = Bt-i + Xt - Dt, where Bt is the book value of the
company at the end of the fiscal year t and Dt is the dividend. The log of the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) return on equity, the log of the book to market ratio
0 it, the log of the leverage ratio, the share turnover of the security, the size of the security (in
billions), the institutional ownership (measured as the ratio of the shares outstanding of the
2 1 The variation of Ht through time is either the result of : (i) investors selling or buying the security charac-
terized by different horizon, (ii) the investors experiencing a change in their characteristics to trade (which could
come from a change in the CEO or a merger), or (iii) both. The variation of Hjt across security mainly comes
from different securities being held by a population of investors characterized by different horizons at a given
moment in time.
security at the held by the 13-F institutions) and the security level institution trading frequency
index Hi as defined above. More details on the data construction and the restrictions on the
sample are given in the Appendix.
Table III reports the descriptive statistics for the securities held on average by high trading
frequency investors (in group U) and the securities held on average by low trading frequency
investors (in group L). There is a total of 1193 securities and 18348 observations, where 989
securities are in the L group least one year and 1116 securities are U group at least one year.
Consistent with table II (characteristics of the portfolio of high and low trading frequency
investors), the securities held by high trading frequency fixed effect investors (in group U),
have a higher turnover (4.7 as opposed to 11.57 for the low group), a higher return standard
deviation (0.37 as opposed to 0.29 for the low group) as well as a lower size (3.7 as opposed to
2.1 billions). Furthermore, they also exhibit a higher return on average (0.2 as opposed to 0.08
for the low group). Finally, these two groups of securities seem to be held by the same share
of institutional investors on average
2.4 Institutions' Trading Frequency and Forecastability
The starting point of the results is summarized in Figure 1. Consistent with the beliefs of many
scholars, policy makers and practitioners, Figure 1 shows that securities held by high trading
frequency investors are associated with more volatility. Figure 1 illustrates the ratio of the
standard deviation of the annual return of the securities in the three frequency groups relative
to the standard deviation of the low trading frequency group. The figure plots the ratio from
1980 to 2005 at a quarterly basis. Securities held by high trading frequency investors exhibit
a standard deviation of their return, on average, 7 percentage points higher than the securities
held by low trading frequency investors (this difference is statistically significant at the 5%
level). Given that the securities' average standard deviation throughout the whole sample is
approximately 0.15, this difference is also economically significant. In fact, in some periods in
the sample, the standard deviation for the high trading group investors is up to two or three
2 2The focus of this paper is not on the difference in the unconditional expected return that the two groups of
securities are holding. This is an interesting direction for future return, which is being more exploited in future
research. For the purpose of this study, I will take the difference as given in order to estimate the forecasting
coefficients more precisely.
times larger than the volatility of securities held by low trading frequency investors. Finally,
the R 2 of the regression of the standard deviation on the dummies for the different trading
frequency groups reveals that almost 22% of the variation in the volatility across securities is
explained by the type of institutions (low and high frequency) holding the securities. Figure 1
also reveals a monotone relationship between the volatility and the trading frequency group.
From this starting point, two questions arise. (i) What are the sources of the this volatility?
In order to answer the first question, I study the difference in the forecasting power of the
price in forecasting future return and return on equity as a function of the investors holding the
securities, i.e. high and low trading frequency investors. The first question leads us to the second
question. (ii) Does the return of the securities held by investors who trade more frequently differ
in terms of its forecastability? In other words, does the price of the securities held by investors
who trade more frequently differ in a systematic way from the price of the securities held by
investors who trade less frequently? To answer the second question, I look at the forecastability
of the return using a set of usual forecasting variables, which have been highlighted in the
literature as being important in forecasting future return. In other words, does the trading
frequency characteristics of the investors holding the securities have information about stock
market return beyond the usual variables?
2.4.1 Forecastability of the Return and the Return on Equity
What are the sources of this difference in volatility? A first step at understanding the sources
of the volatility consists in looking at the predicting power of the security prices in forecasting
future return and/or future cash flow (profitability). In other words, do the prices of the
securities held by high trading frequency investors forecast long run profitability or long run
return? Do they forecast long run profitability less than the securities held by low trading
frequency investors? In order to address these two questions, I estimate the following two
forecasting regressions of a security's total return (r) and total Clean-Surplus profitability (e)
on its book to market ratio at different horizons k using yearly frequency data (the book to
market ratio can be seen as a proxy for the price of a security):23
rit-t+k = Cg + At +#u(U * Oit-1) + 3(M * oi_1) + 3,L(L * 9 it-1) + t-+t+k (2.6)
eit-t+k = acg + At + # (U * it-1) + * ._) + & Mek(L * Oit_1) + it->t+k (2.7)
where k = 1 to 13 years; U stands for high trading frequency institution dummy (upper
tercile), M stands for the medium trading frequency institution dummy (middle tercile) and
L stands for the low trading frequency institution dummy (lower tercile); rit-+t+k and eit-+t+k
are defined as the total return and clean-surplus return on equity for the next k years, i.e.
Xit-t+k = Xit-1+s, where the variables are expressed in log terms; ag is the security group
fixed effect with g E {U, M, L} and At is the time fixed effect. The reason I am controlling for
the group fixed effect is to alleviate the effect that the difference in the return mean (as seen in
table III) could have on the forecasting coefficients. As such, the forecasting coefficients for each
group exploits the within trading frequency group's source of variation. Furthermore, notice
that the estimated coefficients are generally informative for the market-adjusted return, as well
as the excess return, given I cross-sectionally demean all the data in the regressions (2.6) and (
2.7), via the introduction of At. The reason I look at the variables cross-sectionally demeaned
is to alleviate the cross-sectional dependence that exists at the firm-level panel data. Finally,
the choice of 13 years has been made in order to minimize the loss in the data and the number
of securities, which naturally arises as k increases. Furthermore, for comparison purposes, the
securities included in the sample remain for at least 10 years.2 4
The main results are illustrated in Figures 2 (a)-(b) as well as Table IV. Figures 2 (a)-(b)
plot the forecasting coefficients of the total return on equity (Figure 2(a)) and the total return
(Figure 2(b)) as a function of the different horizon (k), where k = 1 to 13 years (#,k and
#ek). They compare the forecasting coefficients for the securities in the high trading frequency
2 3 The reason I use the Clean-Surplus return on equity as opposed to the generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples is because the clean-surplus profitability is linked through Vuolteenaho (2002) accounting-based present
value identity to the book to market as well as the return. As such it allows some clarity in the exposition as
well as an extra intuition behind the results.
2 4 The results have been estimated for a larger sample with all the securities and they remain similar. I decided
for comparison and clarity of exposition to keep the securities, which remain at least 10 years. This affects
particularly the coefficients for low k.
investors group (#8 ) and the low trading frequency investors group (#L). Table IV reports
the forecasting coefficients of the return (first three columns) and the return on equity (last
three columns) for k = 1, 4, 7, 10, 13. The standard errors are reported, in parentheses, using
the Driscoll-Kraay non parametric standard errors in the presence of time and cross sectional
dependence. The table uses T1/ 4 as the number of lags in the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
For each variable (the return and the return on equity) Table IV reports the coefficients for the
low and the high trading group as well as the difference between the two, i.e. (#BU - #,) (the
third column).
From Figure 2 (a), the book to market ratio of the security held by high trading frequency
investors forecasts the long run return on equity, where the 3 ek is monotonically increasing,
starts at 0.1 and reaches -0.7 for k = 13 (long run). In other words, a 1% increase in the book
to market (decrease in price as the book to market is the book value over the market value) is
associated with a 0.7% decrease in the return on the book equity of the company in 13 years.
The forecasting coefficients for the two groups of securities are identical, both from an economic
and a statistical point of view, as can be seen from the last three columns of table IV.
On the other hand, from Figure 2 (b), the forecasting role of the price differs for the return
regression. For the high trading frequency investors group of securities (group U), #$ exhibits
a hump shaped curve picking at around k = 7 at 0.18 (with a standard error of 0.046) and
decreasing to 0.08 at k = 13 (with a standard error of 0.068). Conversely, the predictability
of the return by the book to market for the securities held by low trading frequency investors
steadily increases with k, reaching a coefficient of 0.26 (with a standard error of 0.037) at
k = 13. From table IV, the difference between the two groups is statistically different from
k = 10 onwards. Overall, the book to market ratio does not seem to forecast the long run
return for the securities held on average by investors who trade more frequently as opposed to
the securities held by low trading frequency investors.
Given the differences in the portfolio of the investors with a different trading frequency,
one can wonder whether the differences in the return predictability come from the size or
the turnover of the securities. As we saw from the descriptive statistics (see Table III), the
turnover of the securities in the U group is on average higher, while the size of the securities
U is on average lower. In fact, these variables are known from previous studies to affect the
predictability of the return and help understand the cross section of expected stock returns.
However, notice that previous literature suggests that small stocks exhibit higher returns, under-
react to cash flow news, and the prices forecast better the long run return; Banz (1981), Basu
(1983), Vuolteenaho (2002), Cohen et al. (2002). As such, the results should go even more in
the direction of Figure 2(a)-(b), given the high trading frequency securities are also smaller.
Figures 3 (a)-(b) show #rk and 3 ek after controlling for the size or the turnover of the securities.
Likewise, Figures 4 (a)-(b) illustrate #rk and #ek, after controlling for the size, the turnover, the
leverage ratio and the industry the firms belong to.25 In order to control for the size, turnover
or the leverage of the firm, I use the following general specification:
Tit->t+k= g+At+# (U * 0 it1) + 3(M * 0 it_1) + #,3 (L * t_) + Y1X _i-1+Y (Xt_1*t_1) + t+
eit--t+k- ag+At+3U(U * 06t_1) + #M(M * 6it_1) + #3j(L * 6_1 + 7"Xi-+Ye (Xt_1 *O6t_1) +tt
where Xit_ 1 is the set of control variables (size, turnover, leverage). In order to capture
that the book to market ratio of the securities with different characteristics forecast the return
differently, I add the interaction term, (Xit_1 * Oit-1). Given the differences are not statistically
significant and the results are very comparable to the Figures 2(a)-(b) as well as Table IV, I did
not report the standard errors in a separate table. Overall, the pattern found in Figures 2(a)-
(b) persists in Figures 3 and 4 in both magnitude and shape, as well as statistical significance.
To summarize, the predictability of the return on equity (firm's fundamental) by the book to
market ratio does not seem to differ for the securities held by high as opposed to low trading
frequency investors. The book to market ratio mainly forecasts the long run return on equity
(where long run means 13 years). On the other hand, securities held by high and low trading
frequency investors differ in terms of the predictability of the return. (i) The book to market
ratio does not forecast long run return for securities held by high trading frequency investors,
while it does for securities held by low trading frequency investors. (ii) Furthermore, the return
predictability for the securities held by high trading frequency investors at t - 1, has a hump
shaped curve picking at year 7, and converging to 0, while it increases steadily for the securities
held by low trading frequency investors. This patterns hold after controlling for many securities
251 am using 2 digits for the industries dummies, in order to conserve enough variation in the data.
characteristics such as the size, the turnover, the leverage or the industry. Overall, the book to
market ratio mainly forecasts the long run return on equity as opposed to the long run return
for the securities held by high trading frequency investors. As such, contrary to claims made
by the literature on the investor's short investment horizon, securities held by high trading
frequency institutional investors do not seem to be "disconnected" from the fundamental more
than the securities held by low trading frequency investors.
In order to get another intuition behind the forecasting regression, consider the accounting
present value identity (2.8) introduced by Vuolteenaho (2002). The book to market ratio
summarizes a mixture of information about long run profitability and/or long run return. In
particular,
Ot- = Z prt+j - P et+j + P f Kt+j (2.8)
j=0 j=0 j=0
Where . is the related to the first order Taylor expansion approximation error term. Mul-
tiplying by Ot-1 and taking an unconditional expectation:
E (02_1) = E 6t_1, ( prt+j -E 6t_1, 1: P et+j + 6t_1, E Psi j (29
E( -1  =E -E (2.9)
j=0 j=0 j=0
which can be rewritten as
cov (O_1,z J= 0 Prt+j cov (O6_, _30 Piet+) cov (ot1, EZ o iPt+j
var (Ct-1) var (6t1) var (O6-1) 2
= oLR ~3eR±I3LR (2.11)
The book to market ratio must forecast either of these components. More precisely, from
the identity, the book to market ratio varies if and only if it forecasts long run profitability
(z3=0 Piet+j) or long run returns (_1-o 1 rt+j), or the error term (_ 10 PuJt+j). From
Figures 2 (a)-(b), the book to market for the securities characterized by high trading frequency
investors, mainly forecasts long run cash flow (-0.70) as opposed to the long run discount factor
(~0.08) at horizons as long as k = 13 years. Extrapolating from the trends from the results for
13 years, one can expect that the long run return on equity will be the main component as the
long run discount factor will converge to zero.
2.4.2 Return Forecastability for the securities held by high trading frequency
investors
As we just saw, the return in both the short run and the long run of the securities held by
high trading frequency investors, is almost non forecastable (the forecastability picks at k = 10
at a relatively low value compared to the return on equity). One question, which arises, is: Is
the return of the securities held by high trading frequency investors non forecastable by other
forecasting variables as well? Table V addresses this question. Table V reports the coefficients
of a forecasting regression for the next year return (rit) for the high and low trading frequency
groups, #U and 3 L:
rit= ag+At+#3(U * zt_1 ) + #M(M * zit_1 ) + #L(L * zit-i) + i
where as above U stands for high trading frequency institution dummy (upper tercile), M
stands for the medium trading frequency institution dummy (middle tercile) and L stands for
the low trading frequency institution duimny (lower tercile); ag is the security group fixed effect
with g E { U, M, L} and At is the time fixed effect. In particular, I build on previous literature
to choose the set of forecasting variables, zit-1, which have been highlighted in the firm-level
predictability literature. These variables are the log return, the log of the GAAP return on
equity,26 and the log of the book to market. I also use the log of the leverage ratio and the
institutional ownership of the firm. Most of these variables have been highlighted by previous
studies. Among others the return is capturing the existence of reversal and momentum in the
data; see De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). High book to market
firms have earned a higher average stock return than low book to market firms; Rosenberg,
Reid, and Lanstein (1985). The firms with a higher profitability, measured by the GAAP
return on equity, have earned higher average stock returns; Haugen and Baker (1996). The
firms with a high leverage have higher average returns than firms with low leverage; Bhandari
26 In order to keep comparison with previous literature highlighting the forecasting role of the return on equity,
I use the GAAP return on equity as opposed to the Clean-Surplus one. Notice however, that they are both
highly correlated.
(1988). Institutional ownership forecasts one period return; Wermers (1999).
Each column of Table V represents a subset of the variables just defined, where the common
set of variables across all securities is the return, the return on equity and the book to market.
The standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors are also estimated using the
Driscoll-Kraay non parametric standard errors to take into account the cross-sectional and
time series dependence in the data. The number of lags included are approximately T 1/ 4 .
From the first row of Table V, one can observe an interesting feature. Even though the next
period return is close to non forecastable by most of the variables for the securities held by high
trading frequency investors, apart from the return on equity and the book to market (slightly
significant), Table V reports interesting features. These features suggest that the trading fre-
quency of the investors relate to a new source of heterogeneity among the securities' return.
First, the forecasting coefficients are, except for the leverage ratio, all statistically insignificant
for the securities held by high trading frequency investors. Second, from an economic point
of view, the coefficients are more important for the securities held by low trading frequency
investors. A 1% increase in the return on equity forecasts a 0.4% increase in the next year
return for the low trading frequency group, while only forecasting less than 0.2% increase in
the next year return for the high trading frequency investors group. Third, from the third row,
one can observe that the return exhibits momentum for the securities held by low trading fre-
quency investors and the momentum is statistically significant. Conversely, the securities held
by high trading frequency investors show signs of reversal. In the finance literature, momentum
in return has been associated to an under-reaction phenomenon; while reversal can be justified
by overreaction. However, notice that the reversal for the high trading frequency investors'
group of securities is not statistically significant (with a coefficient of -0.018 and a standard
error of 0.04). This could hint at a potential explanation of the lower volatility of the return
for the securities held by low trading frequency investors, despite the difference in the standard
deviation of the return on equity. If securities under react to the news of a company, then
the security return is likely to move less and exhibit a lower volatility. This channel should be
explored in more detail in future research.
Even though, one cannot accept the null hypothesis of non forecastability of the return by
the usual forecasting variables, from this exercise, beyond the low forecastability of the future
return by the book to market ratio (described in section 4.1), we observe a low forecastability
of the future return by the "usual suspects".
The Horizon as an extra forecasting variable
Given that return predictability differs for the securities held by different trading frequency
investors, this suggests that the trading frequency index has valuable information to understand
the cross section of stock prices. For instance, the prices of the securities held by high trading
frequency investors could be less forecastable because high trading frequency investors practice
arbitrage in the markets. Overall, the high trading frequency investors could have superior
information about the securities, which are being embedded in the price as they trade in the
security. In general, it will be interesting to explore whether in addition to the "usual suspects",
the trading frequency index has information about future stock prices. Table V summarizes
the results. Table V reports the coefficients of a forecasting regression for the next year return,
where I add the Trading Frequency Index as an additional forecaster. Table V compares the
forecasting coefficients for the securities in the high trading frequency investors group (#U)
and the low trading frequency investors group (#L). The Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in
parentheses. The first column looks at the regression where in addition to the trading frequency
index, the return, the return on equity and the book to market are being used. The second
column adds the institutional ownership. Finally, the last column adds the leverage ratio.
From table V, one can notice that the trading frequency index of a security helps to forecast
next year's return. However, only for the securities held by high trading frequency investors.
In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the horizon (approximately 0.10), is only
associated to a 0.05% increase in the next year return for the securities held by high trading
frequency investors. On the other hand, the trading frequency index forecasts a decrease in
the next period return when held by low trading frequency investors. This decrease is neither
economically, nor statistically significant. Overall the introduction of the trading frequency
index does not change dramatically the picture above. It does not affect the forecastable role of
the other variables, such as the return, the return on equity, the book to market and the leverage.
It mainly changed the coefficient on the institutional ownership. Before the introduction of
the trading frequency index as an additional forecasting variable, the institutional ownership
predicted a decrease in the return, while it predicts an increase in the return once I add the
trading frequency index. Notice however, that it still remains statistically insignificant.
This relation between the trading frequency and future return could capture different mech-
anisms could generate the relation between the horizon and next year return. The horizon could
be reflecting information about the long run cash flow which is associated to higher future risk.
Or as hypothesized by earlier work, the short horizon investors have better and more precise
information about long run cash flow, which the securities tend to under-react to. The result
on the predictive role of the horizon of a security, i.e. the average horizon of the investors who
are holding the securities, is connected to early studies about the relation between institutional
investors and future stock returns, e.g. Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Gompers and Metrick (2001).
Most of these studies document a positive relation between institutional ownership and future
stock returns. Institutional ownership is measured as the number of shares of a security held by
institutional investors relative to the total numbers of shares outstanding. Most of these studies
relate the positive relation to either the informational advantage of institutional investors as
a group, or to demand pressures. Yan and Zhang (2009) look at the the forecasting role of
institutional investors found in the data, comparing investors with high portfolio turnover rate
to low portfolio turnover rate. They show that the results are being driven by securities held by
high portfolio turnover rate investors. They claim that investors with a high portfolio turnover
rate have superior information. Given the data used in this study, it is hard to conclude that
higher institutional investors leads to higher next year return for both the securities held by
high and low trading frequency investors.
2.4.3 Return Decomposition
So far we have seen that the (i) the book to market ratio does not forecast long run return for
securities held by high trading frequency investors, while it does for securities held by low trading
frequency investors. More generally (ii) the return predictability differs for the securities held
by high trading frequency investors as opposed to low trading frequency investors. Another
way to look at it, which will summarize all the information is given by Vuolteenaho (2002)
accounting extension of Campbell (1991) VAR return decomposition. In this section, the focus
is on the return. I explore the sources of the difference in volatility illustrated in Figure 1.
Variance Decomposition
Campbell (1991) and Vuolteenaho (2002) relate the unexpected return of a security at time t
to the changes in the expectation of future cash flow (or cash flow news, AEt _j'=o piet+j) and
future return (or discount factor news, AEt E', p~rt+j):
00 0.0
rt - Et-ire = AEt piet+j - AEt E pirt+j + ct, (2.12)
j=0 j=1
where Et_ 1 is the expectation conditional on all the information as of time t - 1; the AEt
is defined as the change in the expectation from t - 1 to t, i.e. Et - Et-1; p is a positive
constant smaller than 1; Furthermore, as earlier, rt is the log of return, et is the clean-surplus
log accounting return on equity and Kt is an approximation error.
The return decomposition in (2.12) originates from the log-linear approximation of a present
value identity expressed in (2.8). From the accounting clean surplus identity (Bt = Bti-1 + Xt -
Dt), the return on equity (ROEt) is given by 27:
ROEt = 1 + X = Bt+Dt (2.13)
BtI Bt- 1
By definition, the return (Rt) is given by:
Rt = M(2.14)
Mt i
Where Mt_1 is the market value of the company the previous year. The clean surplus
identity states that the book equity this year (Be) has to be equal to the book equity the
previous year (Bt- 1 ) plus the earnings (Xt) less the dividends (Dt). The clean surplus return
on equity is capturing the return on the book value of the company. Log linearizing (2.13) and
(2.14):
et = bt - bt-1 + log (1 + exp (dt - be)) (2.15)
2 7 The set of assumptions for the accounting present value identity to hold are given by: (i) the book equity,
B, the dividend, D, and the market equity, M are strictly positive; (ii) the difference between the log book equity
and the log market value, b - m, as well as the difference between the log dividend and the log market value,
d - m are stationary; (iii) the earnings, dividends and book equity must satisfy the clean-surplus identity.
rt = mt - mt-1 + log (1 + exp (dt - mt))
Taking the first order Taylor expansion and substracting the two identities, the dividends
drop out of the relation:
et - rt = p6t - O-1 + kt (2.17)
where Ot is the log of the book to market ratio. Once a relation between the return, the
profitability and the book to market ratio has been established, one can solve the relation
forward to get the present value identity in (2.8):
t-i = ( P'rt+j - E et+j + ( l kt+j
j=O j=O j=0
where I used the assumption that limt_.oo p%6 = 0. The return decomposition is a derivation
of the present value identity (2.8) after substituting (2.8) in (2.17) and taking the expectation
conditional on information at time t - 1. The cash flow news is the percentage change in the
price due to the change in the expected cash flow, i.e. the unexpected return that results from
the cash flow news at given discount factor news and error terms. The same applies to the
discount factor news. Hence, denoting the two return components: (i) Nef,t = AEt E' piet+j
and (ii) Nr,t = AEt E 1 'rt+j, one can rewrite the relation in (2.12):
rt - Et-irt = Nef,t - Nr,t + rt (2.18)
If the unexpected return of a security is negative, either future cash flow, i.e. future ROE,
must be expected to decrease or future return must be expected to increase, or both. In other
words, suppose that the price falls, such that the return decreases, and that the cash flows are
constant. This must be accompanied by an increase in the return at a given point as the asset
cannot be expected to experience a capital loss forever.
Equation (2.12) has been derived in Vuolteenaho (2002) using an accounting based identity.
Contrary to the original Campbell (1991) return decomposition, it expresses the cash flow news
component in terms of the accounting return, i.e. ROE. It uses an accounting-based present
value formula, substituting for the dividends. The accounting based present value formula helps
(2.16)
alleviate several drawbacks associated to the use of the dividends in the firm-level analysis. In
general, the relevance of the use of the dividends in the valuation of stocks is more questionable,
as the dividends are often a poor quality variable at the firm-level.28
Vector Autoregressive approach to the return decomposition estimation
Since neither the cash flows news nor the discount factor news are observable, a common
practice to follow has been to back them out from a VAR specification. The VAR approach
consists in modelling the evolution through time of the return and its forecasting variables using
a vector autoregressive system:
zt = Tz- 1 + et (2.19)
where the first element of the k-dimensional state variable zt is the log of return. Under
the assumption that the evolution of the variables is well specified, that is, all the information
available as of time t - 1 is included in zt_1 and the error term et is independent of everything
known as of time t - 1, I estimate the discount factor news component as follows. Let the
expected return from the VAR specification be given by:
Et (rt+j) = eilizt where j > 1 (2.20)
where el is a k-dimensional column vector with the first element equal to one, [1 0 0.. .0].
Assuming that the transition matrix remains the same for all j > 1, the unexpected return is
given by:
AEt (rt+j) = Et - Et_1 (rt+j) = elrit (2.21)
28 Not only do many firms don't pay dividends, but the dividends may be an incomplete measure of cash flows
to the shareholders. As shown in Grullon and Michaely (2002), corporate firms in the US have substituted
dividend payout with share repurchases and other forms of distributions. This evolution makes the dividends a
smaller fraction of the cash flows to shareholders. Furthermore, the firms tend to use the dividends to distribute
the permanent component of earnings. In contrast, the firms tend to use repurchases to distribute the transitory
component of earnings. This is because the repurchase and issuance policy allows financial discretion, while the
dividend policy calls for financial commitment (Lintner, 1956). Consequently, the use of other types of payout
and the slow dividends change make the dividends partly obsolete for asset valuation. Finally, from a more
theoretical point of view, in a no-friction world such as the one assumed in the Modigliani-Miller model, changes
in the dividends will not affect the value of a stock. Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that the dividend
policy is irrelevant: "while corporate managers have large discretion over payout options, such discretion should
be irrelevant for stock prices. Rather, stock prices should be driven by "real" behavior-the earnings power of
corporate assets and investment policy-and, crucially, not by how the earnings power is distributed."
and the discount factor news is given by:
00 00
Nr,t = AEtEpDrt+j = ZP'jet (2.22)
j=1 j=1
= 1pr (I - pr)-et = A'et
where A' = ' pF (I - pF) 1 . The cash flow news is estimated indirectly as a residual.
Nef,t + rt = AEt Epjet+j + Kt (2.23)
j=0
= rt - Et-irt + A Et pijrt+i
j=1
= (e'1+ A') Et
I call this method, the indirect method, as the cash flow news is estimated as a residual.
The cash flow and discount factor news summarize all the information in the state variables of
the VAR.
Following the indirect method, if the return is not predictable, A' is equal to a vector of
zeroes and all the variation in the return is attributable to the cash flow news and/or the
error term. Furthermore, notice that if the return is unpredictable, the unexpected return is
mainly driven by the cash flow news and, from the book to market present value identity, the
price forecasts long run cash flow news. As a consequence, understanding the decomposition in
the two components not only informs us of the driving force behind the volatility in financial
markets, but it is also informative about the long run return and cash flow predictability as
well.
There is another method to estimate the cash flow news, which I will call the direct method.
One can explicitly add the log clean surplus profitability as a state variable and let lk be a
column vector of size k where the kth variable is one:
Nef,t = AEt E piet+j = ek (I - p ) (2.24)
j=0
This method has the advantage of distinguishing the approximation error components from
the cash flow component. Overall, as pointed out in Chen and Zhao (2009), even though the
indirect method has the advantage of not relying on the dynamics of the cash flows, just the
one of the expected returns, it will suffer from any mispecification of the expected return. Any
mispecification of the expected return will be absorbed by the residuals, i.e. cash flow news.
At the limit the cash flow news, could be larger, as it will embed part of the discount factor
news. To that purpose, I use and compare both the direct and the indirect method.
I estimate a panel VAR, where the state variables included follow the previous section on
the return predictability. The variables are the log return as well as the "usual suspects" in
predicting the return, i.e. the log of the U.S. GAAP return on equity, the log of the book to
market and the institutional ownership. I also use the log of the clean-surplus profitability, in
order to estimate the cash flow news directly and I add the trading frequency index. Further-
more, in order to incorporate the results in the previous section in the return decomposition,
I allow for the securities held by high frequency investors to have a different transition matrix
than the securities held by low trading frequency investors. In particular, the following "Short
VAR" specification 29, i.e. with only one lag summarizes the specification:
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where d_ 1 is a column vector whose first element is equal to one if the security belongs to
the high trading frequency group, whose second element is equal to one if the security belongs
to the medium trading frequency group, and whose third element is equal to one if the security
belongs to the low trading frequency group at t - 1; rit is defined as the log return, 0 it the log
of the book to market ratio, eit is the log of the GAAP profitability, ioit is the institutional
ownership and Hit is the trading frequency index. Notice that depending on the method used,
I add the log of the clean-surplus profitability to the state variable.
2 9 Different specifications with different lags have been considered and the final specification is the one with
one lag as the qualitative results remain the same.
Results
What explains the higher volatility of the securities held by high trading frequency investors?
From the return decomposition, the variance of the unexpected return is given by:
Var (rt - Et_1rt) ~ Var (Ncf,t) + Var (Nr,t) - 2 * cov (Nef,t, Nr,t)
Given the VAR specification:
Var (Nr,t) = A'A
Var (Nf,t) = (e' + A') E (e' + A')'
cov (Ncf,t, Nr,t) = (e' + A') EA
where E is defined as the variance covariance matrix of the error terms in the VAR (E = E (Ete')) .30
Table VII summarizes the variance of the unexpected return (third column) as well as that of
each of its components (fourth to fifth column) for the different investor's trading frequency
group of securities as well as the total. From the third column of Table VII, the securities
held by high trading frequency investors have a higher volatility (variance of 0.111) than the
securities held by the low trading frequency group (variance of 0.059). This higher volatility,
however is mainly driven by the cash flow news (0.095) component.
This evidence is tightly linked to the results reported in Table V. Security prices held by
high trading frequency investors are mainly forecasting future cash flows, measured by the
clean-surplus profitability. However, this table brings extra information in the analysis as it
internalizes the forecastability of the long run return and cash flow by other variables as well
(defined in the VAR). The securities held by high trading frequency investors lack forecastability
by the return, return on equity and book to market. As a result, the discount factor news is
almost non varying and the covariance term is close to zero.
3 0Notice that the estimation of the components of the variance decomposition via the VAR requires the
transition matrix to remain the same for each securities. In further version of the this paper, I deal with this
issue. In terms of the interpretation, one can see the variance decomposition as the decomposition which will
follow if a security were to be held by high or low trading frequency investors forever. What really matters is
that the return is almost non predictable by highly persistent variables for high trading frequency investors. It
makes the discount factor component of the decomposition small relative to the low trading frequency investors'
securities. I am working an alternative way to convey this result.
The question then becomes: Why are the returns of the securities held by low trading
frequency investors less volatile? Interestingly, one can notice that the variation of the cash
flow news is of a similar order of magnitude for both groups of securities. This is because the
securities' long run profitability is mainly driven by the book to market ratio as a result of its
persistence. As we saw earlier, the predictability coefficient of this variable is of a similar order
of magnitude for both groups (around 0.70). The difference comes from the covariance between
the two components (cash flow news and discount factor news). In particular, low trading
frequency securities have a higher covariance (0.022 as opposed to -0.006) than high trading
frequency securities. For low trading frequency securities, on average, the cash flow news is
associated with a discount factor news of the same sign. This is related to an undereaction of
the return to cash flow news and justifies a lower volatility. This is explored in more detail in
the next section.
Underreaction
In this section, I study the extent in which the return of the securities held by low trading
frequency investors is exhibit a lower volatility as a result of an underreaction. First, I look
at the extent the data shows signs of reversal or momentum. I then explore the presence of
underreaction from the following regression:
rit = a + bU(U * Ncf,it) + bM(M * Nc,it) + bL(L * Ncf,it) + eit (2.26)
where again, U, M and L correspond to the dummies for the upper, middle and lower
terciles of the trading frequency. An underreaction is associated with a b < 1, an overreaction
is associated with a b > 1 and b = 1 corresponds to a one to one reaction. A way to interpret
the results is to consider that the b's are capturing the reaction of the return of a portfolio
constructed held only by low, high or medium trading frequency investors.
Table VI reports the coefficients of the regression (2.26). In addition, Panel B reports the
coefficients of a regression, in which I differentiate between good and bad news. A good (bad)
news is defined as a positive (negative) cash flow news. In particular,
rit = a + bU(U * Nc,it) + b(M * N ,it) + bL(L *N ,it)
+6u(U * N5,it) + 6M(M * N 5,it) + 6L(L * N15,it) + Eit
where the superindex G refers to good news. In order to alleviate the attenuation bias
problem, which could come from the indirect method (as Nc5,t also has the error terms and could
be subject to the misspecification as explained earlier), I use the direct method of estimating
the cash flow news. From the present value identity, the stock prices summarize a mixture of
information on the long run cash flow and discount factor. If a variable forecasts long run cash
flow news on top of the book to market ratio, then the security prices are undereacting to that
information. To see this, suppose that there is a change in the expectation of the future cash
flows of a company and the price is not fully reacting to that change. Then the return today
will react by less than it would have, had the price fully responded to the news and no other
variables were forecasting future cash flows. As a consequence, the return will underreact to
that information. From the present value relation, this will be associated, on average, with a
change of the discount factor in the same direction as the cash flow news term. Ultimately, this
generates the decreased predictive power of the price to future cash flow and the underreaction
of the return to cash flow news. As the future return will move in the same direction as the
cash flow news, the immediate underreaction, by construction, can be seen as a slow reaction
of the return to cash flow news. The cash flow news will be fully incorporated to the prices in
the long run.
Overall, from Table VIII, the returns of the securities held by low trading frequency investors
underreact relatively more to cash flow news than the returns of the securities held by high
trading frequency investors. Interestingly, this relative underreaction comes from the reaction
of the returns of the securities held by low trading frequency investors to good news only. The
reaction to bad news is economically and statistically identical for all groups of securities. On
the other hand, the returns held by low trading frequency investors underreact to positive news
with a differential effect (6 L)of -0.25. This underreaction is the source of the lower volatility of
the return of the securities held by low frequency investors.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied the differential response of the firm-level stock price to cash flow news
and/or discount factor news as a function of the trading frequency of institutional investors-a
commonly used proxy for the investment horizon.
I construct a measure for the institution's intrinsic trading frequency. I use the absolute
value of the percentage change in the number of shares investors are holding in a security.
I exploit the three dimensions of the variable: investors, security and time in a three way-
fixed effects model and estimate an institution's fixed effect, which captures the institutions'
intrinsic trading frequency, by controlling for any security and market characteristics, which
could influence the investor's change in its position through time and across securities.
The results are summarized as follows: The predictability of the return on equity (firm's
fundamental) by the book to market ratio does not seem to differ for the securities held by
high as opposed to low trading frequency investors. The book to market ratio mainly forecasts
the long run return on equity (where long run means 13 years). On the other hand, securities
held by high and low trading frequency investors differ in terms of the predictability of the
return. (i) The book to market ratio does not forecast long run return for securities held by
high trading frequency investors, while it does for securities held by low trading frequency
investors. (ii) Furthermore, the return predictability for the securities held by high trading
frequency investors, has a hump shaped curve picking at year 7, and converging to 0, while it
increases steadily for the securities held by low trading frequency investors. This patterns hold
after controlling for many securities characteristics such as the size, the turnover, the leverage or
the industry. Overall, the book to market ratio mainly forecasts the long run return on equity
as opposed to the long run return for the securities held by high trading frequency investors.
As such, the results challenge the view that higher frequency of trading-a commonly used
proxy for investor short-termism-causes a disconnect between asset prices and fundamentals.
Furthermore, I show that the lack of predictability of the return held by high trading frequency
investors is a more general feature of the data, after using the "usual suspects" in forecasting
future return, such as the return on equity, the book to market, the past return, the leverage
or the institutional ownership.
Overall, beyond a specific interpretation of the trading frequency fixed effect, this study
highlights a new type of variable in understanding and explaining stock prices. This variable,
contrary to usual securities characteristics, is related to the heterogeneity in the investors hold-
ing the securities. As such, the results show that the trading frequency index contains novel
information to understand stock prices beyond the usual variables such as the size of a security
among others. This new variable embeds an interesting way of looking at asset pricing as it
relates not to the characteristics of the firm or but rather to characteristics of the investors who
hold the particular security.
Finally, it is worth noting that the present paper is a first attempt to highlight the role of
the trading frequency of the investors to explain and understand stock prices. Even though
these results suggest a specific role for the horizon of institutional investors, there is a definite
need for more studies (both theoretical and empirical) to understand the interaction of the
investment horizon of the investors and the behavior of stock prices in financial markets. In
particular, given that I use quarterly holdings data for the 13-F institutions, I cannot make
any inference regarding the relationship between stock prices and short-termism for day traders
or retail investors. Likewise, short-termism could generate a deviation from the fundamental
valuation at higher frequency (for monthly or daily data) and such deviation decreases for
annual frequency data. Future work should include a better understanding of the relation
between the return, information, and the horizon at different frequencies and for different
groups of investors (retail investors), where some of the mechanisms highlighted by previous
theories could be particularly relevant.
2.6 Appendix: Data Description
Table II uses data from mainly 3 sources : Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F), The
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and the COMPUSTAT annual research file
(COMPUSTAT) database. The market level variables use data from the intersection between
the Institutional Holdings (13F) Database and the CRSP monthly stock file, which contains
monthly prices, shares outstanding, volume of trade, and returns for all publicly traded US
stocks. The accounting based variables use the intersection between the Institutional Holdings
(13F) Database, the COMPUSTAT annual research file, and the CRSP monthly file. The
COMPUSTAT file contains the relevant accounting information for most publicly traded US
stocks. Finally, daily factor data, i.e. High Minus Low (HML), stock market excess return,
risk-free interest rate (one month treasury bill rate), Small Minus Big (SMB), are downloaded
from the Fama-French data source, i.e. Kenneth French's web site at Dartmouth.3 1
I. Market level variables: For each end of quarter and for each security held by an institu-
tion,
(a) the size of the security is measured as the combined value of all common stock classes
outstanding. If the quarter t size is missing, I ignore it from the analysis for the given quarter.
(b) For each quarter from 1980 to 2005, daily excess returns of individual stocks are regressed
on the daily Fama-French three factors (1993,1996):
(rt - r{) = p' (rmt - rf ) + /,3SMBt + /3HMLt + eit
where rit is the return of security i at time t and rf is the daily risk free rate, the excess
return on a market portfolio is (rmt - rf), SMB, i.e. small minus big, is the difference between
the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks, and HML,
i.e. high minus low, is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market
ratio stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. Finally, t stands for
the days and r stands for the quarter. Each regression uses daily data from the year preceding
" http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_ library.html. I also thank Kenneth French
for making these data available. The risk free rate is constructed by Ibbotson Associates.
the end of the quarter r, i.e. from the beginning of April 1980 to the end of March 1981 to
estimate O's for the end of the first quarter of 1981.
Define the volatility, the "systemic" risk and the idiosyncratic volatility for each year as the
sample analogue:
Vol (rit - rf =VolT (i3 (rmt - rf ) + 4.SMB + /3 HML) + Vol, (jt)
where Vol,- (z) = T Zt (XtT - It) 2 .The idiosyncratic volatility of a stock is computed
as the standard deviation of the regression residuals. To reduce the impact of infrequent trading
on idiosyncratic volatility estimates, I require a minimum of 15 trading days in a month for
which CRSP reports both a daily return and non-zero trading volume during the year preceding
the quarter r. It represents a loss of 1% of my sample. The volatility for quarter r is computed
using data from the beginning of the quarter in the previous year to the end of the quarter in
the current year.
(c) The Volume of trade is simply given by the average of the trading volume during the
year preceding the quarter r. The turnover is measured as the average of the volume of trade
divided by the number of shares outstanding during the year preceding the end of the quarter
r. I require at least 6 months with trading volume, and number of shares outstanding data
available to be included in the sample.
(d) The momentum measures are constructed using monthly data information on the return
for each security. Momentum_3 is the compounded past 3 months return from the beginning
of the quarter to the end of the quarter r. Momentum_12 is the compounded past 12 months
return from the beginning of the quarter in the previous year to the end of the quarter of the
current year. I discard any security where the return is missing.
The final set of securities includes all the securities where the set of variables defined from
(a) to (b) is available.
II. Accounting level variables: At the end of each fiscal year and each security held by an
institution,
(a) The book equity uses the total common ordinary equity (COMPUSTAT data item 60)
or the liquidation value of the common equity (data item 235) if data item 60 is unavailable. I
add short and/or long-term deferred taxes (data items 35 and 71) to the book equity, if they
are available. If both data items 60 and 235 are unavailable, I proxy book equity by the last
period's book equity plus earnings less dividends.
(b) The book-to-market is defined as the end of the previous fiscal year book equity divided
by the market equity at the end of June of the current year. The market equity is simply given
by the size of the firm as defined above. For instance, the book-to-market for 1981 is given by
the book equity of the fiscal year 1980 divided by the market equity of the end of June of 1981.
If the book equity is missing, I use the liquidation value of the company (Compustat-data item
235) In addition, I add short and/or long-term deferred taxes (Compustat-data items 35 and
71). If both data items 60 and 235 are unavailable, I proxy the book equity by the last period
book equity plus the earnings (Compustat-data item 172) less the dividends. If neither book
equity nor the earning are available, I estimate the book equity by the previous year book-to-
market multiplied by the current year market equity (assuming that the book to market has
not changed).
(c) The GAAP return on equity is the earnings constructed by the ratio the net income (data
item 172) over the last period's book equity, measured according to the US Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles. If the earnings are missing, they are constructed by the change in book
equity plus the total dividends. I do not allow the firm to lose more than its book equity. I
define the net income as the maximum of the reported net income (or Clean-Surplus net income,
if the earnings are not reported) and the negative of the beginning of the period book equity.
Thus, the minimum GAAP ROE is truncated to -100%.
(d) I calculate the leverage ratio as the book equity over the sum of the book equity and
book debt. The book debt is the sum of debt in current liabilities (data item 34), total long-term
debt (data item 9), as well as the preferred stock (data item 130).
(e) I calculate the yield as the total cash dividends over the market equity at the end of
June of the current year. The earning price ratio is defined as the net income divided by the
market equity at the end of June of the current year. Similar to the GAAP return on equity, I
proxy the earnings by the change in the book equity plus the dividends when the earnings are
missing.
Similar to the market level variables, the set of securities will be restricted to the securities
which have all the variables defined from (a) to (e) available in a given year.
III. 'others' level variables:
(a) The portfolio concentration is measured as the Herfindahl index, i.e. Hit = E (Wjt)2,
where wijt is the portfolio weight of the security j, institution i is holding at the end of quarter
t. The Industry concentration index is given by the same statistics at the industry level instead
of the security level, i.e. wijt is the portfolio weight of industry J in the portfolio of institution
i at the end of the quarter t.
(b) Finally, I look at the three main stock exchanges (NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex), each
institution invests in.
The forecastability exercise mainly uses the same data. In addition, the annual return is
constructed from the CRSP monthly data from the begining of 1980 to the end of 2005. I
annualized return compounding monthly return from the beginning of July t - 1 to the end of
June of year t. Notice that t stands for the year. All variables are in logarithm. In order to deal
with the presence of return close to -1 in the log transformation, I redefine a firm as a portfolio
constituted by 10% of the risk free rate and 90% of the firm return as done in Vuolteenaho
(2002). The results are not sensitive to that transformation. I let any missing or negative book
equity to be zero. In order to deal with values close to -100 percent in the log transformation,
I redefine the Book-to-Market as [0.9 * Bt- 1 + 0.1 * Mt] /M, where Bt is the book value at th
end of the fiscal year t and Mt is the market value at the end of june of year t. I redefine
the return on equity as 10 percent treasury bill and 90 percent GAAP return on equity for
the log transformation. The institutional ownership is defined as the relative number of shares
outstanding of the firm held by institutional investors (13-F institutions) over the total number
of shares outstanding of the firm. Finally, I impose a series of restrictions on the dataset. All
firms must have a December fiscal year t - 1, in order to allign the accounting variables across
all the firms. All firms must have at least one trading day in the month preceding the period
t return. They must have at least one trading day a month in the previous 5 years. I drop all
the firms with a market equity smaller than 10 millions and a book to market ratio larger than
100 or smaller than 1/100 at t - 1.
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Table I: Cross institutions and time description of the fixed effect
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the fixed effect by institutional investors type
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75%
Bank 4610 0.006 0.405 -0.26 0.17
Insurance Companies 1491 -0.007 0.375 -0.27 0.15
Mutual Funds 1384 0.063 0.382 -0.2 0.24
Financial Advisers 12396 0.177 0.445 -0.16 0.48
Others (University Endowments, 2090 0.044 0.487 -0.29 0.32
Pension Funds)
Panel B: Persistence of the fixed effect through time
3 Years 4 Years 5 YearsVariables 1 Year Lag 2 Years Lag Lag Lag Lag
Institution Trading Frequency 0.72 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.49
Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics of the fixed effect estimates. Panel A reports, from the left to the right, the
number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation and the 25 as well as the 75 percentiles for different types of
institution. The types are defined by the classification given by the Thomson Financial Dataset. The statistics are reported for
the whole sample from 1980 to 1998 accross all institutions withing a group (as the classification of the institutions by type
have been misreported after 1998). Panel B reports the first to fifth order autocorrelation of the fixed effect using all the
institutions in the sample from 1980 to 2005.
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Table II: Portfolio Composition of High and Low Trading Frequency Group of Investors
High Trading Frequency Investors Low Trading Frequency Investors
Market
Size
Volatility
Volume
Turnover
Momentum 3
Momentum 12
Low High Ratio H/L Low High Ratio H/L
0.05
0.15
0.04
0.06
0.16
0.13
0.56
0.24
0.60
0.38
0.28
0.36
12.10
1.58
15.51
6.46
1.78
2.77
0.03
0.22
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.13
0.75
0.10
0.69
0.18
0.19
0.23
27.18
0.47
14.82
1.87
1.31
1.72
High Trading Frequency Investors High Trading Frequency Investors
Accounting Low High Ratio H/L Low High Ratio H/L
Book to Market 0.37 0.09 0.25 0.40 0.06 0.15
Yield 0.17 0.30 1.71 0.17 0.18 1.06
Profitability 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.46 19.54
Earning Price Ratio 0.22 0.19 0.88 0.22 0.13 0.60
Leverage 0.01 0.97 2.23 0 0.98 245.78
Others High Trading Frequency Investors High Trading Frequency Investors
NYSE 0.71 0.83
Nasdaq 0.26 0.16
AMEX 0.03 0.02
Industry 0.17 0.16
Concentration 0.08 0.09
Table II reports the average share of the portfolio of the investors in the high trading frequency group and the low
trading frequency group in securities with different characteristics. The first three columns report the information
for the high trading frequency investors group and the last three columns report the information for the low
trading frequency group. For each group of investors, I report the composition of their portfolio for three groups of
the securities' characteristics: Market, Accounting and Others. For the Market and Accounting characteristics, I
report three numbers, the share held in securities with a low value, a high value of the given characteristics as
well as the difference in the shares with a low and high value. For instance, the first line of the three first columns,
from the left to the right, gives the average shares of the portfolio of high trading frequency investors in small
securities, in large securities and the ratio between these two numbers. A security is said to be small (large) if it
belongs to the lower (upper) quintile group in terms of its size (price times number of shares outstanding). The
industry and the concentration reports the average Herfindhal Index of the portfolio of the investors in the two
groups. Finally, notice that I don't report the standard errors as given the size of the sample all the differences are
statistically significant.
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Table III : Descriptive Statistics of the state variables
Investors Trading Frequency
Variables Low High Low High Low High Low High
Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75%
0.08 0.20 0.29 0.37 -0.06 -0.01 0.25 0.41
(Clean-Surplus)
Return On Equity
(GAAP) Return On
Equity
Book to Market
Leverage
0.10 0.15 0.20 0.31 0.03
0.09 0.10 0.16 0.23 0.06
0.03 0.19 0.25
0.06 0.15 0.17
-0.36 -0.51 0.55 0.63 -0.73 -0.92 -0.01 -0.14
-0.50 -0.53 0.46 0.54 -0.71 -0.73 -0.15 -0.16
Turnover 4.78 11.57 4.51 11.78 2.17 4.56 5.94 14.38
Size (billions)
Institutional
Ownership
Trading Frequency
Index
3.7 2.08 15.1 5.83 0.152 0.213 1.62 1.81
0.43 0.50 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.58 0.67
-0.14 0.05 0.06 0.09 -0.17 0.00 -0.09 0.08
Table III summarizes the descriptive statistics for the securities used in the security level analysis by the investors' trading
frequency group (High Trading Frequency Group and Low Trading Frequency Group). A security is in the High (Low) Trading
Group if the average trading frequency fixed effect of the investors holding the security is in the lowest (highest) tercile group.
For each characteristics of the securities, Table III reports the mean, the standard deviation, the 25 as well as the 75 percentiles.
The return is the log of the annual compounded return using monthly data from the beginning of July to the end of June of each
year. The Clean Surplus return on equity is the return on equity adjusted for equity offering, while the GAAP return on equity is
the earnings over the past fiscal year book value of the firm. Both are in log terms. The book to market is the log of the book
value for the past fiscal year over the market value at the end of June of each year. The leverage is the log of the book equity
over the sum of the book equity and book debt of the firm. The turnover is the ratio of the volume divided by the size of the
security at the end of june of each year. The size is the market value of the security, i.e. the price times the number of shares
outstanding at the end of june of each year. The institutional ownership is the ratio of the number of shares outstanding held by
institutional investors (13-F institutions) over the total number of shares outstanding of the security. Finally, the Trading
frequency index is the weighted average of the trading frequency fixed effect of the institutions holding the security. The weights
are defined as the ratio of the number shares of the institution j over the total number of shares of the institutions holding the
security at a given year (end of June).
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Figure 1: Ratio of Annual Return Standard Deviation for High, Medium and Low
Institutions' Trading Frequency Group relative to the Low Trading Frequency Group
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Figure 1 illustrates the ratio of the average standard deviation for the securities held by high, medium
and low trading frequency investors relative to the average standard deviation for the securities held
by low trading frequency investors across time (quarter). The annual return for each security is using
daily compounding. The standard deviation for each security is estimated from the daily frequency
annual return for each quarter. I then take the average of the standard deviation for each group of
security (Low, Medium, High) and show the ratio of each average with respect to the Low group. Each
group is defined with respect to the trading frequency index of the securities at quarter t., i.e. the
weighted average fixed effect of the institutions holding the securities at quarter t. I sort and assign
each security at a given quarter to a trading frequency group defined by the three terciles of the
trading frequency index at quarter t. The difference in the standard deviation is statistically significant
as can be seen in the following regression:
StandardDeviationit=0.10(=a)+0.07(= 6 HighTradingGroup)+O.016(= 6 MediumTradingGroup)+Eit
(0.0006) (0.008) (0.008)
Where i stands for the group of securities and t the quarter and the standard errors are below in
parentheses. Furthermore, the adjusted R2 is equal to 0.22.
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Figure 2(a)b Forecasting coeffidents of the return on equity
at different horizons (k)
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Figure 2(b): Forecasting coeffldents of the return at
different horizons (k)
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Figures 2 (a)-(b) plot the forecasting coefficients of the total return on equity (Figure 2(a)) and the
total return (Figure 2(b)) at different horizon (k), where k = 1 to 13 years (prk and pek):
rit4 t+k=L
0 g+At+3Urk (U*eit-1)+ 6mrk (M*eit-1)+ f3-rk (L*eit-1)-+Erit t+k
eit4 t+k- g+At+f~Uek (U*eit-1)+ 8Mek (M*eit-,)+ BLek (L*eit-1) +e'it4 t+k
Where eit-, is the log of the book to market of security i for the previous fiscal year; U, M, L are
respectively a dummy equal to 1 if the security i at year t-1 belongs to the high, medium or low
trading group and zero otherwise; rit,t+k is the total return from t to t+k and eitt+k is the total Clean-
Surplus return on equity from t to t+k. Finally, ag for g={U,M,L} is the security group dummy and At is
the time fixed effect. The figures 2 (a)-(b) compare the forecasting coefficients for the securities in the
high trading frequency investors group (#uk) and the low trading frequency investors group (I3L). The
low (high) trading frequency investors group is defined as the securities with a trading frequency index
at year t lower (higher) than the trading frequency lowest (highest) tercile. The trading frequency
index is defined as the weighted average of the fixed effects of the institutions holding the securities at
year t, where the weights are defined as the number of shares institution i holds relative to the total
number of shares all the institutions hold in security i. The standard errors and the difference between
the forecasting coefficients of the low and high group are given in table IV for clarity purposes. The
total number of years (k) has been chosen in order to minimize the loss in the number of securities in
the sample.
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Table IV: Forecasting Regression Coefficients by Trading Frequency Group for k=1, 4, 7, 10, 13
years and the
Return
return as well as the return on equity
Clean-Surplus Return on Equity
Trading Frequency Group Trading Frequency Group
Low High Diff High - Low Low High Diff High - Low
0.032
(0.018)
0.14
(0.036)
0.18
(0.046)
0.13
(0.044)
0.08
(0.068)
0.018
(0.016)
0.052
(0.044)
0.077
(0.055)
-0.033
(0.064)
-0.18
(0.016)
-0.11
(0.008)
-0.321
(0.017)
-0.48
(0.024)
-0.59
(0.032)
-0.69
(0.04)
-0.12
(0.011)
-0.3
(0.028)
-0.41
(0.029)
-0.55
(0.04)
-0.7
(0.053)
-0.014
(0.012)
0.021
(0.039)
0.07
(0.046)
0.039
(0.058)
-0.005
(0.059)
Table IV reports
1, 4, 7, 10, 13 (
the forecasting coefficients of the return (first three columns) and the return on equity (last three columns) for k =
prk and Oek:
rit4t+k=At+ag+PUrk (U*eit-1)+ lMrk (M*it-1)+ lLrk (L*it i)+EIt+k
eit4t+k=At+ag+P'ek (U*it.1)+ rMek (M*it1 )+ pLek (L*it-1)+ Eeit~t+k
Where og for g={U,M,L} is the security group dummy and Xt is the time fixed effect, Oit-1 is the log of the book to market of security
i for the previous fiscal year; U, M, L are respectively a dummy equal to 1 if the security i at year t-1 belongs to the high, medium
or low trading group and zero otherwise; rit.t+k is the total return from t to t+k and eit4t+k is the total Clean-Surplus return on
equity from t to t+k. The standard errors are reported, in parenteheses, using the Driscoll-Kraay non parametric standard errors in
the presence of time and cross sectional dependence. The table uses T114 as the number of lags in the Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors. For each variables, the return andthe return on equity, Table IV reports the the coefficients for the low, the high trading
group as well as the difference between the two; pUk,f3Lk as well as lUk- _Lk (the third column). The low (high) trading frequency
investors group is defined as the securities with a trading frequency index at year t lower (higher) than the trading frequency lowest
(highest) tercile. The trading frequency index is defined as the weighted average fixed effect of the institutions holding the securities
at year t, where the weights are defined as the number of shares institution i holds relative to the total number of shares all the
institutions hold in security i. For the return, notice that the difference becomes statistically significant at 5% from k = 10 onwards.
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0.014
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Figure 3(a): Forecasting coefficients of the return on equity at
different horizons (k) - Size and Turnover Control
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Figure 3(b): Forecasting coefficents of the return at different horizons
(k)- Size and Turnover Control
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Figures 3 (a)-(b) plot the forecasting coefficients of the total return on equity (Figure 3(a)) and the
total return (Figure 3(b)) at different horizon (k), where k = 1 to 13 years (prk and Pek) after for
controlling for size or turnover:
rIt>t+k=cg+At+fIrk (U*eit-1)+ fMrk (M*eit-,1)+ 6irk (L*it-1 )-- 6(Xit-* eit-1)+62xit-1 +rit,t+k
eit,t+k=ag+At+Uek (U*eit-1)+ f6ek (M*eit-1)+ fLek (-*eit-1±61(Xie-* Oit-1)+6 2Xit-, +,eet,t+k
Where 6;t- is the log of the book to market of security i for the previous fiscal year; U, M, L are
respectively a dummy equal to 1 if the security i at year t-1 belongs to the high, medium or low
trading group and zero otherwise; rit,t+k is the total return from t to t+k and et,t+k is the total Clean-
Surplus return on equity from t to t+k.; Xt-1 is the size or the turnover of the security. Finally, og
for g={U,M,L} is the security group dummy and At is the time fixed effect. The figures 3 (a)-(b)
compare the forecasting coefficients for the securities in the high trading frequency investors group
(#Uk) and the low trading frequency investors group ('6Lk). The low (high) trading frequency investors
group is defined as the securities with a trading frequency index at year t lower (higher) than the
trading frequency lowest (highest) tercile. The trading frequency index is defined as the weighted
average fixed effect of the institutions holding the securities at year t, where the weights are defined
as the number of shares institution i holds relative to the total number of shares all the institutions
hold in security i. The total number of years (k) has been chosen in order to minimize the loss in the
number of securities in the sample. The Standard errors are omitted for clarity purpose. For each k,
the Coefficients are not statistically different at 5% significance level.
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Figures 4 (a)-(b) plot the forecasting coefficients of the total return on equity (Figure 3(a)) and the
total return (Figure 3(b)) at different horizon (k), where k = 1 to 13 years (Prk and pek) after for
controlling for size or turnover:
ritt+k=cg±At+IUrk (U*eit-1 )+ f3Mrk (M*Oit-,)+ pI!rk (L*eit-,1)+ 51(Xit-1 * eit-1)+6 2xit-1 +Erit 4 t+k
eitt+k=ag+At+fuek (U*eit-,)+ PMk (M*8it-1)+ 'lek (-*eit-1)+5,(Xt- * eit-,)+52Xt-l+e it#t+kWhere Oit-j is the log of the book to market of security i for the previous fiscal year; U, M, L are
respectively a dummy equal to 1 if the security i at year t-1 belongs to the high, medium or low
trading group and zero otherwise; rit,t+k is the total return from t to t+k and e,t~t+k is the total Clean-
Surplus return on equity from t to t+k.; Xt-1 is the size, the turnover, the leverage, the primary
exchange market as well as the industries of the security. Finally, og for g={U,M,L} is the security
group dummy and At is the time fixed effect. The figures 4 (a)-(b) compare the forecasting coefficients
for the securities in the high trading frequency investors group (I#uk) and the low trading frequency
investors group (#L k). The low (high) trading frequency investors group is defined as the securities with
a trading frequency index at year t lower (higher) than the trading frequency lowest (highest) tercile.
The trading frequency index is defined as the weighted average fixed effect of the institutions holding
the securities at year t, where the weights are defined as the number of shares institution i holds
relative to the total number of shares all the institutions hold in security i. The total number of years(k) has been chosen in order to minimize the loss in the number of securities in the sample. The
Standard errors are omitted for clarity purpose. For each k, the Coefficients are not statistically
different at 5% significance level.
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Table V: Return Predictability by investor trading Frequency Group
(1)
Trading Frequency
Index Group
(2)
Trading Frequency
Index Group
(3)
Trading Frequency
Index Group
(4)
Trading Frequency
Index Group
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Book to Market(t-1)
GAAP return on Equity(t-1)
0.058
(0.014)
0.04
(0.019)
0.392 0.165
(0.048) (0.058)
0.058
(0.014)
0.393
(0.049)
0.041
(0.018)
0.165
(0.058)
0.056 0.039 0.056
(0.013) (0.019) (0.013)
0.396 0.166 0.397
(0.048) (0.058) (0.048)
Return(t-1)
Leverage(t-1)
0.071 -0.018 0.071 -0.018 0.069 -0.018 0.069 -0.018
(0.032) (0.04) (0.031) (0.04) (0.032) (0.04) (0.032) (0.04)
-0.007
(0.016)
0.013
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.016)
0.013
(0.018)
Institution Ownership(t-1)
Observations
Nb. Securities
Adjusted R2
18348
1193
0.194
-0.068
(0.03)
18348
1193
0.195
18348
1193
0.195
-0.016 -0.067 -0.014
(0.042) (0.03) (0.042)
18348
1193
0.195
Table V reports the coefficients of a forecasting regression for the next year return (Pu and PL)
rit=At+ag+U (U*zit-1)+ sM (M*zit-1)+ pL (L*zit.1)+Eit
Where At and og (g={U,M,L}) are the time and trading frequency group dummies; U, M, L are respectively a dummy equal to 1 if the security i at
year t-1 belongs to the high, medium or low trading group and zero otherwise; zit-1 is defined as the log of the book to market ratio, the log of the
return, the log of the return on equity. In addition, I add the log of the leverage ratio and the institutional ownership as potential forecaster of
future return as it has been highlighted by the literature. Table V compares the forecasting coefficients for the securities in the high trading
frequency investors group (u) and the low trading frequency investors group (pL). The low (high) trading frequency investors group is defined as
the securities with a trading frequency index at year t lower (higher) than the trading frequency lowest (highest) tercile. The trading frequency
index is defined as the weighted average of the fixed effects of the institutions holding the securities at year t, where the weights are defined as the
number of shares institution j holds relative to the total number of shares all the institutions hold in security i. The standard errors are in
parentheses. The standard errors are estimated using the Driscoll-Kraay non parametric standard errors to take into account the cross sectional and
time series dependence in the data. The number of lags included are approximately T'.
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0.041
(0.017)
0.166
(0.058)
Table VI: Return predictability by investor trading Frequency Group-Trading Frequency
Index as an additional forecaster
(1) (2) (3)
Trading Frequency Trading Frequency Trading Frequency
Index Group Index Group Index Group
Low High Low High Low High
Trading Frequency -0.054 0.478 -0.044 0.51 -0.047 0.507
Index(t-1)
(0.081) (0.115) (0.079) (0.12) (0.084) (0.12)
Book to Market(t-1) 0.06 0.034 0.057 0.036 0.057 0.038
(0.014) (0.02) (0.013) (0.02) (0.013) (0.017)
GAAP return on Equity(t-1) 0.395 0.164 0.4 0.164 0.4 0.164
(0.049) (0.057) (0.048) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057)
Return(t-1) 0.072 -0.031 0.069 -0.031 0.069 -0.031
(0.031) (0.041) (0.031) (0.041) (0.031) (0.042)
Leverage(t- 1) -0.005 0.011
(0.017) (0.018)
Institution Ownership -0.074 0.032 -0.073 0.033
(0.031) (0.043) (0.032) (0.044)
Observations 18348 18348 18348
Nb. Securities 1193 1193 1193
Adjusted R2  0.199 0.2 0.2
Table VI reports the coefficients of a forecasting regression for the next year return (PU and L) :
rit At+ a.+ U (U*zit..)+ pM (M*ziti)+ OL (L*zitl)+EIt
Where At and ag (g={U,M,L}) are the time and trading frequency group dummies; U, M, L are respectively a dummy
equal to 1 if the security i at year t-1 belongs to the high, medium or low trading group and zero otherwise; ziti is
defined as the log of the book to market ratio, the log of the return, the log of the return on equity. In addition, I add the
log of the leverage ratio and the institutional ownership as potential forecaster of future return as it has been highlighted
by the literature. Most importantly, I add the Trading Frequency Index as an addition forecaster. Table V compares the
forecasting coefficients for the securities in the high trading frequency investors group (pu) and the low trading
frequency investors group (pL). The low (high) trading frequency investors group is defined as the securities with a
trading frequency index at year t lower (higher) than the trading frequency lowest (highest) tercile. The trading
frequency index is defined as the weighted average fixed effect of the institutions holding the securities at year t, where
the weights are defined as the number of shares institution j holds relative to the total number of shares all the
institutions hold in security i. The standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors are estimated using the
Driscoll-Kraay non parametric standard errors to take into account the cross-sectional and time series dependence in the
data. The number of lags included are approximately T"'.
Table VII: Variance Decomposition by Investors' Trading Group
Discount Factor-
Total Discount Factor Cash FlowVariance Nobs-Nsec . Cash Flow NewsVariance News Variance News Variance Covariance
Low Frequency 6093-989 0.059 0.018 0.086 0.022
Std error JK (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.012)
Medium Frequency 6808-1146 0.060 0.009 0.075 0.012
Std error JK (0.006) (0.008) (0.017) (0.01)
High Frequency 6640-1116 0.111 0.004 0.095 -0.006
Std error JK (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
Total 18348-1193 0.077 0.010 0.085 0.009
Std error JK (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007)
Table VII summarizes the return decomposition of the securities by trading frequency group. From the left to the
right, it shows the number of observations, the total variance, the variance of the discount factor news and the
cash flow news and the covariance. The results are illustrated for the low, medium and high trading frequency
group. The low (high) trading frequency investors group is defined as the securities with a trading frequency index
at year t lower (higher) than the trading frequency lowest (highest) tercile. The trading frequency index is defined
as the weighted average of the fixed effects of the institutions holding the securities at year t, where the weights
are defined as the number of shares institution i holds relative to the total number of shares all the institutions
hold in security i. The standard errors are in parentheses and they are estimated using a Shao Rao Jacknife
standard errors.
Table VIII : Underreaction by institution trading group
Panel A: Reaction to Cash Flow News
r(t)=a+bCF(t)
Variables Total Low Frequency Medium Frequency High Frequency
b 0.701 0.665 0.657 0.763
jk s.e. (0.029) (0.037) (0.033) (0.044)
Panel B: Good Cash Flow News-Bad Cash Flow News
Variables Low Frequency Medium Frequency High Frequency
b 0.759 0.720 0.776
jk s.e. (0.022) (0.039) (0.04)
b (Good news) -0.250 -0.158 -0.032
jk s.e. (0.079) (0.064) (0.085)
Table VIII summarizes the coefficients of a regression of the return on the cash flow components of the
security:
rit=a+bL*(CFit*L)+bu*(CFit*U)+b m *(CFit*M)+Eit
Where CFit is the cash flow components estimated using the VAR; U, M, L are respectively a dummy equal to
1 if the security i at year t-1 belongs to the high, medium or low trading group and zero otherwise; rit is the
return. The figures 3 (a)-(b) compare the forecasting coefficients for the securities in the high trading
frequency investors group (bu) and the low trading frequency investors group (bL). The low (high) trading
frequency investors group is defined as the securities with a trading frequency index at year t lower (higher)
than the trading frequency lowest (highest) tercile. The trading frequency index is defined as the weighted
average of the fixed effects of the institutions holding the securities at year t, where the weights are defined
as the number of shares institution i holds relative to the total number of shares all the institutions hold in
security i. The standard errors are in parentheses and they are estimated using a Shao Rao Jacknife standard
errors.
Chapter 3
Institutional Investors' Intrinsic
Trading Frequency and the
Cross-Section of Stock Returns1
3.1 Introduction
Heterogeneity among investors is a prevalent feature of financial markets. Investors differ in
many dimensions such as their preferences, their types, their constraints, their information, the
markets they participate in and their investment horizon. However, depending on the environ-
ment, heterogeneity may play little or no role in equilibrium asset prices. For example, in a
world with complete markets, diversity in investors' characteristics is irrelevant. In particular,
all financial claims can be priced through a representative agent's stochastic discount factor that
is uniquely determined by prices and not by the underlying heterogeneity of investors. Rubin-
stein (1974), Constantinides (1982), Grossman and Shiller (1981), Krusell and Smith (1998) and
many others provide conditions under which aggregation, or at least approximate aggregation,
obtains even in the presence of heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. Nevertheless,
there are many theoretical models in which heterogeneity of investors is a key determinant of
asset prices. Examples include heterogeneity of beliefs (Geneakoplos (2010), Scheinkman and
Joint with Fernando Duarte
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Xiong (2003)), information (Allen, Morris and Shin (2006), Angeletos, Lorenzoni and Pavan
(2010)) and preferences (Constantinides and Duffie (1996), Chan and Kogan (2002)).
On the empirical side, the literature has downplayed the importance of heterogeneity in
investors' characteristics as a source of information to understand stock prices. Most leading
asset pricing models2 ignore heterogeneity, yet successfully match the observed patterns of a
wide range of macroeconomic and financial variables. When studying the cross-section of stock
returns, a standard approach 3 is to use variables that are inherent to the underlying firm -such
as size or book-to-market ratio- and not to the type of investor holding the stock.
This paper exploits institutional investors' intrinsic trading frequency as a source of hetero-
geneity to empirically answer the following question: Do the returns of a given security differ
in a systematic way when held by investors with different trading frequency? We find that the
answer is yes. We show that, even after controlling for security fixed-effects, time fixed-effects,
market volatility, trading volume, liquidity, momentum and exposure to the Fama-French fac-
tors, the returns of portfolios held by investors with different intrinsic trading frequency differ
significantly. Moving from the first to the last quintile in the distribution of trading frequency
-that is, moving from stocks held by investors who trade more frequently to those held by in-
vestors who trade less frequently- is associated with an expected gain in returns of 6 percentage
points over the next year.
Our results allow us to make two contributions. First, we show that stock holders' charac-
teristics provide information about the cross-sectional distribution of stock returns that is not
contained in firm-specific characteristics or aggregate market variables. This is an important
finding because it challenges two widely used paradigms in finance: the existence of a represen-
tative agent (or in general, of aggregation) and the irrelevance of the identity of stock holders.
To understand these two paradigms, consider the net-present value formula for a stock's price:
00
Pt = Z Asds. (3.1)
s=t+1
2 Both consumption-based models such as Bansal and Yaron (2004)'s long-run risk model, Barro (2005) and
Gabaix (2008)'s rare disasters and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)'s habit-formation, and factor models like the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
3 Popularized by Fama and French (1993)
113
According to equation (3.1), if two different investors are not large enough to directly affect
the aggregate discount factor At, and do not have a controlling stake in the firm so that they
can not influence the cash flow dt, then the fact that one of them owns the stock -and not
the other- makes no difference in the stock's price. In contrast, we find that stock prices do
depend on at least one intrinsic characteristic of its holder, the trading frequency. Because
we control for aggregate and firm-specific variables, and because we can study the subset of
institutional investors that are small enough so that they can not affect the aggregate discount
factor and do not hold a large enough proportion of stocks to control any firms, we provide
evidence that investors' trading horizon are not acting on prices through At or dt. We conclude
that heterogeneity across investors is an important dimension of asset prices.
The second contribution is to introduce a new variable, the trading frequency of a stock, that
helps predict the cross-sectional distribution of returns. We find that our results are a "pricing
anomaly" in the sense that common indicators of systematic risks such as the Fama-French
factors do not explain the spread in returns between stocks held by high and low-frequency
traders.
To obtain our results, we use the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings dataset to get
stock positions for large US financial institutions at a quarterly frequency for the period 1980-
2005. Following Parsa (2010) we construct a security-specific trading frequency index by taking
the weighted average of the intrinsic trading frequencies of the institutional investors who hold
the security, with weights given by the size of the position of each investor. We construct the
intrinsic trading frequency of investors by using a fixed-effects model. Concretely, we measure
an investor's change in his position as the absolute value of the percentage change of number
of shares in a given security. We estimate a regression of institutions' turnover of securities
on a time fixed effect, a security fixed effect, their interaction, and an institution fixed effect.
The institution fixed effect captures the institutions' intrinsic trading frequencies by controlling
for any security and market characteristics which could influence the investor's change in his
position across time and across securities. In this way, changes in institutional holdings due to
events like an increase in market-wide volatility or a flow of information at the security level
do not in themselves affect our measure of investors' intrinsic trading frequencies.
To identify systemmatic differences in stocks with different trading frequencies, we form
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portfolios by sorting stocks based on their trading frequency on the previous year. We find that
the relation between expected mean returns and trading frequency is monotonically decreasing.
This pattern holds within subgroups of securities that are independently sorted on size, book-to-
market, liquidity and past performance. In addition, the relationship between trading frequency
and returns does not disappear when considering returns that are risk-adjusted by the Fama-
French factors, two different measures of liquidity introduced by Sadka (2006) and Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003), and the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description
of the literature. Section 3 describes the data as well as the methodology. Section 4 provides
the results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
This paper uses the trading frequency measure developed in Parsa (2010), which is the first
paper to suggest the importance of the intrinsic trading frequency to understand properties of
asset prices. Parsa (2010) interprets the trading frequency as a measure for short-termism and
then studies whether short-termism is associated with excess volatility and a disconnect between
prices and fundamentals. In contrast, the present paper studies whether trading frequency,
not necessarily interpreted as short-termism, can be used to predict the cross-section of stock
returns. The focus of the present paper is on the heterogeneity of investors and stocks -on
the cross-sectional aspects- rather than the evolution and relation between volatility, cash
flows and fundamentals -the time-series aspects- studied in Parsa (2010). These two papers
highlight the usefulness of the measure developed in Parsa (2010) to learn about different aspects
of financial markets and the economy.
More generally, this paper connects and contributes to three different strands of the ex-
isting literature. First, this paper adds to the vast literature on the relationship between the
institutional investors and stock prices. This literature has documented a positive, contempo-
raneous relation between institutional investors' buying and stock returns; Lakonishok, Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Wermers (1999, 2000), Nofsinger
and Sias (1999). It has also been highlighted that institutional buying is positively related to
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short-term expected return, where the expected returns are higher (lower) for stocks experi-
encing significant institutional buying (selling); see Daniel, Grimblatt, Titman and Wermers
(1997), Gompers and Metrick (2001). Most of this literature considers the group of institu-
tional investors to be a homogeneous group. In line with Parsa (2010), this paper contributes
to the previous literature by considering the group of institutional investors as a heterogeneous
group and by exploiting the heterogeneity among the institutional investors in order to under-
stand stock prices. Thus, this paper contributes to a subset of the literature which explores
the heterogeneity of investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) explores a dataset of the share-
holdings in FSCD stocks and documents differences in the buy and sell behavior as well as
the performance of different types of investors, such as households, foreign investors, financial
institutions and insurance companies. Wermers (1999) focuses on the mutual fund industry and
provides evidence on the "herding" behavior of mutual funds as well as their impact on stock
prices. Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2002) study the difference between the trading behavior
of institutional investors as opposed to individual investors in their reaction to cash flow news
using a VAR-return decomposition at the firm level. In general, the approach in these studies
consists of exploring a source of heterogeneity in the type of investors, i.e. mutual funds, retail
investors, institutional investors, and so on. In this paper, the heterogeneity is the intrinsic
investor trading behavior measured by the trading frequency fixed effect.
Second, this paper is connected to previous studies that have examined the portfolio turnover
rate of institutional investors and its interaction with financial markets motivated by the effect
of the investment horizon of institutional investors; see Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005), Ke,
Ramalingegowda and Yu (2006), Jin and Kogan (2007), Khan, Kogan and Serafeim (2010),
Parsa (2010), Yan and Zhang (2009). Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) look at the corporate
controls market and show that firms with shareholders having a higher portfolio turnover are
more likely to get an acquisition bid, but at a lower premium. Yan and Zhang (2009) find
that the trading of institutional investors with a high portfolio turnover rate forecasts future
stock returns. This paper is related and adds to the previous studies, as it uses the institu-
tion's equity portfolio churning information. However, following Parsa (2010), it focuses on the
institutions' intrinsic trading characteristic as opposed to its equilibrium trading behavior to
find evidence on the relation between the institution's investment horizon and stock prices. We
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exploit the variation in the trading behavior intrinsic to the institution by using the fixed-effect
trading frequency of the investors. Furthermore, in contrast to earlier studies, the main focus
of this study is on the differential response of the stock prices to the interaction of the trading
frequency fixed effect rather than on the effects of the demand by institutional investors on
stock prices. In this manner, the study is related to Jin and Kogan (2007) as well as Parsa
(2010). Jin and Kogan (2007) use the variation in the portfolio turnover rate of the mutual fund
managers and its interaction with a measure of investor impatience, defined as the sensitivity
of money flows into and out of the fund in response to the short-term performance of the fund.
They find that mutual fund managers tend to focus on short-horizon investments due to the
short horizon of their investors (and not the other way around). Their evidence suggests that
this behavior may result in abnormal returns as it leads to an inflated demand of short hori-
zon investment opportunities at the expense of longer horizon alternatives. However, Jin and
Kogan (2007) differs on several points with respect to this study. Similar to Parsa (2010), the
measure we construct for the institutional investors' trading frequency is a "black box", which
captures the component of the institution's turnover, which is explained by the institution's
intrinsic characteristics as opposed to the market and/or characteristics of the securities in
which they invest. Thus, we do not focus exclusively on one particular channel through which
the higher trading frequency of the institutions may affect stock prices. Institutional investors
can have different horizons for many reasons: different levels of patience (subjective discount
factor), liquidity needs, administrative costs, legal restrictions, competitive pressures related
to performance-based pay; see Dow and Gorton (1997), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Bolton,
Scheinkman and Xiong (2006). Instead, the measure used in this study allows us to focus on
the whole set of institutional investors and the interaction of their trading frequency with stock
prices, as the only information required is the holdings of the investors. Similar to the findings
in Jin and Kogan (2007), we provide evidence that the institution's trading frequency matters
for the behavior of stock prices. Finally, this paper complements Parsa (2010), which focuses on
the source of the volatility in stock prices between its cash flow and discount factor component
as a function of the trading frequency index. Parsa (2010) highlights that the movements of
the prices of the securities held by investors trading more frequently is traced back by the long
run cash flow of the securities. In line with the results in Parsa (2010), we demonstrate that
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the portfolio of the securities held by investors trading more frequently is closer to their risk
adjusted return.
Finally, this paper connects to the literature on the cross sectional behavior of stock returns.
This literature has documented a number of empirical patterns unsupported by a standard
Capital Asset Pricing Model. 4 The firm size, the book-to-market ratio (Basu (1983), Fama and
French (1993)), the firm's prior performance (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) and the liquidity
(Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Sadka (2006)) have each been established as an important
dimension in order to understand stock prices. This paper contributes to the previous literature
as it underlines a new variable that brings forth information about stock prices, the trading
frequency index. However, in contrast to previous work, the role of the trading frequency index
in understanding stock prices suggests a new way of looking at asset pricing as it exploits the
heterogeneity of the investors characteristics. Not only do we show that the cross-sectional
return of the trading frequency portfolio is not explained by their respective market risk or the
usual variables (Fama-French factor, liquidity factor, momentum factor), but the dimension of
interest is related to a characteristic of the securities, which is embedded in their ownership.
3.3 Data Description and Methodology
In order to study the relationship between the investors' trading frequency and the cross-
section of stock returns, (i) We construct an investor-specific measure of the intrinsic frequency
of trading; then (ii) we construct a security-specific measure of the composition of the intrinsic
trading frequency of the investors holding the security at a given moment in time. Finally,
(iii) we use the security level measure constructed in (ii) to study the relationship between the
aforementioned security-specific characteristic and the cross-section of stock returns. In what
follows, we begin with a brief description of the different data sources. We then describe, step
by step, each of the three former points as well as the results on the relationship between the
investors' trading frequency and the cross-section stock returns.
"The Capital Asset Pricing Model, introduced by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), Treynor
(1961), implies that the expected stock returns are determined by their level of beta risk through a positive and
linear relation.
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3.3.1 Data Description
The information used in this study comes mainly from three sources: The Thomson Reuters
Ownership Data, the Fama-French factors and the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). In addition, the one-month Treasury Bill Rate at monthly frequency gives the risk-free
interest rate from Ibbotson Associates.
In order to study the institutional investors' trading frequencies, we use information about
the quarterly equity holdings of all the institutions provided by the Thomson Reuters Ownership
dataset.5 The dataset results from the 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 which requires all institutions with greater than $100 million worth of securities under
discretionary management to disclose their holdings on all their common-stock positions more
than 10,000 shares or $200,000 on the SEC's form 13F. The institutions included are divided into
5 categories: Banks, Insurance Companies, Investment Companies and Their Managers (e.g.
Mutual Funds), Investment Advisors, which includes the large brokerage firms, and all Others
(Pension Funds, University Endowments, Foundations). It reports a total of 4382 managers.
The data coverage increased in both the securities' and managers' dimensions from a total of
573 managers and 4451 securities in 1980 to 2617 managers and 13125 securities in 2005. The
institutional investors represented initially 16% of the market they invested in ($954 million)
in 1980 but this number increased to about 44% ($17,500 million) in 2005.6
The Fama-French and momentum factors are taken from Kenneth French's website at Dart-
mouth.7 The Sadka liquidity measures are described in Sadka (2006). The measure captures
non-traded, market-wide, undiversifiable liquidity risk. Finally, the Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) liquidity factor is based on the turnover of the securities.
The monthly market information-i.e. return, price, shares outstanding-about each se-
curity is taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The set of securities
included corresponds to the intersection of our two main data sources, i.e. the securities that
belong to the portfolio of the 13-F financial institutions and the market information available
5 The dataset was previously known as the CDA/Spectrum 34 database. The institutions in the sample are
also referred to as the 13F institutions in reference to the form they are required to file on a quarterly basis.
6 Some of this growth is due to an increase in the value of the equity market throughout the sample period,
which forced more institutions to file the 13-F forms, as the rising market pushed their portfolios across the
nominal threshold level of $100 million. For more details about the dataset, see Gompers and Metrick (2001).
7http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_ library.html
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in the CRSP. We restrict our attention to securities traded in the NYSE, the AMEX and the
NASDAQ, provided they are held by more than 25 institutions, or that the institutions hold at
least 10% of the shares outstanding. Our sample has 12455 securities represented and a total
of 288760 data points.
3.3.2 Methodology
After briefly introducing the dataset used, the remainder of this section describes each step
of the methodology. We start with the institution-specific trading frequency measure. Then
we construct the security-specific trading frequency measure as the composition of the trad-
ing frequency of the institutions holding the security. Finally, we explain the methodology
used to study the relationship between the security-specific measure and the cross section of
stock returns. The trading frequency measures closely follow Parsa (2011) where more detailed
information about the respective measures can be found.8
Institutional Investors Intrinsic Trading Frequency
Define sijt as the number of shares institution i is holding in security j at quarter t. We capture
the trading frequency of institution i in each security j at quarter t as the absolute value of the
percentage change in the position of institution i in security j at quarter t:9
yijt = abs Szjt - 8 klt-1 (3.2)
1/2(sijt + sijti) /
If an institution i is holding the same number of securities at quarter t and t - 1, then
yijt = 0. If on average yijt is bigger for institution i than institution i', then the institution i is
rebalancing its portfolio more frequently than institution i' during a given period of time.
In order to construct a measure that captures an investor's idiosyncratic tendency to change
his or her position, once any security or market effects have been partialled out, we exploit yijt's
8 More details are provided in the appendix found at http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/sparsa/research.
9 We are using in the denominator the average number of shares in quarter t and quarter t-1 instead of the
number of shares in quarter t-1. The main reason is to keep yijt from being forced to be a missing value when
the number of shares moves from 0 to a positive number. However, notice that as the number of shares increases
from 0 to a positive number yijt will be equal to 2. Hence, part of the information is clearly missing as a change
of an institution's position is treated differently whether it was holding a positive number or 0 at t - 1.
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three dimensions in a three-way, fixed-effect model. In particular, we estimate by ordinary least
squares, for each year T=1980,...,2005 a regression of the form:
Y t = aT + hT + g +#X : +Jt (3.3)
where y T is the absolute value of the change in the holdings of institution i in security j
in quarter t of year T, h7 is the institution fixed effect; g is the time-security interaction
fixed effect and X? controls for the size of the portfolio of investor i as well as the size of
each security in the portfolio of investor i.10 The estimates of hiT in equation (3.3) provide an
annual measure of the investor's trading frequency that does not confound any security or time
effects. The two latter effects are fully absorbed by the term gjt. We allow the measure of the
institution's trading frequency (hT) to change annually in order to capture changes across time
that could be driven by investor characteristics, such as the investment horizon associated with
changes in its corporate governance, its objective, its CEO, the regulation or its preferences.
An investors's intrinsic trading frequency is defined by the fixed effect h[ in regression (3.3).
A larger institution's fixed effect hf is associated with investors who change their positions
more often and hence have a higher idiosyncratic trading frequency. Ultimately, hT provides a
measure comparable to a portfolio turnover rate. However, by exploiting the three dimensions
of the data (institutions, security and quarter), it combines the changes to an institution's
security holdings in one churning rate, which summarizes only the trading behavior that results
from the institution.
3.3.3 Security Specific Trading Frequency
For each 13-F institution, the Thomson Reuters ownership data reports the securities the in-
vestor is holding in his or her portfolio and their respective position in the securities. For each
year T, quarter t and security j held by a group of institutions I, the security j's trading
frequency index at year T and end of quarter t is defined as the weighted average of the fixed
l0 Concretely, the fixed effect measures are computed with respect to the following normalization:
Et ojitgji = Ej J.ithi = 0 where 6jit = 1 if yjit is non missing and 0 otherwise.
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effects of the institutions in Ij:
HitT = ( WijtThiT (3.4)
iEIj
where the weights are Wij tT= MT , and SijtT is the number of shares outstanding of securityEiEjj Siit
j held by institution i at year T quarter t, and hiT is the fixed effect of institution i at year
T. The weight WijtT captures the relative importance of investor i for security j at year T
and quarter t, in terms of the number of shares investor i holds relative to the total number of
shares the group of institutional investors is holding. This implies that the trading frequency of
an investor holding 90% of the shares of a security should have a greater effect than the trading
frequency of an investor holding only 10% of the shares of a security. The security's trading
frequency index will give more weight to the former investor's fixed effect than to that of the
latter.
HjtT maps the institutional investors' trading frequency, hT, to the security. HJtr is in-
terpreted as the average trading frequency of the population of institutional investors holding
the security j at year T. A security j will have a high trading frequency index if, on average,
the institutional investors holding the security are characterized by a short investment horizon,
proxied by a large h. Overall, the institutions are weighted by their relative size with respect
to the institutions holding the security. As a consequence, the variation in H can be traced
back to one of two sources: (i) For a given pool of investors, the investors with a lower value
of the fixed effect are holding a higher share of the security. In other words, the high trading
frequency investors represent a higher share of the security, i.e. higher weight WijtT on the high
h3 T (the high trading frequency investors). (ii) For a given weight, the institutions holding the
security have a higher institution's trading frequency. Both sources of variation, translate into
a security having higher trading frequency investors than another security or having a higher
trading frequency across time."1 Finally, it is important to note that even though the trading
frequency fixed effects at the institution level are orthogonal to any security and market char-
acteristics by construction, there is a correlation between the securities characteristics and the
"The variation of HjtT through time is either the result of : (i) investors selling or buying the security
characterized by a different horizon, (ii) the investors experiencing a change in their characteristics to trade
(which could come from a change in the CEO or a merger), or (iii) both. The variation of HjtT across security
mainly comes from different securities being held by a population of investors characterized by different horizons
at a given moment in time.
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trading frequency index. This dependence arises from the portfolio selection of the investors,
which ultimately defines the weights WijtT.
3.3.4 Cross-Section of Expected Stock Return
In order to analyze the effects of trading frequency on the cross-section of expected stock return,
we first sort all the securities for each time period into 5 or 10 portfolios based on their measure
of trading frequency. For the 5-portfolio case, the portfolios are assembled based on the quintiles
in the following way: the first portfolio is the value-weighted portfolio of the 20 percent of the
stocks with the lowest trading frequency index the previous year, the second portfolio is the
value-weighted portfolio of the 20 percent of the stocks with the next highest trading frequency
index the past year, and so on. For the 10-portfolio case, the quintiles are simply replaced by
deciles. The main exercise will consist of comparing the average excess return along the trading
frequency dimension. Given that the trading frequency fixed effects use all the information for
the whole year in which it was estimated, we consider only the trading frequency measure lagged
by one year. This assures that we are using exclusively past information in our cross-sectional
regression in order to predict the cross section of stock returns. All of the remaining sorting
exercises follow the same precept so that an investor could have reproduced our study in real
time.
Descriptive Statistics
Table I summarizes the descriptive statistics of the main characteristics of the securities in
our sample, which consists of 12,455 securities and 288,760 data points. Table I reports the
means and the standard deviations for the excess return, the size, the book-to-market ratio,
the past performance, the liquidity and the trading frequency index. For each statistic, we also
report a number for two groups of securities, the securities held in the previous year by the
low and high trading frequency investors. Notice from the last line that the trading frequency
index ranges from -0.18 (for the low trading frequency group of securities) to 0.18 (for the high
trading group of securities), while it is close to zero for the full sample, giving a relatively
easy benchmark to understand the magnitude of the trading frequency measure. There is more
variation within the high trading frequency group than low trading frequency group. Looking
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at the column of the mean, one can notice that the high trading frequency securities have
lower excess returns, are substantially more liquid and are larger than the low trading group of
securities. Interestingly, from the momentum line, one can observe that the securities held by
the low trading group of securities also exhibit lower past performance. However, one should
notice the substantial difference in the standard deviation across the two groups of securities
for the liquidity as well as the size, highlighting a difference in the heterogeneity within the
groups in terms of the characteristics of the securities. We will show in the next section that
after we control for heterogeneity in all of these dimensions in several ways, the portfolios still
show the spread in returns stemming from their different trading horizons.
3.4 Results
In this section, we explore the extent to which ownership matters in explaining differences
in expected returns in the cross-section of stock by exploiting the heterogeneity in investors'
trading frequency.
3.4.1 Is there a relation between trading frequency and returns?
Figure I illustrates the empirical relation between the realized return and the trading frequency
index by reporting the average annualized return for the different trading frequency portfolios.
The only difference between Figure I (a) and Figure I (b) is that the number of portfolios formed
increased1 2 from 5 to 10. Independent of the number of portfolios considered, there is a clear
negative relation between the horizon and the realized return. The higher the average trading
frequency of the institutional investors holding the security the previous year, the smaller
the realized return this year. The spread in the realized returns is economically significant:
The low-trading frequency portfolio exhibits an average annualized return of approximately 11
percentage points and the high trading frequency portfolio is exhibiting an average annualized
return of approximately 5.4 percentage points.
Table II shows that the relation exists within sub-groups of different types of securities by
double-sorting portfolios with respect to their size, book-to-market ratios, liquidity and past
2 Our results still hold when forming 25 portfolios, although the statistical inference becomes more challenging
because, especially in the double sorting, some portfolios end up having a small number of firms.
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performance. The double sorting is accomplished as follows: (i) We sort all the securities
into five groups based on their trading frequency. (ii) We independently sort all the securities
into three groups based on each of the dimensions mentioned above. (iii) We construct fifteen
different portfolios for each trading frequency and characteristic combination.
Table II shows that a strategy that consists of buying low and selling high trading frequency
securities generates an annual return close to 5 percentage points. This difference is statistically
significant at the 5% level, as can be noticed from the t-statistic of the last column. The
same pattern is revealed when one looks at stocks divided by any of the other characteristics
considered. The difference is the smallest for the group of small securities, which is mainly
driven by a higher average return for the high trading group of securities. However, in terms of
the statistical significance, the relation remains relatively stable even for the small securities.
The natural next step consists of exploring these spreads and the extent to which it can
be explained by the characteristics or the risk exposures of the portfolios, and not by their
institutional ownership.
3.4.2 Can we explain trading frequency returns by systematic risks?
The first step in exploring the relation highlighted in Figure I is to explore the results controlling
for the Fama-French factors. Figure II reports the mean, annualized excess return of the
different trading frequency portfolios as a function of the mean excess return predicted by the
standard Fama-French model. For each portfolio p, we run the following time-series regression:
-f = a, + (Rm, - rf,t)f3' + SMBt,SMB + HMLt#HML + Et (3.5)
t = 1, ...,I T (3.6)
where R, - rf is the excess return on a broad market portfolio, SMB (small minus big) is
the difference between the return on a portfolio of small and large stocks, and HML (high
minus low) is the difference between the return on portfolios of high and low book-to-market
stocks, and the time variable t refers to quarters. The OLS estimates are &, and #3. Figure II
plots E [Rp,t - Rf = } 1 (R,,t - Rf) in the y-axis and E X ZT Xt#, on the
x-axis. Each portfolio is represented by a triangle as well as a number that denotes the quintile
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of the trading frequency index (increasing from 1 (low trading frequency) to 5 (high trading
frequency)). Figure III summarizes the pricing error (alpha) of the different portfolios as a
function of the trading frequency index. The average trading frequency within each portfolio
ranges from -0.15 for the low trading frequency group to 0.16 for the high trading frequency
group.
Figure II shows a discrepancy between realized and predicted returns. This divergence is
more pronounced for the low trading group of securities. Overall, the portfolio defined by the
low trading group of institutions exhibits a realized return of 12 percentage points, from which
approximately 9 percentage points have been accounted for by the model. Figure II suggests
that the ownership matters, and it matters specifically for the low trading frequency group
of securities. Figure III shows that the pricing error is a linear and monotonically decreasing
function of the trading frequency index. As such, the higher the trading frequency of the
institutional investors holding a security, the smaller the underlying alphas.
A more econometrically precise picture of Figures II and III is given in Table III. This table
reports the characteristics of trading frequency portfolios from the lowest trading frequently
portfolio to highest trading frequency portfolio divided into five value-weighted portfolios. The
table reports the Fama-French factor sensitivities, i.e. the slope coefficients in the Fama-French,
three-factor-model time-series regressions as well as the alphas and the R 2 (from the left to the
right). From Table III, one can notice that overall it seems that apart from the low trading
group of securities, the model seems to do a fair job from the R 2 point of view. However, the
market risk does not help explain the difference in the return, as the coefficients of the different
portfolios are roughly constant. The risk-adjusted return from the first column (alpha) shows
that the portfolio that shorts the high trading frequency securities and buys the low trading
frequency securities earns approximately 4 percentage points on an annual basis. The bottom
line from Table III is that there is a substantial risk-adjusted average return from the trading
frequency strategy that can be implemented.
Given the particular nature of our portfolios, there are two other dimensions of portfolios
highlighted in the literature that could account for our results: liquidity and momentum. More
liquid securities are naturally associated with a higher trading frequency index. This high
correlation is expected as investors trading more frequently might select a more liquid security.
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Conversely, investors trading more frequently might increase the liquidity of the securities they
invest in by the activities they engage in. For these two reasons, it is necessary to control for the
liquidity of these portfolio to make sure that the results are not completely driven by liquidity
risk. Likewise, for the momentum, one could expect that high-trading frequency securities might
be more correlated to the momentum factor as high trading frequency investors could potentially
care more about the short-term price movements and engage in momentum strategies. Figures
IV and V illustrate the results after accounting for the two factors. Specifically, for each
portfolio, we estimate:
R,, - rf = a, + (Rm,t - r5,t)o" + SMBt3sMB + HMLtOML (37)
+MOMt#,40o + LIQ#,3IQ + et, t = 1,...,T, (3.8)
where in addition to the variables from (3.5), we have added the liquidity factors based on
Sadka (2006) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and the momentum factor. Interestingly, from
Figure V one can notice that the introduction of the new factors actually increases the pricing
errors. As such, the spread highlighted in Figure II is not confounding these two characteristics.
As in Figure III, Figure V shows that the pricing error (alpha) decreases monotonically with
the trading frequency.
Table IV summarizes the results for all the cases considered. It reports the statistical
significance of the figures just discussed. It compares the estimates of the pricing error, &, for
the regressions (3.5) and (3.8) as well as the simple CAPM model and a model controlling for
the long run and short run reversal. The t-statistic is computed using a Newey-West estimator
with 3 lags, which is robust to correlation of the error terms across portfolios, within portfolios
and across time. Furthermore, we report in the column labeled GRS, the "GRS test statistic"
for the hypothesis that all &, are jointly zero. It is simply an F-test adjusted for finite samples
and is F-distributed, F[M, T - M - 1], with M and T-M-1 degrees of freedom, where M is
the number of factors in Xt. From Table IV, even though the alpha of each portfolio is not
statistically significant on its own, the null hypothesis that all the & are jointly zero is rejected.
Our results show that an investor can earn on average 3.3 percent per year without being
exposed to any source of the common systematic risks considered here.
127
3.4.3 Can we explain trading frequency returns by a trading frequency in-
dex?
So far, we have highlighted a relationship between trading frequency and stock returns. We
showed that the relationship cannot be accounted for by the usual factors or variables used
in the literature. Can this difference be explained by a trading frequency "factor"? In the
previous section, Figures III and IV suggest a linear and monotone negative relation between
the trading frequency index and the pricing error. In other words, the higher the trading
frequency index, the closer the return from its fundamentals or from the return predicted by a
standard cross-sectional model.
In order to explore this further, we build a trading frequency factor as the difference between
the return of the portfolio of the bottom 20% trading frequency group of securities and the top
20% trading frequency group of securities. We then try to explain the extent to which adding
this extra factor helps us account for the pricing error. A first answer to this exercise is
summarized in Figure VI and VII. Figure VI illustrates the relation between the realized excess
return and the predicted return and Figure VII illustrates the relationship between the pricing
error and the predicted return after controlling for the trading frequency factor. In particular,
for each portfolio, we estimate:
- = ap + (Rm,t - rf,t) '+ SMBtSMB + HMLt/pHML (3.9)
+MOMtpoMOM + LIQ-/3o ' + TFt3TF 4 et, t = 1,---,T- (3.10)
where in addition to the variables from (3.8), we have added the trading frequency factor TF
as defined above. Figure VI shows that the realized return aligns more naturally with the 45
degree line. The difference between the realized and the predicted excess return is by and large
accounted for by the inclusion of the trading factor. This is also reported in Figure VII, which
shows that the new pricing errors from a model that internalizes the trading frequency factor
are smaller and do not have a systematic correlation with the trading frequency measure. Table
V shows the related statistical information. On one hand, even though the W's are smaller and
they do not exhibit a specific relation with the trading frequency, one can still reject the null
of all W's being jointly zero. On the other hand, from an economic point of view, the return
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an investor will make exploiting the trading frequency difference is now substantially smaller
after accounting for the trading frequency return. Hence, adding the trading frequency factor,
even though it adds new information, provides a mixed response to the spread in returns of the
different trading frequency portfolios.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that stock returns are predicted by the intrinsic frequency of trading
of its institutional holders. Moving from the first to the last quintile in the distribution of the
security-specific trading frequency is associated with an expected gain in returns of 6 percentage
points over the next year. The magnitude and predictability of these returns persist or even
increase when risk-adjusted by measures of systematic risks such as the Fama-French factors.
The result that stock returns depend on who holds them is at odds with two standard
views in finance. The first is that a stock's price is frictionlessly determined by the discounted
sum of its dividends. If two institutional investors are not large enough to directly affect the
aggregate discount factor and do not have a controlling stake in the firms in which they invest,
then the fact that one of them owns the stock -and not the other- should make no difference
in the stock's return. The second standard view that is challenged by our results is that of
the representative agent whose stochastic discount factor prices any given cash flow. In such
an economy, the identity and heterogeneous characteristics of stockowners should provide no
information about the cross-section of stock returns.
Another way to state our findings is to interpret them as a "pricing anomaly" in the sense
that neither aggregate risk factors nor firm-specific characteristics can explain the spread in
returns between stocks held by high and low-frequency traders. An explanation of our results
will most likely be found by analyzing the "demand side" instead of the "supply side" of the
market, i.e. how traders who demand stocks behave, instead of how firms who supply stocks
behave.
Herein lies a limitation of our study: even though the relationship between trading horizon
and stock returns is empirically strong and pervasive among different subgroups of stocks, there
is no theoretical explanation for why this is the case. The apparent breakdown of the relation
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between stock prices and their corresponding discounted sum of dividends and the emphasis on
traders' heterogeneity suggests that behavioral explanations in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001), could provide potential explanations
of our results. At a minimum, explanations will most likely deviate from complete market,
representative agent, frictionless economies.
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Table I
Descriptive statistics
The table shows the annualized mean and standard deviation of excess returns R - Rf, market capital-
ization (Size), Book-to-Market ratio (B/M), volume per number of shares outstanding (Liquidity), last
quarter's excess returns (Momentum) and Trading Frequency. Excess returns are from CRSP. Market
capitalization is measured as price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding reported in CRSP.
The trading frequency of a security is constructed following Parsa (2010). The first column shows the
statistics for the full sample of securities, while the last two columns show the statistics for stocks in
the lowest and highest quintile of the trading frequency distribution, respectively.
Full sample Low trading frequency High trading frequency
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
R - Rf 0.0310 0.278 0.0348 0.253 0.0212 0.311
Size 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 0.754 2.96
B/M 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723
Liquidity 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 5.21 5.21
Momentum 0.0305 0.304 0.0381 0.294 0.0286 0.310
Trading -0.0176 0.137 -0.177 0.0646 0.171 0.130
Frequency
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Table II
Mean Returns and t-Statistics of Sorted Portfolios
The table shows annualized mean excess returns and the corresponding t-statistics of value-weighted portfolios formed
by sorting on the characteristics defined in Table I. The first row is a single sort on quintiles of trading frequency
for each quarter t. The next rows perform a double sort by independently placing each stock into one of five trading
frequency quintiles and one of three size, book-to-market, liquidity or momentum groups. Portfolios are formed by
grouping stocks that belong to the interesction of two groups. The reported mean returns are the time-series averages
of the annualized returns of each portfolio. The column High-Low constructs a zero-investment portfolio by buying
the portfolio in the High trading frequency group and shorting the portfolio in the Low frequency group.
Trading Frequency
Single-sort
Size
Small
Medium
Big
Book-to-Market
High Growth
Medium
High value
Liquidity
More illiquid
Medium
More liquid
Low
0.129
[3.37]
High
0.112
[2.89]
0.108
[2.62]
0.0939
[2.03]
0.0789
[1.53]
High-Low
0.0505
[2.18]
0.143 0.132 0.139 0.105 0.107 -0.0366
[3.41] [2.75] [2.69] [1.95] [1.98] [-1.60]
0.114 0.108 0.101 0.0923 0.0638 -0.0505
[3.23] [2.75] [2.30] [1.89] [1.21] [-1.94]
0.111 0.105 0.0878 0.0789 0.0528 -0.0583
[3.41] [3.21] [2.52] [1.85] [1.07] [-1.62]
0.0843 0.0821 0.0342 0.00407 -0.0454 -0.130
[2.25] [2.15] [1.12] [0.0021 [-0.392] [-3.42]
0.0102 0.0244 0.00783 -0.00807 -0.0181 -0.0283
[1.03] [1.35] [0.00532] [-0.0031] [-0.47] [0.0001]
0.148 0.132 0.137 0.0639 0.0353 -0.113
[9.78] [5.13] [3.35] [2.68] [1.35] [2.53]
0.0163 0.0133 0.00959 0.00648 0.00597 -0.0104
[1.95] [1.54] [1.13] [0.70] [0.633] [-2.90]
0.0398 0.0225 0.0216 0.021 0.0135 -0.0263
[3.53] [2.3] [2.23] [2.00] [1.17] [-5.98]
0.125 0.0838 0.0618 0.0449 0.0406 -0.084
[6.78] [5.31] [3.95] [2.78] [2.25] [-6.74]
Momentum
High past returns
Medium
Low past returns
0.169
[2.29]
0.105
[0.994]
0.0119
[0.0829]
0.121
[1.93]
0.077
[1.55]
0.236
[4.23]
0.118
[1.36]
0.0179
[0.151]
0.0972
[1.84]
0.11
[1.22]
0.101
[0.952]
0.0342
[0.357]
-0.0928
[-1.19]
0.0407
[0.379]
0.0547
[1.03]
-0.262
[-2.87]
-0.0642
[-0.363]
0.0428
[1.02]
Table III
Time-Series Regressions of Returns of Trading
Frequency Portfolios on Fama-French Factors
The table shows estimates of the intercept, coefficients and R 2 of time series regressions of excess
returns on the Fama-French factors. Each row corresponds to one of the portfolios constructed by
sorting on trading frequency as explained in Table II. t-statistics are reported in brackets.
oMKT SMB HML R2
Trading Frequency
Low -0.0131 1.10 -0.312 0.488 0.926[-0.86] [20.9] [-4.72] [6.40]
2 -0.0005 1.12 -0.113 0.24 0.965
[0.0516] [35.8] [-2.89] [5.30]
3 0.0156 1.01 -0.0226 -0.0587 0.944
[1.66] [30.8] [-0.554] [-1.25]
0.0195 1.01 0.181 -0.103 0.918
[1.83] [27.6] [3.92] [-1.94]
High 0.0261 0.923 0.302 0.0758 0.796[1.59] [16.3] [4.24] [0.921]
High-Low 0.0392 -0.007 0.0246 -0.0165 0.513[1.51] [-1.96] [5.44] [-3.17]
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Table IV
Pricing Errors of Different Models
When Pricing Frequency-Sorted Portfolios
The table shows the performance of different factors when pricing 5, 10 and 25 portfolios constructed
by sorting on stock's trading frequency as described in Table II. As factors, we consider the market
excess return (CAPM), the Fama-French factors (FF), Jegadeesh and Titman's momentum (UMD),
long-term return reversal (Rev) and liquidity factors of Sadka and Pastor/Stambaugh (Liq). All
the reported statistics are obtained from regressions of the excess return of the 5, 10 or 25 trading
frequency portfolios on the different pricing factors. Mean |a| is the average across regressions
of the absolute value of the estimate of the intercept in annualized percentage points. GRS is
the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken test-statistic (an F-statistic adjusted for finite sample bias) of the null
hyphothesis that the & for all portfolios are jointly zero, for which we also report its p-value. The
Mean R 2 is the average value of the R 2 across regressions.
FF FF+UMD+Liq
0.015
15.5
0.00
0.910
0.0161
11.4
0.00
0.831
0.0215
25.9
0.00
0.685
0.0221
14.2
0.00
0.910
0.0215
8.38
0.00
0.877
0.0278
37.5
0.00
0.812
FF+UMD+Rev+Liq
0.0327
12.1
0.00
0.914
0.0310
8.1988
0.00
0.837
0.0339
30.1
0.00
0.707
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5 portfolios
Mean I &I
GRS
p-value
Mean R2
10 portfolios
Mean I &I
GRS
p-value
Mean R 2
25 portfolios
Mean |6-1
GRS
p-value
Mean R2
CAPM
0.0324
15.9
0.00
0.885
0.0307
12.3
0.00
0.808
0.0342
25
0.00
0.635
Table V
Time-Series Regressions of Returns of Trading Frequency Portfolios
on Fama-French and a Trading Frequency Factor
The table shows estimates of the intercept, coefficients and R 2 of time series regressions of excess returns on the
Fama-French factors and a the High-Low portfolio. Each row corresponds to one of the five portfolios constructed
by sorting on trading frequency as explained in table II. t-statistics are reported in brackets.
FREQ MKT gSMB pHML R2
Trading Frequency
Low 0.0054 47.2 1.02 -0.0220 0.294 0.974
[0.591] [13.2] [31.8] [-0.488] [6.14]
2 0.0043 9.91 1.06 -0.0525 0.199 0.968
[0.494] [2.88] [35.8] [-1.21] [4.34]
3 0.0131 -6.51 1.01 -0.0626 -0.0319 0.945
[1.39] [-1.77] [30.9] [-1.35] [-0.651]
0.0092 -26.3 1.10 0.0194 0.0053 0.952
[1.11] [-8.13] [36.7] [0.475] [0.122]
High 0.0054 -52.8 1.01 -0.0220 0.294 0.938[0.591] [-14.7] [31.8] [-0.488] [6.14]
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